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This dissertation is a study in ethnicity and transnational networks with the 
primary focus on the Chinese in Indochina, including Cochinchina, Cambodia, and 
Tonkin, which were under French colonial rule.  It is the product of research 
undertaken at Hanoi’s Vietnamese National Archives #1, the Vietnamese National 
Library in Hanoi, Saigon’s Vietnamese National Archives #2, the Centre des Archives 
d’Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence, London’s Public Record Office, and the Australian 
National Library and National Archives in Canberra.  Access to these archives has 
allowed me to place overseas Chinese networks within the contexts of both Chinese 
and Southeast Asian history.  As a result, this work has theoretical implications for 
transnational studies of borders inside and outside of Asia.   
This dissertation is the first transregional study of institutions organized by the 
overseas Chinese population of Indochina during the French period. These Chinese 
formed their original organizations in China, and then reached across the China-
Indochina border, expanding across Indochina.  In China, native-place ties inherited 
from their fathers bound them together, and after they reached Indochina, they 
established bases, most often in Saigon-Cholon, and then expanded into other cities 
and towns where their networks competed for commercial gain and political influence.  
Narratives of the lives, crimes, and political and economic ventures of scores of 
overseas Chinese living and working in Cochinchina, Tonkin, and Cambodia provide 
the backbone for my arguments. At the time, all of these places were under French 
colonial rule, and Chinese networks negotiated the pathways and pitfalls of French  
colonial law to achieve their own agendas and maintain multidirectional ties, not only 
with all of their branches in Indochina but with their native places in China as well. By 
concentrating on the points where Chinese, Vietnamese, and French interests 
intersected, I show how they cooperated and came into conflict with each other.   
Ultimately, I conclude that even while the French held official authority in the 
colonies of Indochina, Chinese transnational networks exercised unofficial control 
over decision-making, not only in commerce but also in the wider arenas of politics, 
law, and society as they pertained to local Chinese communities. 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
One issue that severely impacted the ability of French authorities to exercise 
control over Indochina’s Chinese community also challenges the modern day 
researcher attempting to investigate those same communities and make concrete 
connections between its members: the problem of Chinese names.  Every Chinese 
name had a Vietnamese pronunciation due to the fact that the Vietnamese shared parts 
of China’s linguistic heritage.  Originally, Chinese characters comprised the language 
of Vietnam’s educated elite, the mandarinate.  These characters were known as Han. 
Over time, a Vietnamization of these characters occurred, resulting a written language 
composed of Chinese style characters with very different meanings, pronunciations, or 
even composition from any purely Chinese counterparts.  This language was called 
nom.  By the early 20
th century in Vietnam, most texts were written in a combination 
of  Han and nom characters, but by the time of the French, efforts at linguistic 
modernization intended to increase literacy rates across Indochina resulted in the 
promotion of quốc ngữ, the romanized version of Vietnamese characters still used 
today.   
Because all Chinese characters had a Vietnamese pronunciation, all Chinese 
names also had Vietnamese pronunciations, and by the 20
th century, many, if not most, 
overseas Chinese went by the quốc ngữ pronunciations of their names while they were 
in Indochina.  The problem rests in the fact that one Vietnamese transliteration of a 
specific Chinese character might actually be a homonym of dozens, or even scores, of 
other Chinese characters.  For this reason, and because the generally colonial nature of 
my archival documents favors the use of quốc ngữ, I have generally not provided 
names in Chinese characters.  In fact, many Chinese businessmen and notables in 
Indochina even used quốc ngữ when signing their names on petitions sent to the 
French that were written entirely in Chinese!  
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese of Southeast Asia are a population of great historic and economic 
significance in the region.  Chinese across Southeast Asia organized themselves into 
communities based upon dialect and native place.  These organizations, called 
huiguan, closely paralleled the functions and demography of similar associations 
located in China’s major urban centers, and they attempted to replicate, with varying 
degrees of fidelity, the social, religious, and networking environments of the native 
places from which they hailed.  Furthermore, by providing material aid and financial 
connections that extended from China into major urban centers across the region, and 
from Southeast Asia’s urban capitals into the rural hinterlands beyond, overseas 
Chinese communities did exist within a framework of carefully defined and measured 
relationships that was essential to the functioning of Chinese trade and commerce in 
the region. 
Chinese communities in Indochina differed even more significantly from the 
Chinese model than many of their counterparts in other Southeast Asian countries.  
With first seven and later five linguistically based groups, Indochina’s Chinese 
communities exhibited a far smaller degree of intercommunity segmentation than did 
the Chinese populations in Singapore, for example, where Chinese groups by the 
hundreds allowed intra-community division to a remarkable degree.  This 
homogenization was in large part due to the combined effects of regulating legislation 
imposed upon them from the outside, first by the Nguyen regime and later by the 
French colonialists.  The wealth of recent scholarship focusing upon urban 
organizations in modern China gives us unprecedented access into the structure, 
function, and evolution of Chinese societies, organizations, and associations in the 
great cities of the Chinese Empire and, later, Republic.  With this dissertation, I hope 
to have created a synthetic study emphasizing the importance of Chinese  
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congregations, or huiguan, in Indochina, their ties to one another and to the native 
places from whence they came, and the ways in which the French colonial authority 
both nurtured and undermined these ties.   
How did different elements of overseas Chinese society interact with one 
another?  Established overseas Chinese communities and enclaves long predated the 
French occupation of Indochina, meaning that well before the arrival of the French, 
competition and conflict between subethnic groups had already generated ferocious 
rivalries and devoted partnerships.  This phenomenon was most marked in the case of 
Cochinchina’s secret societies, where, for example, rivalry between the Trieu Chau 
and Phuoc Kien Chinese in the Mekong Delta was so intense that French police and 
local authorities spent months trying to stem the wave of violence that the open 
conflict between the two dialect groups had spawned.  The ensuing period of 
adjustment, where Chinese communities and French colonialists tested the boundaries 
of a relationship altered by an ever-expanding colonialism, represented a time of great 
significance for both populations, but especially for the overseas Chinese, whose 
growing awareness of national interests spawned a new kind of self-identification.  By 
the late imperial and early republican periods, Chinese nationalism and anti-foreign 
sentiment reached such a crescendo that nationalist activities in Saigon and Cholon 
were often either sponsored by the united congregations of the cities, or led by the 
Guomindang Committee for Indochina, a group that boasted a leadership comprised of 
notable Chinese from across the congregational spectrum. Accordingly, this story is 
set in a time when all of these places were under French colonial rule, and Chinese 
networks negotiated the pathways and pitfalls of French colonial law to achieve their 
own agendas and maintain multidirectional ties, not only with all of their branches in 
Indochina but with their native places in China as well.  
3 
This study is the product of research undertaken at Hanoi’s Vietnamese 
National Archives #1, the Vietnamese National Library in Hanoi, Hanoi’s Social 
Science Library, Ho Chi Minh City’s Vietnamese National Archives #2, Ho Chi Minh 
City’s Tông Hơp Library, the Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence, 
London’s Public Record Office, and the Australian National Library and National 
Archives in Canberra.  Access to Chinese-, Vietnamese-, and French-language 
documents in these various archives has allowed me to place overseas Chinese 
networks within the contexts of both Chinese and Southeast Asian history, a 
circumstance that I hope will contribute significantly, not only to our understanding of 
Chinese organizations in general and Chinese communities in Indochina under French 
rule, but also to our awareness and appreciation of the importance of competing 
colonialisms, transnational ties, and border studies outside of, as well as within, Asia.  
The place filled by this dissertation in the historiography of China and the overseas 
Chinese is a more complex question.  To understand the position of this research in the 
larger field of Asian history, we must first turn to the topic of Jurgen Habermas’ 
public sphere. 
Public Sphere and Civil Society 
In the post-World War II era, scholars of state and society have repeatedly 
confronted the issue of public sphere as German social theorist Jurgen Habermas has 
conceived it.  As Habermas writes, public sphere is “a domain of our social life in 
which such a thing as public opinion can be formed.  Access to the public sphere is 
open in principle to all citizens … Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters 
of general interest without being subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they 
may assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their opinions freely … The 
term ‘public opinion’ refers to the functions of criticism and control of organized state  
4 
authority that the public exerts.”
1  In other words, Habermas’s “public sphere” deals 
fundamentally with our modern notions of democracy and participatory government.   
For Habermas, public sphere is not the inevitable result of history’s natural 
evolution; rather, it is the by-product not only of a specific time and place, Western 
Europe in the 17
th and 18
th centuries, but also of a specific class of citizens, the 
bourgeoisie.  Habermas writes, “under conditions of complete mobility of producers, 
products, and capital, supply and demand would always be in equilibrium … under 
these conditions, but only under these, would each person have an equal chance … to 
attain the status of property owner and thus of ‘man,’ that is, the qualifications of a 
private person admitted to the public sphere – property and education.”
2  I n  t h i s  
context, issues of public sphere seem singularly unsuited to Chinese history, whether 
Imperial or Republican. And yet, as William Rowe has summarized in his 
comprehensive historiographical article on the subject, public sphere is the very topic 
to which historians of Chinese State-Society relations have turned.  From Chang Hao’s 
study of Liang Qichao’s attempts at mass politicization to Rowe’s own books on 
Hankou, scholars such as Mary Backus Rankin, David Strand, Keith Schoppa, Joseph 
Fewsmith, Philip Kuhn, Prasenjit Duara, and Kwan Mun Bun have all made the issue 
of the public sphere, or of its Chinese vocabulary, a centerpiece in the historiography 
of modern China.
3  In fact, as will be elaborated upon later in this introduction, the 
                                                 
1 Jurgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere,” in Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives 
in Cultural Studies ed. Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson, (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1991), 398-9. 
2 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society tr. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 86-7. 
3 See Chang Hao, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971); Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the state: North china Villages, 1900-
1942 (Stanford, CA: Stanford university Press, 1988); Joseph Fewsmith, “From Guild to Interest 
Group: The Transformation of Public and Private in Late Qing China,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 25, no. 4 (Oct 1983); Philip Kuhn and Susan Mann Jones, “Introduction,” in Select Papers 
from the Center for Far Eastern Studies 3 (University of Chicago) (1978-9); Kwan Man Bun, The Salt  
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issue of the public sphere in China is quite contentious, as evidenced by Frederic 
Wakeman’s blistering rejection of its applicability to the Chinese case.
4 
In the Introduction to his edited volume, A History of Private Life,
5 Philippe 
Ariès has suggested that, in Europe, the public sphere grew most rapidly when the 
state’s bureaucracy proved least able to back up its claims of control, or, in the words 
of William Rowe, this growth “took place in precisely that early modern interval when 
the state’s jurisdictional claims were expanding at a far greater pace than its 
institutional abilities to realize these claims.”
6  While Rowe goes on to say that recent 
scholarship on China makes Ariès’ model more applicable to late Imperial and 
Republican China, I would like to suggest that this model also raises interesting 
questions when applied to the world of Indochina’s overseas Chinese.  But before this 
dissertation goes any further in addressing this issue of public sphere, some 
clarification is in order.  “Public Sphere” as it described by Habermas is a clearly 
defined intellectual category, implying the rise of common space, public gatherings, 
and the freedom of speech provided therein; however, the strict geographical, 
temporal, and demographic bounds placed upon the public sphere by Habermas make 
its direct applicability to any Chinese case a bit far-reaching.  More useful, perhaps, 
                                                                                                                                           
Merchants of Tianjin: State Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’I Press, 2001); Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in china: 
Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); William Rowe, 
Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1984) and Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1989); Keith R. Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Political; Change: Zhejiang Province in 
the Early 20
th Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); and David  Strand, Rickshaw 
Beijing: City, People, and Politics in 1920’s China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
4 For a fierce post-Tiananmen rebuttal to the existence of a Chinese public sphere, see Frederic 
Wakeman, “The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political 
Culture” Modern China 19, no. 2 (April 1993). 
5 Philippe Ariès, “Introduction,” in A History of Private Life: Volume III, Passions of the Renaissance 
ed. Roger Chartier and tr. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 9-
11. 
6 William Rowe, “The Public Sphere in Modern China,” Modern China 16, no 3 (July 1990), 323.  
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would be an examination of public sphere from a structural perspective, the very 
scenario that Ariès has described.  To that end, this dissertation removes the definition 
of public sphere from its original context, altering the meaning in order to describe the 
space between the overt autocratic dominance claimed by Indochina’s French colonial 
authorities, whether practically or through colonial legislation, and the extent of this 
authority’s impact upon Indochina’s overseas Chinese.   
Local Elite Autonomy and the Public Sphere in China 
In order to better situate these questions in a Chinese context, a more careful 
examination of the public sphere debate as it pertains specifically to China is required.  
In fact, the roots of this debate can be found much earlier, in the works of German 
sociologist Max Weber.
7  Weber, in an exhaustive examination of the secondary 
sources available on China at the time, determined that China’s material inferiority to 
the West in modern times stemmed directly from her failure to develop a “rational” 
organization or system of behavior, an inadequacy he attributed to China’s lack of an 
“urban community.”  According to Weber, an urban community was characterized by, 
among other things, equality under a rational legal system, general enfranchisement 
and bureaucratic accountability, and a heavy emphasis on trade and commerce, which 
formed the basis of a sort of proto-capitalism. 
China’s failings were, according to Weber, made worse by the presence of a 
powerful, autocratic government whose control of commercial operations and natural 
passages of trade (for example, rivers) determined the development of the economic 
sector rather than the increasing autonomy of any urban commercial community.   
More damningly, Weber asserted that the Chinese emphasis on native-place and 
                                                 
7 In particular, Max Weber, The City,tr. & ed. Don Martindale and Gurtrud Neuwirth (New York: 
Collier Books, 1958) and Max Weber, The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism, tr. Hans 
Gerth (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951).  
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kinship effectively precluded the development of any urban community or urban 
autonomy.  Weber noted, “The ‘city’ was … never the ‘hometown’ but typically a 
place away from home for the majority of its inhabitants.”
8  Thus, the sojourning 
nature of urban-dwelling Chinese, and their strong ties with their native-place 
communities, prevented them from developing an shared urban culture of their own 
that transcended particularistic ties.  In other words, these particularistic groups 
impeded “the fusion of urban dwellers into a homogenous status group.”
9   
These are the very notions addressed by William Rowe in his book, Hankow: 
Commerce and Society in a Chinese City; however, Rowe takes rather a different view 
of the Chinese situation.  In fact, he disagrees fundamentally with Weber on several 
points.  First, Rowe maintains that Weber’s scenario ignores the possibility of the 
existence of different cities across China geared to different functions, for example, 
one to imperial administration and another to commerce and trade.  This oversight, 
according to Rowe, stems largely from the fact that Weber provides only for two types 
of settlements, cities and villages, and allows for no urban degrees in between.
10  As 
proof of the magnitude of this oversight, Rowe proffers G. William Skinner’s “central-
place” theory, which posits that the increasing differentiation of China’s urban 
structures occurred alongside the gradual commercialization of the Chinese world.
11  
More significant, according to Rowe, was Skinner’s suggestion that different cities 
with different purposes also occupied different places in China’s administrative and 
                                                 
8 Weber, The Religions, 90. 
9 Weber, The City, 97. 
10 Rowe, Commerce and Society, 7. 
11 A more detailed explanation of Skinner’s theory can be found his article, G. William Skinner, 
“Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Parts I, II, and III,” The Journal of Asian Studies 24, 
no 1 (Nov 1964); 24, no 2 (Feb 1965); 24, no 3 (May 1965). Although modern urban scholarship has 
gone a long way towards significantly discrediting the rigidity of Skinner’s proposed urban hierarchy, 
his notion that cities of different sizes performed different economic and commercial functions has been 
largely unassailed.  
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commercial hierarchies. In other words, Rowe claims that Skinner’s notion allows for 
a more nuanced comparison of Chinese cities of roughly equivalent size.  Rowe 
explains, “Thus, an urban center whose position in the administrative hierarchy was 
disproportionately higher than its position in the marketing hierarchy would be likely 
to have a very different social structure from one in which the relative hierarchical 
rankings were reversed.”
12 
By using the Chinese city Hankou as his model, Rowe strives to show how 
Hankou not only deviates from Weber’s autocratic model, but to emphasize how, in 
this atypical Chinese city, imperial administrators actively supported the 
modernization of Hankou’s commercial interests and operations across a broad range 
of commercial ventures.
13  In fact, in the second volume of his remarkable urban 
study, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, Rowe goes so far as to 
suggest that this fledgling “modernity” exhibited in Hankou constituted a form of 
“public sphere,” along the lines of Habermas’s European ideal.  
Rowe’s powerful and persuasive foray into Chinese history’s civil society 
debate charted a new path for other scholars of Chinese local rural and urban elite; 
however, it did not go unopposed.  In particular, the noted Chinese historian Frederic 
Wakeman took issue with a number of Rowe’s assertions, a disagreement ranging 
from the theoretical applicability of Habermas’s public sphere in the Chinese case to 
whether or not Hankow even constituted a city in the first place.  According to 
Wakeman, Rowe’s assertions about the existence in Hankow of a “broader urban 
community” with which merchant guilds “increasingly sought to identify their [own] 
interests”
14 bears no validity because the merchant guilds in question were not 
themselves natives of Hankou.  Urban community, Wakeman suggests, is impossible 
                                                 
12 Rowe, Commerce and Society, 9. 
13 Rowe, Commerce and Society, 10. 
14 Rowe, Commerce and Society, 10.  
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when the community in question is comprised of sojourners who were not only alien 
to the city, but who maintained other residences in their native places during the 
commercial off-season.
15   In fact, whether unconsciously or deliberately, Wakeman’s 
response to this phenomenon echoes the stand originally taken by Max Weber when 
he claimed that particularistic groups impeded “the fusion of urban dwellers into a 
homogenous status group.”
16   
In the context of urban Chinese history, this dissertation pertains directly to the 
enduring questions of the public sphere and civil society debates that have been raised 
by these prominent scholars of China.  Is Max Weber right about Chinese differing 
from Westerners in their failure to achieve institutional autonomy from the state?  Is 
he correct when he attributes that failure to the unsuccessful modernization of the 
commercial practices of Chinese merchants and their unwillingness to relinquish 
kinship or other particularistic ties as a prerequisite for mercantile relationships?  Is 
William Rowe correct in tackling the shortcomings of Weber’s paradigm so directly?  
Did the Chinese guilds of Hankou achieve institutional autonomy from the state, as 
Rowe has suggested, or is Frederic Wakeman justified in his skepticism?  Did Rowe’s 
evidence fail to show that Chinese guilds or any other non-state institutions attained 
autonomy from the state in Hankou?  As Wakeman has suggested, should we 
completely set aside Habermas’ notion of public sphere as a concept for understanding 
Chinese history? 
Historians and social scientists specializing in China have debated these issues 
widely, and a rich body of historiography addresses all of these questions in various 
forms; however, to the best of my knowledge, historians of Asia have yet to raise these 
questions with respect to Chinese communities outside o f  C h i n a .   H a v e  o v e r s e a s  
                                                 
15 Wakeman, “The Civil Society,” 117-8. 
16 Weber, The City, 97.  
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Chinese communities devised non-state institutions that have gone beyond the 
particularism of family and native place associations?  If so, have these institutions 
achieved autonomy from the state in countries outside of China?  Have these 
institutions created a public sphere?  Each of the 9 chapters of this dissertation 
attempts to address these questions by examining the scope and functions of the 
Chinese congregations, or huiguan, operating in three regions of French Indochina 
during the colonial period, or, more precisely, between 1870 and 1945.  In so doing, 
this dissertation hopes to shed some light on the degree of autonomy accessible not 
only to urban overseas Chinese elite, but also to Indochina’s overseas Chinese 
communities at large.   
When traditional imperial authority vanished in Indochina, to be replaced by 
the autocratic colonial power of the French, what happened to the Chinese?  To what 
degree were Indochina’s overseas Chinese able to attain autonomy from the 
dominance of the French colonial state?  Did overseas Chinese institutions manage to 
adapt the French institutional form of the congregation to meet the needs of their own 
communities, even if those needs went against the wishes of the French?  Did they 
achieve some degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the French colonial government, and if so, 
did this autonomy represent a type – or even a proto-type – of public sphere? In the 
final analysis, were Indochina’s overseas Chinese able to create a public sphere?    
11 
CHAPTER 1:  CHINESE CONGREGATIONS, FRENCH COLONIAL 
AUTHORITIES, AND THE INDOCHINESE MILIEU 
Even supposing that France gains nothing, we will have at least been 
the laborers in a providential effort on this globe if we have brought 
back life, agriculture and man into regions given up to banditry and 
sterility, if we have made these rivers the conduits of transport . . . if we 
have exploited these forests and revived these fertile but uncultivated 
valleys.
17 
       H u b e r t   L y a u t e y  
The key to understanding Chinese politics and society in French colonial 
Indochina lies in the institution of the congregation.  This institution attained its final 
official form throughout Indochina on October 5, 1871, when French authorities 
passed a law requiring every Chinese to belong to a congregation, and it continued to 
be the focus of interactions between the French and the Chinese for the next three-
quarters of a century – until 1954 when French colonial rule in Indochina came to an 
end.  During this period, Chinese made many uses of congregations, and their 
appropriations and reinterpretations of congregations are the subject of the following 
chapters of this dissertation.  But before considering how Chinese used the 
congregation system to their own advantage, it is important to understand why the 
French adopted the congregation system in the first place and how they relied upon 
congregations to extend their rule throughout Indochina. 
                                                 
17 General Hubert Lyautey, as quoted in Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas 
Expansion (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 138.  Most famous for his long years of service in and 
love of Africa, including an appointment as the first resident General of Morocco, Lyautey also served 
as an officer and an administrator in Tonkin from 1894-1897, where he led troops along the Chinese 
border to suppress the Black Flag rebellions and later served as head of the Government General’s 
military office in Indochina. Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 134-138.  
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French Decision to Adopt Congregations 
The relationship between Indochina’s overseas Chinese community and the 
French had its own watershed moments, most often marked by legislation enacted by 
French authorities with the intention of solidifying their control over resident Chinese.  
The legislative interference of the French vis-à-vis the membership, scale, and 
responsibilities of local Indochinese associations and organizations informed the scope 
and function of these institutions to a considerable degree, causing the congregations 
of Indochina to differ from typical overseas Chinese huiguan in one significant 
respect:  French law mandated their existence, their organizational and leadership 
structures, and their official roles within the colonial society.  
The French began promulgating laws concerning the Chinese in Cochinchina 
within months of their assumption of power in the provinces surrounding Saigon and 
Cholon.  On April 14, 1863, the Annamite emperor Tu Đuc attempted to preserve the 
sovereignty of Annam by placating the French, ceding to France the provinces of 
Bien-hoa, Gia-đinh, and Mytho, as well as the Poulo Condore islands. Four months 
after they became custodians of the three provinces, on August 11, 1863, the French 
administration passed the first colonial law ever to concern Chinese congregations in 
the newly acquired territory, and three more laws joined this law on the books over the 
next two years.
18  Although the French had taken possession of three provinces of 
Cochinchina, another three provinces along the southern coast and the Cambodian 
border remained nominally in Annamite hands; however, this territory, comprised of 
the provinces of Vinh-long, Chau-Đoc, and Ha-tien, had been completely cut off from 
                                                 
18 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations in French Indochina, tr. Claude Reed (New Haven, 
CT: Human Relations Area Files, 197?), 45. The four laws concerning Chinese congrégations were 
dated August 11, 1863, February 4, 1863, November 1, 1863, and April 12, 1865 and can be located in 
the Bulletin Officiel de la Cochinchine for 1862, 1863, and 1865.    
13 
the Annamite kingdom by the cession of territory to the French.
19  Within three years 
of acquiring their first territorial foothold in Cochinchina, the French extended their 
control across the entire territory when they used the excuse of social disorder to 
occupy the remaining three provinces of Cochinchina.  In the case of Vinh-long, Bien-
hoa, and Chau-Đoc, the French did not wait to acquire legal possession of the region 
to begin legislating the affairs of the provinces.  The French military asserted control 
over the provinces in 1867 and retained their de facto control until the three provinces 
were officially ceded to France in 1874.
20  
In the years prior to 1871, the French had debated their colonial position with 
regard to congregational membership and had even enacted some preliminary 
regulations, but their ultimate approach to managing the overseas Chinese had not yet  
been formalized.  In 1862 and 1863, early Cochinchinese laws of French design 
summarily abolished the former imperial practice of requiring congregational 
membership.  In other words, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the social and 
organizational restrictions that had been put into place by the Nguyễn dynasty were 
actually removed, essentially allowing the Chinese unfettered access to the mercantile 
spoils of the new order.  But French magnanimity quickly fell victim to Sino-French 
competition on local economic and administrative fronts as the French began first to 
examine their options for control and then to apply this control to the Chinese residing 
in their territories.   
As early as 1871, a full three years before the French consolidated their control 
over the colony, French laws having to do with the congregations were extended to 
include Chinese living in all six provinces of French controlled Cochinchina.
21  The 
                                                 
19 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 45. 
20 Bien-hoa, Vinh-long and Chau Đoc were given to the French upon the signing of the Treaty of 
Saigon, March 15, 1874. 
21 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 46.  
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passing of this law on October 5, 1871 represented the formal birth of the French 
congregation system, extending the system’s reach across French-controlled 
Cochinchina and formally launching the two most fundamental components of the 
colonial congregation system. First, it officially recognized seven Chinese 
congregations, the congregations of Canton, Fukien, Hakka, Hainan, Trieu-chau, 
Phuoc-chau, and Quinh-chau.
22  Second, it established that all Chinese nationals 
residing in Cochinchina were required by law to belong to one of the seven 
congregations if they desired to remain in the country.  Chinese citizens employed by 
European firms were the only exception to this law.
23 Although a number of other 
laws in later years developed and refined the French system of monitoring and 
controlling the overseas Chinese,
24 the 1871 law created the very first pitch upon 
which the game of Franco-Chinese relations within Indochina would be played 
throughout the colonial period.  As the fundamental organizational component of 
Indochina’s Chinese community, congregations were unique to Indochina, although 
similar groups of Chinese existed wherever large native place communities settled 
outside of China.
25  As evidenced by the picture below, these Chinese communities 
built huiguan, or meeting halls, that served their communities in Indochina. 
                                                 
22 The seven official congrégations were later reduced to five, when the Phuoc-chau and Quinh-chau 
groups were removed from the list. 
23 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 46. 
24 A second law governing Chinese congrégations in Indochina, also quite notable, was the declaration 
made on January 23, 1885 by the Governor of Cochinchina within which no less than seven articles 
exclusively addressed the regulation of Chinese congrégations. Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese 
Congregations, 46.   
25 These groups, known as huiguan or bang in Chinese, were comprised of members speaking the same 
dialects and from the same (or similar) subethnic places in China.  They existed within China as well, in 
major urban centers, although in Southeast Asian cities the divisions between subethnic places tended to 
be less refined than within China proper.  In other words, whereas Cantonese huiguan in a city like 
Shanghai might have been divided along lines as specific as village, county, or occupation, in Southeast 
Asia, the population of overseas Chinese generally did not support such precise segmentation.  In terms 
of occupational segmentation, communities like the Hakka of West Borneo were comprised almost 
entirely of miners (see Yuan Bingling, Chinese Democracies: A Study of the Kongsis of West Borneo,  
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Figure 1 Cantonese Temple in Cholon.
26 
The establishment of the 1871 law represents a watershed moment for French 
laws governing the Chinese.  Some French sources attribute this revision of policy to 
an attempt to encourage Chinese immigration in order to meet the urgent demand for 
manual labor in Cochinchina at the time of the French occupation,
27 but this notion 
seems somehow insufficient.  The basic economic situation of Cochinchina and the 
financial networks exploited by many of the Chinese living there meant, essentially, 
that hiring indigenous laborers proved far more economical than hiring Chinese 
laborers for any given task. Although early French investors and colons might have 
preferred to rely on more expensive but better connected Chinese labor in establishing 
                                                                                                                                           
1776-1884 (Leiden: Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies, Universiteit Leiden, 
2000) for more on these Chinese settlers) and Singapore’s Chinese, such as the bricklayers of Taishan 
county, also occasionally divided along occupational lines; however, even in Cochinchina, Indochina’s 
Chinese population combined with strict French control of the Chinese population to limit professional 
segmentation as a category that only existed inside the structure of the congrégation and never equaled 
or superseded it. 
26 Picture taken by author on 2001 trip through Cholon 
27 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 56.    
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their colonial infrastructure, it seems unlikely that it would have taken the French 
nearly ten years to see the economic realities of Cochinchinese labor.   
It is, perhaps, more likely that the fledgling colonial administration sought to 
depart from a long-established Nguyễn imperial policy in an attempt to forge its own 
relationship with the powerful and well-connected Chinese merchants and 
businessmen whose businesses and networks had been, to varying degrees, a critical 
component of the economic stability of the Mekong Delta.  In any case, according to a 
colonial French account, when the number of Chinese immigrants increased 
considerably and began to include individuals labeled as “dangerous” and 
“troublemakers,” the original Annamite law was reworked by the French and 
reinstated to require congregational affiliations.
28  Mandatory affiliation also tacitly 
removed the congregations of Phuoc-chau and Quinh-chau from the list of acceptable 
affiliations by mandating that all immigrants had to belong to one of the five 
remaining congregations in order to continue to reside in Cochinchina.
29  In fact, the 
French actually extended the Nguyen congregation model beyond the Chinese for 
whom it had originally been intended, eventually including Indians, non-indigenous 
Muslims, and Japanese on the list of groups requiring “congregational” representation. 
On January 23, 1885, the system of mandatory congregational affiliation was 
finally cemented into place in Cochinchina.  This law, which will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter, became the blueprint for all future Chinese 
legislation in the colony.  As a result of this law and the 1887 establishment of the 
Government General of Indochina, the period between 1885 and 1887 effectively 
                                                 
28 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 56.   
29 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 57.  To the best of my knowledge, after the 
promulgation of this law in 1885, the five congrégations of Canton, Hainam, Hakka, Phuoc-kien, and 
Trieu-chau became the standards for fulfilling the membership requirements in all subsequent laws 
promulgated by the French with regard to the requirement of congrégational affiliation.  
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marks the true beginning of the tactical maneuverings between Indochina’s Chinese 
community and the French.  While Sino-French interaction before this time had 
possessed significance, especially in the colony of Cochinchina which acted as the 
proving ground for French colonial policy vis-à-vis the overseas Chinese, those early 
interactions represented a testing phase, where long established Chinese communities 
interacted with newly established French administrators to attempt to define the 
boundaries of their working relationship.  After the mid-1880’s, however, the real 
jockeying for advantage began.  In other words, while the 1887 establishment of the 
Government general marked a watershed in the history of French control over 
Indochina, for the overseas Chinese residing there, the most significant moment 
arguably occurred two years earlier, in 1885.   
Patterns of French Control in Indochina 
The remainder of this chapter will reorient our focus, widening in scope to 
include a general overview of French conquest in the region.  This more general 
discussion is significant not just as background to our larger investigation, but also as 
a mirror of the patterns of expansion followed by the French in their assertion of 
control over Indochina’s resident Chinese.  The institution of the congregation system 
followed closely on the heels of the gradual extension of French control in the five 
regions of Indochina, and the establishment of the French administrative hierarchy 
gives a clear picture of the authoritative ladder to which Indochina’s Chinese were 
subordinate.  In addition, a brief outline of the geographically-based hierarchy 
established by the French colons raises interesting questions about French patterns of 
control and the Chinese response to those patterns. 
France’s relationship with Indochina developed as much by serendipity as 
colonial design.  In France, popular sentiments toward colonial expansion were 
generally indifferent at best, and often, as the unfortunate careers of several of  
18 
Indochina’s early administrators reveal, downright antipathetical.  The occupation and 
annexation of large tracts of Tonkin and Cochinchina were more representative of 
reaction than of action, a result of fierce competition with the British across the globe 
as well as in Asia, and the ever-present evangelical influence of the Roman Catholic 
Church.  In fact, the Church herself eventually ensured France’s colonial foothold in 
Indochina, colonialism motivated by trade but justified by the need to protect Catholic 
missionaries in the area.  
The British occupation of Hong Kong and the persecution of French 
missionaries in China caused a waxing of French interest in Asia, a circumstance that 
coincided directly with new aggressively anti-Catholic policies undertaken by the 
Nguyễn regime.  Whether their concern was legitimate or pretextual, the French used 
the protection of their missionaries as the justification for attacking Vietnam.  In the 
summer of 1858, a French fleet led by Admiral Rigault de Genouilly occupied 
Tourane
30 but disease plagued his troops and he moved south to Saigon early the 
following year.  More pressing events in Europe, Africa, and China diverted the 
attention of Napoleon III for a few years, but in 1862, Saigon and three of 
Cochinchina’s provinces were ceded to the French.  In 1867, acting on his own 
recognizance, the French commander at Saigon occupied the other three provinces, 
bringing all of Cochinchina under French control. 
While consolidating their hold on Cochinchina, the French turned their 
attention to Cambodia as well.  Torn between the French and the Siamese and 
threatened with open rebellion by his own half brother Si Votha, the young 
Cambodian King Norodom accepted a French protectorate over his nation in 1863. 
Despite the reluctant acquiescence of the young king, it took another two decades for 
the French to establish themselves as Cambodia’s true authorities.  During this time, 
                                                 
30 Present-day Đa Nang.  
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French expansion into Tonkin also began in earnest, first with the ill-fated occupation 
of Hanoi by Francis Garnier in 1872.  In 1883, Henri de Rivière led more serious 
attempt to capture Hanoi, but although he met with more military success, he, as with 
Garnier before him, was killed in the fighting.
31  Disgraced yet again in the quest for 
control in Tonkin, the French then turned their full military attention to the area.  The 
final result of the full-fledged French invasion was the establishment of a formal 
protectorate over both Tonkin and Annam; however, despite their nominal control 
over Tonkin, violent resistance in the Tonkinese Alps and along the Chinese border 
continued for two decades after the establishment of the protectorates, lasting into the 
early years of the 20
th century.
32   
Despite continuing unrest along the Tonkin-China border, the French 
established the Government General of Indochina in 1887, consolidating the 
administration of the three more recently acquired protectorates of Cambodia, Tonkin, 
and Annam with Cochinchina’s colonial government.
33  The following map provides 
an holistic overview of the patterns and timeline of the French conquest of Indochina.  
The chronology of the French occupation of Indochina, as well as their periodic 
                                                 
31 Both Garnier and Rivière were killed by Chinese “Black Flag” soldiers. 
32 More specific details of the French conquests in Indochina and their Asian antecedents can be found 
in dozens of sources, including the following: Aldrich, Greater France; John F. Cady, The Roots of 
French Imperialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Norman G. Owen, 
The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2005); Herbert Priestley, France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperialism (New York: D. Appleton-
Century Co., 1939); Stephen H. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (London: 
Cass & Co., Ltd, 1963). 
33 The transformation of Laos into a French protectorate was undertaken largely as a result of the efforts 
of the French explorer and diplomat Auguste Pavie, whose close relationship with Laotian authorities 
gave the French the advantage in securing control of that country and opposing the historical influence 
of Siam.  Laos was finally brought into the fold of the Indochinese Government General in 1897.  As 
Laos possessed only a very small Chinese population until very late in the colonial period, it is not 
really a significant part of the story of Indochina’s Chinese congregations.  A firsthand account of the 
story of French involvement in Laos can be found in Auguste Pavie’s extensive journals (published in 
English in various forms by White Lotus Press).  
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assertions of control over Indochina’s overseas Chinese population, directly tell the 
story of Sino-French relations in Indochina; however, to achieve a clearer 
understanding of the intricate interplay between colonialists and compradors, 
geography and the colonial administrative hierarchy are just as important as time.  
Whether intentional or unintentional, the French Government General constructed a 
vast colonial pyramid of geographic and administrative authority intended to deal with 
colonial issues.  This chapter will now briefly turn our attention to issues of 
geography, demography, and colonial personnel in order to convey a clearer idea of 
the state of the territories with regard to the interaction between the overseas Chinese 
and the French. 
 
Figure 2.  French Conquest in Indochina
34 
                                                 
34 http://www.atlas-historique.net/1815-1914/cartes_popups/IndochineConqueteGF.html.  Feb 12, 2006.  
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As evidenced by the preceding map, the French exerted control over the 
various regions of Indochina gradually over a fairly extended period of time.   
Administratively speaking, the French colonial apparatus was complex and 
hierarchical, but also occasionally internally oppositional when it came to on-the-
ground relationships with local Chinese communities.  Directives from Paris carried 
the most weight in the colonies, although typically, the Governor General easily 
persuaded the French government into specific courses of action.  When Governor Le 
Myre de Vilers assumed control of the colony of Cochinchina at the start of the Third 
Republic, he instituted the Colonial Council to act as a check upon the possible future 
irresponsibility of a Governor General.
35  While the success of his attempt at creating 
checks and balances remains open to debate, the Colonial Council became a 
significant player in the governance of and direction taken by the French territories of 
Indochina. 
The Governor General himself was master of the territories, and the Lieutenant 
Governor of Cochinchina and the Residents Superior of Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia, 
and Laos were his direct subordinates.  In practice, and perhaps in theory as well, the 
Lieutenant Governor of Cochinchina wielded greater power and influence than the 
Residents Superior.  This is likely explained by two considerations:  first, 
Cochinchina, unlike the other four regions, was a direct colony rather than a 
Protectorate; and second, Cochinchina was integral to the financial life of the colony 
in a way that the other regions were not, not only because of its production capacities, 
but also because of its role as a major Southeast Asian regional entrepôt.  
Provincial Administrators rested beneath the Governors and Residents on the 
colonial hierarchy, and they were the direct representatives of the French government 
in the provinces.  In some areas, as was the case with northern Tonkin after the 
                                                 
35 Virginia Thompson, French Indo-China (New York:  The Macmillan Co., 1942), 59.  
22 
establishment of the Government General but before the pacification of the area, 
individual provinces were ruled by Military Commanders who wielded both civil and 
military authority in their jurisdictions.  A provincial administrator’s billet was a 
thankless task, carried out by men who, more often than not, were overwhelmed by the 
ceaseless demands made on their office, both by their subordinates and by their 
superiors.  Assistant Administrators were often appointed to support the 
Administrators in their tasks; these men generally only came to the fore when the 
Administrator was away, or when they were involved in direct conflicts with him.  
These men were fundamentally responsible for ensuring peace and prosperity in their 
bailiwicks, and the seemingly endless flow of correspondence sent to their Governors 
or Residents concerning the smallest details of provincial events provides fertile 
ground for exploring the day-to-day workings in their regions. 
The task of governing large cities fell to each city’s mayor and to the 
Municipal Councils.  Only the largest cities had mayors, among them Saigon, Cholon, 
Hanoi, and Haiphong.  While the mayors were always French, the Municipal Councils 
enjoyed a more diverse membership, including Frenchmen, indigenous people, and, 
when urban demographics warranted it, overseas Chinese.  On the city level, powerful 
tensions between the colonial administrations and local representatives are most 
apparent.  Particularly in the case of Cholon, city mayors tended to view the Chinese 
far more sympathetically than did their counterparts in the Government General.  This 
phenomenon was due, no doubt, to the fact that the overseas Chinese community 
played such a socially significant role in ensuring the welfare of the urban community. 
Chinese congregations built hospitals, tended to the poor, built schools, and 
contributed to French projects of all kinds, and accordingly, prominent Chinese 
individuals developed close working relationships with municipal administrators.   
This tendency was most apparent in the long, turn-of-the-century career of Cholon’s  
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Mayor Drouhet, who supported the Chinese community in the city and received 
support from it in turn. 
Mayors and Councilmen might have governed cities, but police controlled 
them, preserving order and ferreting out crime and improprieties with an often 
astonishing vigor.  Municipalities had their own police forces, but local and colonial 
police were largely under the jurisdiction of the Government General.  In Indochina, 
the Sûreté represented the law enforcement pinnacle, an impressively effective 
intelligence and policing organization with a complex network of informants and 
agents throughout Asia.  From Vietnamese revolutionaries apprehended on the streets 
of Hong Kong or Shanghai to Chinese anarchists detained in Hanoi, the Sûreté dealt 
with France’s most imperative political or criminal issues; however, despite the 
existence of such a fearsome regulatory body, the vast majority of the police that 
appear in archival sources were merely cops walking the daily beats, stumbling across 
malfeasance when they least expected it and using human intelligence – from French, 
Vietnamese, or Chinese informants – to do their jobs.
36  
In the geographical hierarchy, Paris stood unchallenged at the top of the 
colonial mountain.  While the importance of colonies might wax or wane over time, 
the prestige of the motherland remained an ever-present concern, a focus that perhaps 
explains why France’s colonial efforts generally occurred in response to the actions of 
other world powers rather than as a result of any rigid French ideology of conquest.  
As French historian Robert Aldrich notes, France’s imperial inclinations were 
thwarted by the “lack of unanimity inside France about the proper course of action to 
follow in expansion, or indeed whether it suited France to acquire and preserve far-
                                                 
36 While most – though not all – policemen appearing in archival documents were French, local 
indigenous police also patrolled the streets of Indochina, keeping order and defending neighborhoods 
and communities from petty crime.  
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flung imperial domains at all.”
37  I n  l i g h t  o f  F r a n c e ’ s  o w n  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  
instability, her inability to formulate and stick with a coherent imperial policy is 
understandable.  Aldrich continues, “From the conquest of Algiers in 1830 to 
decolonisation of Algeria in 1962, France endured significant political turmoil, several 
revolutions and a bewildering number of regimes: Restoration, July Monarchy, 
Second Republic, Second Empire, Third Republic, Vichy collaboration and German 
occupation during the Second World War, the Fourth Republic, and the Fifth 
Republic.”
38  Colonial struggles resulted in the abrupt recalls to Paris of a number of 
Indochina’s Governors General and the attempts to pacify Tonkin even caused the 
collapse of the government of Prime Minister Jules Ferry in 1885.
39  Thus, domestic 
instability, rapidly changing domestic priorities vis-à-vis colonial expansion, and no 
coherent strategy for empire-making forced Indochina’s governors to direct their 
territories while constantly glancing over their shoulders to gauge the reactions of the 
French masses, the incumbent administration in Paris, or France’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  
Prior to the establishment of the Government General in 1887, French interests 
in Indochina were governed from Saigon, where the French Governor of Cochinchina 
resided; however, after 1887, when Tonkin and Annam were brought into the colonial 
fold, the French moved their headquarters to Hanoi, building a new governor’s palace 
and reducing stewardship over Cochinchina to a Lieutenant Governor’s spot.  While 
this transfer of authority to the north ostensibly meant that Hanoi took precedence over 
Saigon, the distance of more than one thousand kilometers between the two cities 
meant that the Lieutenant Governor, despite resting under the authority of Hanoi’s 
Governor, still controlled an area of tremendous value in terms of trade and 
                                                 
37 Aldrich, Greater France, 90. 
38 Aldrich, Greater France, 90. 
39 Aldrich, Greater France, 97.  
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agriculture.  More to the point, Saigon lay just downriver from a city that early French 
explorers referred to as the Bazar Chinois, but this city, known in Vietnamese as 
Chợlớn or, literally, Big Market, laid claim to a vibrant and energetic trade, as well as 
the largest established population of overseas Chinese in the five territories of 
Indochina.  The following map is a 1790 representation of Saigon and the Bazar 
Chinois, giving some idea as to their proximity and locations along the local 
waterways.  
 
Figure 3 Map of Saigon
40 
                                                 
40http://www.oldsiamtrading.com/Merchant2/merchant.mvc?Screen=CTGY&Store_Code=oldsiamtradi
ng&Category_Code=maantiquar.  Feb 12, 2006  
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Eventually, as urban sprawl caused these cities to meet, they became 
collectively incorporated as Saigon-Cholon, although each had it own mayor and 
municipal councils well into the 20
th century.  Just as the establishment of the 
Government General favored Hanoi over Saigon, from a French perspective, the 
colonial administration of Cochinchina preferenced Saigon over Chợlớn; however, 
from the perspective of overseas Chinese demographics, exactly the opposite was true.  
From a military perspective, headquartering in Saigon was quite sensible because of 
the established fort and garrisoned troops that could offer immediate and decisive 
support in the event of a violent confrontation between French officers or officials and 
local indigenous communities; however, other less obvious reasons might have played 
a role as well.  In fact, the French selection of Saigon as their center of power in the 
area could also be indirectly attributable to French desire to avoid the Chinese domain.  
Such reluctance likely had its origins in two phenomena. The first is the overt 
repugnance expressed by the French for areas settled or controlled by the overseas 
Chinese.  This disgust had its roots in French stereotypes depicting the Chinese as 
plague-ridden and unclean, a view that will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 5 of 
this dissertation; however, I would like to suggest that French racial typing also 
informed the second phenomenon that led to French avoidance of Chinese dominated 
areas.  The perception of overseas Chinese as greedy and possessed of pecuniary 
cunning might well have led the French to stake claim to their own territory outside 
the traditional bailiwick of the Chợlớn Chinese.  In either case, it is certain that the 
French viewed Indochina’s Chinese as a force to be reckoned with. 
In 1901, French censuses estimated the Chinese population of Cochinchina at 
91,727 people, but that number did not include another 40,632 people who were of 
mixed Chinese and Vietnamese heritage.
41  In February 1902, the city of Hanoi 
                                                 
41 Population of Cochinchina, 27 December 1901, CAOM, INDO GGI 20542.  
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boasted 1,900 Chinese residents in a total population of 127,114.
42  By 1926, the 
Chinese population had exploded in all regions of the Colonies. In Cochinchina, 
numbers of Chinese increased by 150%, resulting in a Chinese population of around 
250,000.  With 95,000 Chinese in Cambodia and 48,000 in Tonkin, the Chinese had 
become a significant foreign presence in the Colonies.  The total Chinese population 
of the five French controlled regions numbered 405,000 and Chinese continued to 
enter the colony in great numbers.
43  33,800 Chinese immigrated to Cochinchina in 
1926 alone.
44   
For the French, the resident Chinese were a bit of a two-edged sword. On the 
one hand, they had established pre-existing trade networks and relationships 
throughout Indochina and had a long tradition of competition with the indigenous 
populations for economic supremacy.  The existence of a substantial foreign 
population concerned primarily with its own economic interests gave the French 
immediate, if limited, access to trading routes and markets that they would have had 
great difficulty accessing so quickly on their own.  When it came to rice production, 
fisheries, and other staple industries, major Chinese firms dispatched agents into the 
countryside at harvest time to buy the entire rice crop of rural villages.  After returning 
to Chợlớn or another city with their purchase, the firms proceeded to sell the rice in 
Indochina or on the world market, achieving a form of vertical integration by means of 
monopolizing responsibility for every task but the actual farming.
45  On th e oth er  
hand, the Chinese population enjoyed numbers large enough to make it a significant 
threat to French economic and political authority, a dilemma that became increasingly 
apparent as the 20
th century progressed.  
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43 Letter from the Director of Economic Affairs, 13 July 1927, CAOM, INDO GGI 55164.   
44 Chinese Immigration in Cochinchina, 31 July 1927, CAOM, INDO GGI 55164.   
45 Thompson, French Indo-China, 169.  
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Only three out of five territories in Indochina possessed a Chinese population 
of sufficient magnitude to make it of serious concern to the French:  Cochinchina, 
Cambodia, and Tonkin.  As will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, the Chinese 
of Cambodia, while self-governing and ruled independently by the French under the 
standard congregation system, were largely subordinate to the Chinese of Cochinchina 
when matters of international or community-wide politics came to the fore.  In fact, in 
many respects, the overseas Chinese of Cochinchina and Cambodia were easier to 
govern; access to those territories was primarily by sea and could be more strictly 
controlled.  Many of Indochina’s wealthiest and most respected businessmen made 
their profits from dealings in Cochinchina and Cambodia and, therefore, had a vested 
interest in law and order as it pertained to the local Cochinchinese communities of 
overseas Chinese.   
Tonkin’s situation was much more complicated.  The immense border with 
China stretches more than one thousand kilometers along the southern Chinese 
province of Guangxi alone, a circumstance that made controlling Chinese migration 
into the Protectorate nearly impossible.  The dense alpine terrain made a perfect safe 
haven for smugglers, criminals fleeing Chinese officials, criminals fleeing French 
retribution, or the less nefarious vagrant wanderers who populated the region.  Large 
bands of anti-Qing revolutionaries found refuge in Tonkin’s mountains in the early 
20
th century, a circumstance that frequently aggravated relations between France and 
the Celestial Empire.  Wealthy Chinese merchants in Hanoi and Haiphong refused to 
take responsibility for the actions of Chinese elsewhere in the region and the French 
had no choice but to accept their reluctance.  After all, it had taken French authorities 
well over a decade to achieve control over far north Tonkin’s villages and highways.  
As one turn-of-the-century colonial publication noted, “This border is not a natural 
boundary. It cuts one country in two, the two parts of which are absolutely similar  
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from the point of view of the terrain and of the inhabitants, and is nothing more than 
the limit of the centuries-old encroachment of the Chinese upon the Empire of 
Annam.”
46  As the following map demonstrates, the long and winding Sino-Tonkin 
border rests entirely in the mountains and is sparsely populated, settled only in the 
form of small towns and villages from Laos all the way to the South China Sea: 
 
Figure 4 Map of Border
47 
Arguably, the porousness of that border region remains to this day.  In the high 
country of far northern Vietnam, along the Chinese border, Hmong and Dzao women 
still sell traditional fabrics adorned with Chinese coins and baubles, and an afternoon 
spent watching the bridge between Lao Cai in Vietnam and Hekou in China reveals a 
ceaseless stream of pedestrian and bicycle traffic, each individual laden with 
refrigerators, air-conditioners, or washing machines, heading into Vietnam for villages 
unknown. 
                                                 
46 Notice Sur le Kouang-Si Rédigée à l’Etat Major des Troupes de l’Indochine (Hanoi: F.-H. Schneider, 
Imprimeur-Éditeur, 1900), 33. 
47 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_vietnam_border_88.jpg.  Feb 12, 2006.  
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French Strategies for Controlling the Overseas Chinese 
As French colonialism took its course, each component of the Indochinese 
colony established its own specific regulations intended to govern the Chinese in their 
individual territories.  Laws controlling all aspects of the membership and institutional 
lives of the congregations emerged gradually as each region succumbed to French 
colonial ambitions.  After the completion of the French conquest, initial, regionally-
specific regulations were adopted in Cochinchina on October 16, 1906, in Tonkin on 
December 12, 1913, in Laos on January 7, 1919, in Cambodia on November 15, 1919, 
and on September 25, 1928 in Annam.
48  Not until 1935 did the French use the excuse 
of the establishment of the Union of Indochina to promulgate one law intended to 
govern all Chinese in French-controlled Indochina, irrespective of the individual legal 
differences that had previously existed.
49   
Ultimately, the texts of each region’s individual law underwent little revision 
when the law of 1935 superseded them, but the basic requirements of congregational 
membership, intended as an extra measure of control over what the French considered 
to be an otherwise suspicious population, found expression in language both redolent 
with contractual implications and impossible to misunderstand.  
In order to gain admission into Indochina, the Chinese immigrants must 
be accepted into a congregation which agrees to be responsible for their 
personal tax, and for any fines which may be due for any reason, and 
which further agrees to foot the expenses of repatriation to China in 
case they are expelled, or in the case that the congregation no longer 
wishes to be responsible for them. By admitting them to membership 
the congregation agrees to accept these responsibilities.
50 
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In other words, this 1935 law gives the congregation, as represented, 
ultimately, by its elected president, the unenviable task of vouching for the moral 
integrity of its members, a statement of trust on the part of the congregation made 
more dramatic because of the stiff penalties that would be applied to the institution if 
its trust were to be proven ill-advised; however, the risk to the congregation did not 
end with the behavior of its own members.  This law obligated congregations to 
accept, essentially without recourse, the decisions made by French colonial authorities 
with regard to any malfeasance or dishonesty on the part of the overseas Chinese in 
Indochina.  It is a law written in strong language, expressing expectations and 
consequences with great clarity, and, for better or for worse, it served as the keystone 
for Sino-French interactions in Indochina until the departure of the French in 1954. 
Practically and logistically speaking, this strategy of controlling the Chinese 
affected them in several significant ways.  Not only did it have the obvious 
consequence of limiting Chinese immigration to those individuals who were able to 
find sponsorship through a congregation, but it also meant that if a Chinese immigrant 
were to be at loggerheads with his congregation or choose to disassociate with it, he 
was required by law to either leave Indochina altogether or to accept membership in 
another congregation which, with very few exceptions, meant transferring his place of 
residence to an entirely different city or region.  Furthermore, mandatory affiliation 
found reinforcement with policy of requiring all Chinese residents of Indochina to 
carry identification cards, known as cartes de sejour or residence permits, on their 
persons at all times. French authorities could demand that an immigrant produce his 
residence card at any time and without specific cause, and failure to comply with this 
regulation could result in an individual’s imprisonment until his congregational chief  
32 
or the Bureau of Immigration vouched for him.  If no one vouched for him, the penalty 
was deportation.
51 
As will be addressed in the following chapter, exceptions to the strict, 
geographically-defined congregation system existed in Tonkin, where Chinese coolie 
labor made for mobile populations of insufficient numbers to warrant multiple 
congregations based on native place but comprised numbers too great, in the minds of 
the French administration, to be left without congregational supervision. These special 
statutory cases included Chinese employed by Tonkin’s public works, agricultural, 
and mining enterprises, and were designed primarily to account for the many Chinese 
employed in the Tonkinese mining enterprises of Hongay and Cong-trieu. For Tonkin-
based Chinese laborers, single corporate congregations not differentiated by native-
place fulfilled all of the roles and responsibilities required of typical, sub-ethnically 
defined congregations throughout the rest of Indochina.
52   
Conclusion 
Everything about the French colonial apparatus, from the administrative 
structures to the geographic divisions of the provinces, was designed to enhance and 
enable greater French control over the five territories of Indochina.  In particular, 
using Nguyễn codes as a legislative base, French laws concerning Indochina’s 
overseas Chinese aimed at forcing those long-established Chinese communities into a 
colonial cast from which deviation would be punishable by financial penalty or even 
expulsion from French territory.  The remainder of this dissertation explores the 
Chinese congregations as institutions, and in so doing, examines the issue of colonial 
control and its effectiveness vis-à-vis Indochina’s overseas Chinese.   
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From the perspective of overseas Chinese, the congregation system imposed 
upon Chinese communities in Indochina was essentially of foreign design.  Conceived 
by Vietnam’s Nguyễn dynasty and transformed by the interests and mores of the 
French, the burden of this alien system of organization and control informed the 
social, economic, and political operations of Indochina’s Chinese communities in 
ways both minor and significant.  By analyzing the institution of the Chinese 
congregation in French Indochina, this dissertation seeks to answer one basic question:  
as the French congregation system was imposed on Indochina, what did the Chinese 
make of it?    
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CHAPTER 2:  CHINESE SUFFRAGE AND CONGREGATIONAL ELECTIONS 
By examining the works of French and Indochinese legal scholars from the 
first half of the 20
th century, this chapter traces the evolution of the electoral process 
within the congrégations, evaluating not only the processes themselves, but also the 
French policies governing those practices, as well as the role played by Indochina’s 
Chinese community in defining and often altering electoral procedures to better suit 
the needs and mores of the entire Chinese community. This evaluation includes a brief 
discussion of the differences in electoral requirements from region to region in 
Indochina and also offers some insight into the reasons underlying these differing 
policies.  
In principle, these differences revolve around the issue of suffrage.  The 
interplay between Chinese and French ideas about voting eligibility highlights several 
significant points of contention between the French administration and the Chinese 
community over the necessity for or limitations of democratization within the Chinese 
congrégations. When discussing the electoral process, specific examples of contested 
elections provide concrete instances of electoral conflicts and disputes, which further 
highlight the conflict over sovereignty within the Chinese community and the 
willingness of the French administration to intervene in the electoral process when 
they disapproved of the direction being taken by a specific congrégation.  
The Issue of Chinese Suffrage 
For local and regional administrative purposes, a president and a vice-president 
whose elections were both mandated and carefully delineated by colonial law typically 
led congrégations. During the colonial period, voting eligibility differed from province 
to province according to the size and prosperity of the overseas Chinese population in 
any given region.  In the small towns and outlying provinces outside of Cochinchina,  
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universal male suffrage enabled all Chinese men over the age of 18 to participate in 
presidential and vice-presidential elections held by the congrégations with which they 
were affiliated.
53  Different electoral standards determined voting eligibility in certain 
special zones, including all of Cochinchina, Cambodia’s Phnom Penh district, and the 
cities of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Đinh in Tonkin.  In these areas, only prosperous 
Chinese or property owners enjoyed the right to vote.
54  According to 
contemporaneous legal scholars in France, the rationale behind this restriction was 
primarily socio-economic. The French educated, Vietnamese legal scholar, Nguyen 
Quoc  Đinh, addressed suffrage within the congregations in his book, Les 
Congregations Chinoises en Indochine Francaise.  Published in 1941 based on 
research he compiled in the late 1920’s, Nguyen’s book claims,  
[T]he requirements are normally more rigorous in the countries and 
localities when the body of the immigrants…includes a large number of 
rich and influential Chinese, whose economic position is important. In 
these regions, so that the president of the congrégation may be someone 
with real power and authority, he is chosen by those individuals 
meeting certain financial requirements.  This is why there is, in addition 
to the preceding requirements, a system requiring ownership…
55 
Despite broader similarities consisting primarily of financial requirements, 
Indochinese electoral policies differed considerably from region to region and the 
overseas Chinese themselves had input into the development of colonial policy in this 
regard.  A brief background of electoral regulations in Cochinchina provides a more 
extensive elucidation of this situation. 
                                                 
53 Universal male suffrage was the norm for all of Laos and Annam during the colonial period. 
54 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 97.   
55 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 97.    
36 
Overseas Chinese residing in Cochinchina enjoyed universal male suffrage in 
the early days of French colonization.
56  Of the four earliest laws addressing the issue 
of congrégational elections, the first three outline no minimum requirements for voting 
eligibility,
57 and the fourth law, promulgated on January 23, 1885, actually confirms 
universal suffrage for Cochinchina when it states in Article 16 that each 
congregational president is to be elected by all of the Chinese “living in the 
neighborhood and belonging to the congrégation.”
58  Not until 27 years after the 
establishment of the colony did the first law appear which limited voting eligibility for 
the Chinese.  In this law, Article 25 decrees, “all those who are for any reason exempt 
from the poll tax shall not be voters.”
59 While this law really only prevented a very 
small percentage of the Chinese from voting, namely disabled or elderly
60 people, 
immigrant workers residing in Cochinchina for less than one year, and agricultural 
workers, it proved to be the first step down a slippery slope leading to the effective 
abolition of universal suffrage for overseas Chinese residing in Indochina. However, 
the impetus behind this change was not, as might have been expected, the French 
administration; rather, the leaders of Indochina’s Chinese community themselves 
requested stricter limits on eligibility to vote in congrégational elections. 
As a whole, Indochina’s collected Chinese community had actively protested 
colonial laws that they believed infringed upon their rights or dignity from the very 
beginning of the French occupation of Saigon and Cholon.  Not only were these 
protests handed directly to French officials in the form of formal petitions and 
                                                 
56 Under French law, Chinese residents over 60 years of age were no longer considered contributing 
members of the colony and protectorates.  Thus, I suspect that 60 years of age was the de facto limit on 
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57 These first three laws were the decisions of February 4, 1863, and November 1, 1863, and also the 
law of October 5, 1871. Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 97. 
58 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 97.   
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complaints,
61 but they were also often forwarded to Chinese officials in a 
congrégation’s native place
62 or even to the Chinese ambassador in Paris. From 1866, 
the Imperial ambassador in Paris began to present formal petitions to the French 
Department of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Chinese residing in Indochina.  These 
early petitions generally dealt with one of two subjects: the poll tax, which had 
increased under French rule; and the system of immigration, which required overseas 
Chinese to carry identification cards listing, among other things, their personal 
measurements, a policy from which foreign residents of other nationalities were 
exempt, and one which the Chinese found particularly degrading.
63 When Paris failed 
to respond to the 1866 requests, the Chinese ambassador tried again, submitting 
further petitions in 1892, 1893, and finally, in 1903.
64  
Although the ambassador’s efforts made little headway with the Paris 
Department of Foreign Affairs, local Cochinchinese complaints and demands 
evidently met with more success because in 1905, in response to the dissatisfaction of 
the Chinese community, the colonial government commissioned one of its officers, 
Charles Hardouin, to investigate the matter.  Hardouin traveled extensively through 
British and Dutch territories in the region to examine both the overseas Chinese 
                                                 
61 For an example of one of these early petitions, refer to the 1866 petition presented to the French by 
the assembled congregations of Cholon delineating the treatment expected of the Chinese by the 
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62 This was especially true in the cases of the Fukien and Cantonese Congrégations. 
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aided the police in apprehending Chinese who attempted to avoid payment of the head tax, or who tried 
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64 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 47.    
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communities themselves and the laws governing those communities in territories 
colonized by other European powers. The report submitted by Hardouin upon his 
return to Indochina not only suggested the key step of the transforming the 
congrégations into organizations legally responsible for the activities and behavior of 
their members, but also provided the research used by the colonial government in 
promulgating the law of October 16, 1906, entitled, “Concerning the Congrégations,” 
which remained the fundamental law governing Chinese organizations in Indochina 
until the ratification of the Nanking agreements between 1930 and 1935. Additionally, 
the law of October 16, 1906, which was designed to apply only to Chinese 
communities existing in Cochinchina, became the blueprint for colonial laws 
regulating the Chinese in all five regions of Indochina.
65   
What is the significance of the law of October 16, 1906, for Chinese suffrage? 
After Hardouin returned with his proposals, a commission composed of both members 
from various departments within the colonial administration and prominent Chinese in 
Cochinchina met to discuss his findings and determine how best to apply them.  As the 
Chinese communities in Cochinchina were comprised largely of Chinese nationals, the 
Immigration Service bore responsibility for enacting and enforcing legislation 
involving Chinese organizations. When the question of electing congrégational 
officers arose, the Immigration Service referred back to the large number of Chinese 
complaints they had received over the past years concerning the electoral process.  
The bulk of these complaints originated from prosperous and prominent Chinese 
merchants and businessmen who resented the breadth of Chinese suffrage because “it 
allowed many Chinese to vote who did not merit the privilege.”
66   
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The commission questioned its Chinese members extensively on the subject of 
voting eligibility and they requested that suffrage be limited exclusively to 
congrégation members falling into the very top bracket of the personal tax, a tax based 
almost entirely on income and property ownership.  If the administration remained 
unwilling to place such exclusive limits on Chinese suffrage, then, by way of 
compromise, the Chinese members urged the commission at least to limit voting 
eligibility to Chinese falling into the top four categories of the personal tax.
67  In the 
end, capitulating in part to the requests presented by Cochinchina’s prominent Chinese 
businessmen, the commission determined that voting in the cities of Saigon and 
Cholon would only be open to Chinese in the top four categories of the personal tax; 
however, the commission insisted on broader eligibility in the countryside, leaving 
rural eligibility open to all Chinese paying either a license fee or a land tax. These 
recommendations were incorporated in their entirety into the law of October 16, 1906 
and can be found in Article 2 of that law, which addresses the issue of congrégational 
elections and Chinese suffrage.
68  Thus, monied elements within the Chinese 
community itself were one of the primary motivating factors behind the restrictions 
placed upon Chinese suffrage by the French.  Vestiges of the importance of these 
wealthy Chinese can still be seen in Indochina’s Chinese temples today, where 
pictures of congregation leaders like the one shown below, yellowed with age and 
spotted by mildew, still adorn the temple walls 
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Figure 5 Leaders of Congregation
69 
As with other laws before 1906, the Cochinchinese legislation was particularly 
important because it served as the basis for voter laws throughout Indochina.  Laws 
concerning Chinese suffrage in the rest of Indochina varied widely from region to 
region, a result of the demography of Chinese settlement.  Accordingly, the territories 
of Laos and Annam tended to address the issue only in passing while laws became 
increasingly specific and restrictive in Cambodia and Tonkin. In the case of 
Cambodia, laws of September 7, 1912, and of November 15, 1919, mandated that all 
voters must be on the rolls of those who pay license fees or land taxes. In Tonkin, 
voting restrictions were put into place in the cities of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam 
Đinh,
70 first by the laws of December 21, 1910, and December 12, 1913, which placed 
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increasingly strict controls on urban voting eligibility, culminating in suffrage only for 
those Chinese in the two highest categories of wealth.
71 Liberalization of the statutes 
occurred with the November 11, 1924 law, which allowed the top four categories to 
vote. Additionally, a basic land tax or license fee requirement similar to the one in 
place in rural Cochinchina was instituted for Quang Yen province as a result of the 
large Chinese population in that region.
72 
The Case of Tonkin 
Tonkin’s Chinese community proved especially complicated to regulate due to 
the financial realities of the region.  Unlike the rest of Indochina, Tonkin played home 
to a rather large population of Chinese laborers and coolies.
73  These workers found 
employment in some agricultural ventures, but, as a general rule, worked in the many 
mines and mineral concessions scattered across Tonkin’s mountainous north.  This 
area not only possessed the mineral richness necessary to create a demand for manual 
labor, but enjoyed the added condition of being geographically close to China, thus 
providing a welcome source of employment for manual laborers from China’s 
southern provinces and, in particular, the devastatingly poor provinces of Guangxi and 
Yunnan.  
                                                                                                                                           
recognized Nam Đinh as a major urban area with a high (relatively speaking) concentration of Chinese 
much earlier than Nguyen’s study would indicate.   
71 Projet d’arrêté réglementant les Congrégations asiatiques au Tonkin, Art. IV, pp. 3-4, TTLTQG1, 
RST 8886. 
72 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 99-101.   
73 Despite the distance at which Tonkin lagged behind Cochinchina and Cambodia with respect to the 
size of its Chinese population, Tonkin’s mines attracted a significant population of Chinese coolies 
unmatched by either Cochinchina or Cambodia.  In the two southern regions, the Chinese population 
was associated predominantly with trade and pan-Southeast Asian mercantilism.  Although some 
Chinese coolie labor could be found in the primarily Chinese-owned pepper plantations of 
Cochinchina’s southernmost provinces (such as Ha Tien), indigenous laborers generally proved to be 
more cost effective in those areas and plantation-owners accordingly hired Cochinchinese or Annamite 
workers to fill the slots more typically occupied by Chinese coolies in Tonkin.  
42 
Despite labor patterns that virtually assured the presence of Chinese workers 
from most, if not all, of China’s southern provinces, the laws governing Chinese 
congrégations in Tonkin made specific provisions only for congrégations composed of 
members from the Cantonese and Fujianese communities. This provision resulted 
from a law determining that only homogenous groups with populations exceeding 100 
eligible men could form independent congrégations unique to their ethnic sub-
region.
74  Inevitably, this law combined with existing laws on suffrage and property 
ownership to privilege communities of established merchants and skilled workers 
based in Tonkin’s larger urban centers, effectively excluding migratory laborers in the 
north. Also as a result of this statute, even in Tonkin’s hinterlands and smaller market 
centers, Cantonese and Fujianese communities surface most frequently in daily 
records.   
Generally, early information on Tonkin’s upland congregations centers around 
congregational leadership.  For example, in 1890, the president of Sơntay’s Fujian 
Congregation, a man by the name of Phoun-Lou-Mui, became seriously ill.  By 
January of 1891, Phoun-Lou-Mui’s illness had progressed to such a degree that he 
decided to return to China and leave Sơntay, we can safely assume, forever.  After his 
departure, on January 20, 1891, new elections were held, and the well-respected 
storekeeper Vinh-Hung won the presidential post by unanimous vote.
75  Thi s story 
typifies the colonial concern with distant congregations.  As long as the organization 
ran smoothly and followed the proper procedures, it only appeared briefly on the radar 
screen when its leadership changed. 
Despite the careful detail with which they attempted to regulate Chinese 
communities in Tonkin, early colonial statutes failed to provide for the large numbers 
                                                 
74 Projet d’arrêté réglementant les Congrégations Asiatiques au Tonkin, Art. I & II, p. 2, TTLTQG1, 
RST 8886. 
75 French Resident, Sơntay, to Resident-Superior, Hanoi, 20 January 1891, TTLTQG1, RST 29035.  
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of Chinese coolies working in the region.  Accordingly, the law of 1910 made specific 
provision for the large community of Chinese miners, declaring that any Tonkinese 
mining, agricultural, or engineering company employing 50 or more Chinese laborers 
would organize a single congrégation specific to the individual company to which all 
Chinese workers, irrespective of their place of origin, would belong. These special 
congrégations would be “administered in an entirely autonomous fashion and will 
enjoy complete independence with respect to the congrégation that exists in the 
province [in which the company is based].”
76  No financial requirements limited 
voting eligibility for members of Tonkin’s corporate congrégations.
77 
What can we extrapolate from the absence of voting restrictions among 
Tonkin’s coolie community? The existence across Indochina of voting restrictions of 
varying rigorousness has already been established, as have some of the Chinese and 
French justifications for the policy of limited suffrage in congrégational elections. The 
benefits for a policy of restricted suffrage seem fairly clear on both sides of the 
equation.  From the Chinese perspective, the dominant economically based social 
hierarchy found reinforcement in a system where only community members of some 
means could participate in the leadership process. As wealthier Chinese members bore 
the lion’s share of the expense for supporting a congrégation’s programs and 
institutions, they staked a logical claim to a greater share in the organization’s 
decision-making processes.  Additionally, as the following chapter will discuss in 
greater detail, wealth as a prerequisite for leadership enjoyed nearly unrivaled 
prominence as a determinant for status in overseas Chinese communities, not only in 
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Tonkin, Cambodia, and Cochinchina, but in Singapore, Malaya, and Dutch Indonesia 
as well.
78  
From the French perspective, Chinese resistance to the ideal of universal 
suffrage bore some weight, but not as much as the notion of putting people who could 
be held financially responsible for the misdeeds of the organization at the 
congrégation’s helm. The importance of selecting solid, respectable individuals to lead 
Tonkin’s Chinese community was a paramount concern to the French provincial 
administrators for several practical reasons.  Wealthy leaders possessed the resources 
to reimburse the French government for any expenses incurred as a result of Chinese 
misconduct, but more importantly, leaders with long histories in the region were 
viewed as more likely to support the goals of the French regime than to risk the loss of 
their livelihoods.
79  Additionally, general experience indicated that those with a vested 
interest in the system would govern more responsibly than those with nothing to lose; 
however, in the case of the corporate congrégations of Tonkin, these rules did not 
apply. Why? 
To answer this question, we must first take a closer look at the congrégations 
in question.  Corporate congrégations were composed of members who largely slipped 
between the cracks of the traditional urban-centered Chinese social structure.  These 
Chinese laborers were nearly always poor and quite frequently illiterate; therefore, it is 
unlikely that any of them would have qualified to vote under the suffrage laws existing 
in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries.  Additionally, companies tended to hire people 
                                                 
78 The practical and cultural importance of wealth as a precondition for congregational leadership is 
explored in greater detail in the portion of this dissertation addressing the characteristics preferred in 
Congregation presidents.  
79 Circular regarding elections of the Presidents of Chinese congregations, 22 September 1908, 
TTLTQG1, RST 22.502. Although this circular never makes this point specifically, the emphasis it 
places upon selecting presidents with deep financial and personal roots in the region implies this point 
quite clearly.  
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from an assortment of native places in China so the formulation of a corporate sub-
ethnic place identity proved problematic. A typical congrégation was reluctant to 
vouch for people about whom it knew nothing, fearful that they would have to bear the 
financial brunt of any malfeasance committed by the person or disappearance of the 
individual from his workplace.  Furthermore, in the case of engineering companies, 
such as those constructing the railway lines across northern Tonkin and into China, the 
workplace was highly mobile and could shift from province to province in a very short 
period of time.  This doubtless exacerbated the reluctance of a standard congrégation 
to accept responsibility for these coolies.  On the other hand, the French administrators 
were quite displeased by the lack of a traditional structure of social regulation within 
these laborer communities. To solve these problems without forcing other more 
orthodox Chinese congrégations to accept new members at random,
80 the French 
elected to create a special system that would provide these corporate communities 
with a strict structure of social governance without interfering with the basic scheme 
they had established and extrapolated to apply to all of the other regions of Indochina.  
Despite the different structure developed to address the issue of mobile 
Chinese labor in the north, the new conventions were not always followed.  In 1915, 
four Chinese Presidents were appointed by the Commander of Tonkin’s Second 
Military Territory, Major Marquet, to oversee the Chinese coolie population in the 
mining conglomerations of Pia-Ouac.
81  The Major forwarded the order of 
appointment to the French Resident-Superior in Hanoi from the territorial 
headquarters at Cao Bang with an explanation of the difficulty involved in holding 
elections for Chinese coolies. He fully acknowledged his intent to violate colonial 
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or refuse membership based on their own individual criteria. 
81 Letter from the commandant of Tonkin’s second Military Territory to the Resident Superior in Hanoi, 
26 October 1915, TTLTQG1, RST 8667.  
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procedure, writing, “Elections did not proceed in accordance with Article 12 of the 
Order of December 12, 1913, because [doing so] is nearly impossible.”
82  T h e  
population in Pia-Ouac’s mines was composed primarily of wandering laborers who 
came to Tonkin from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan and drifted out again when 
they decided to move on or return to China.  With such irregular sojourns in Tonkin, 
no one knew these coolies and therefore no one could be found to vouch for their 
respectability or character.  For the Territorial Commander, responsible for all events 
in his region, this shifting population engendered skepticism and concern. “An 
election undertaken with people like this would be utterly meaningless,” he wrote.
83  
Instead, he suggested that the mine supervisors invest their own Chinese managers 
with the congregational authority to match their professional authority over the coolies 
with whom they worked.
84  As the following photograph indicates, mining areas in 
Tonkin were often in remote, rugged locations, developed only in terms of mining 
infrastructure and industry, and generally far from the beaten path. 
Although we do not know what the Resident Superior’s ultimate decision was, 
archival sources give us a clear idea of his natural inclination.  When Hanoi’s Chief 
Administrator forwarded the Pia-Ouac decision to the Resident-Superior,
85 the 
Resident responded with disapproval, suggesting that designating congregation 
presidents in this manner was a useless exercise and that the position of a 
congregational president in these labor intensive environments was often filled by a 
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Chinese chief of operations for the company anyway.
86  In other words, the Resident 
saw little use in violating colonial law by disenfranchising the Chinese laborers if 
elections would also result in the corporate congregations choosing presidential 
candidates that were acceptable to the French.  
 
Figure 6 Mining
87 
Candidacy and the Electoral Process 
Apart from the issue of suffrage, strict rules governed both an individual’s 
eligibility for candidacy, and also the actual mechanics of the voting process. As with 
suffrage, laws governing eligibility for candidacy instituted much stricter criteria in 
Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Tonkin than they did in Annam and Laos. The standard 
justification for this inequity appears to be that the dearth of Chinese in Laos and 
Annam prevented them from enacting such stringent financial requirements.  After all, 
the absence of any eligible candidates would surely throw a kink into the electoral 
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process. Despite these differences, a number of the minimum requirements for 
eligibility remained the same in all five regions.
88 
As established by the French administration, the eligibility requirements for 
candidacy for the office of congrégation president read much like the requirements for 
any contemporary political office.  To start with, a prospective president was at least 
30 years of age. Although there was no requirement dictating a minimum duration for 
a candidate’s membership in the congrégation in which he sought the presidency, a 
candidate was required to have resided in the territory in which the congrégation was 
located for at least two years.  Additionally, eligibility depended upon satisfaction of a 
morality clause; any criminal convictions, or any civil convictions in which a penalty 
was administered by a judge, permanently excluded an individual from holding a 
congregational office.
89  According to Nguyễn, commercial law excluded a Chinese 
resident from candidacy for one further offense:  
Since the individuals who have been declared bankrupt by the courts 
are not eligible to hold offices, it would seem, though there are no 
specific statements to that effect in the law, that, by extension of this 
general rule, Chinese shopkeepers who have been declared bankrupt 
are not eligible for the office of the president of the congrégation.
90 
Although these rules appear to reflect a colonial legislative bias, echoes of common 
Chinese patterns of leadership selection can be seen in this French-endorsed system.  
Yen Ch’ing-hwang suggests that the Chinese model highlights three basic 
characteristics that determine an individual’s eligibility to lead a clan: “seniority in 
generation and age, social standing, and integrity.”
91  
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89 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 101.   
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Fulfillment of these basic requirements did not necessarily mean automatic 
approval if a candidate succeeded in winning election to his office of choice.  Once 
again, colonial law prescribed different procedures for the different regions of 
Indochina.  Laws governing the Chinese congrégations provided for straightforward 
elections in Tonkin, Annam, and Laos. In those three territories, eligible members of 
the congrégations voted for the candidate of the choice.  The winner’s name was then 
submitted for approval to the Résident-Supérieur responsible for the region and the 
election was complete.   
A very different procedure determined the outcome of presidential and vice-
presidential elections in Cochinchina and Cambodia.  In those territories, members of 
the congrégation met for an election in which the top three candidates were selected 
for submission to French authorities. Upon receipt of the candidates’ names, 
Cambodia’s Resident Superior and the Governor in Cochinchina then selected the new 
officers for their respective regions from the list provided them.
92  Clearly, this 
undermined the democratic value of elections in those regions by granting the final 
choice to the French authorities. 
Resignations and Dismissals from Office 
Although the post of congregational president was ostensibly for a set term of 
four years, in practice, popular and respected leaders could continue in their posts until 
ill health or death forced the issue of their retirement.  Cases of voluntary repatriation 
to China because of sickness were quite common across Cochinchina and Tonkin.  To 
give just one example, Phoun-Lou-Mou, the president of the Fujian congregation in 
Sơntay, retired back to China in 1891 due to grave personal illness.
93  Not all retirees 
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returned to China after stepping down from their leadership positions, but illness 
remained an ever-present danger in the Indochinese sojourn. In addition to personal 
illness, presidents often resigned their posts and returned to China to attend to an 
ailing parent, or to arrange the funeral of a recently deceased parent. This was the case 
with Lam Khai Bui, the president of the Hainan congregation in Ha-Tien who retired 
to return to Hainan Island and arrange a proper funeral for his mother.
94  Filial duty 
was not an automatic exemption from congregational responsibilities.  Before his 
departure back to Hainan, Lam was required to verify that none of his congregation’s 
payments or taxes was in arrears.
95 
At times, the election records themselves allow brief insight into the 
devastating hardship of life in Indochina.  In the case of Tanan’s Trieu Chau 
congregation, 1895 proved to be a particularly ill-starred year for the congregation’s 
leadership.  In January 1895, the Trieu Chau president, a 54-year old man named 
Trinh Ngoc, asked permission to retire from his post, saying that his state of health 
prevented him from fulfilling his duties. Trinh Ngoc’s resignation having been duly 
approved, the congregation elected a new leader, the 48 year old Trang Tich.
96  
Ratification of Tanan’s Trieu Chau elections came through from Saigon on January 
15, 1895.
97  By January 17, a mere two days later, the congregation had to reconvene 
for a third presidential election.  Trang Tich, it seemed, had died. In his place, the 
congregation elected 56-year-old Lâm Văn.
98 The records of this particular series of 
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elections are interesting on a number of fronts, giving particular insight into three 
aspects of congregational life.   
From the human perspective, the unexpected obstacles to this particular 
electoral process reveal the tenuousness of immigrant life in rural Southeast Asia.  In a 
period of just a few weeks, one man retired from his prominent position with broken 
health, another man died before he could even take office, and not until the third 
attempt was an electee healthy enough to survive in the leadership role. Similarly, the 
registers of the many votes taken to assign a Trieu Chau president give us a window 
into certain general leadership characteristics within Tanan’s Chinese community.  For 
example, looking at the voting registers reveals that every Chinese member of the 
congrégation who ran for the presidential office was also eligible to vote.  The basis 
for this conclusion lies in careful observation of the details.  The complete list of 
eligible electors is included in the election file,
99 and every candidate for congregation 
president appears on the elector list.  Additionally, these records suggest that older 
candidates performed more successfully in the elections than did candidates in their 
twenties, thirties, or even early forties.
100   
Also, electors themselves tended to be older.  In the case of this Trieu Chau 
congregation, 11 of the 18 eligible voters were over 37 years of age, effectively well 
into middle age. The issue of age takes on more significance when factors of 
environment and life expectancy are figured into the equation. As in the case of the 
hapless Trang Tich, who, at a mere 48 years of age, passed away before he could 
assume his office, old age came quickly, and Cochinchina’s tropical climate 
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contributed to the ill-health of many of the region’s residents. Cholera and malaria cut 
devastating swaths through the Mekong Delta region at regular intervals, and 
overwork combined with the vices of a bachelor lifestyle to cheat many overseas 
Chinese out of old age. The very nature of financial success contributed to the age of 
congrégation leaders as well.  Establishing a successful business or company took 
valuable time, and unless one was fortunate enough to be the scion of a successful 
house, success often arrived alongside middle age. The link between age and fiduciary 
stability further cemented the importance of age and experience as leadership 
characteristics for members of the Chinese community.  
Other than personal or familial health, finances and geography also played 
paramount roles in an individual’s suitability for the presidential post.  In the instance 
of Lam Khoan, briefly the president of Gia Đinh’s Cantonese congregation, he 
resigned his post within two weeks of being elected to the position because his 
finances were insufficient to shoulder the very real economic burden imposed upon a 
congregation president. To make matters worse, Lam Khoan lived in village quite 
distant from the congregation’s headquarters and had trouble spending as much time 
there as he felt he ought.
101  In situations like these, compassionate dismissal came 
quickly.  Within two weeks, Gia Ðinh’s administrator, Marquis, had forwarded the 
letter to the Lieutenant Governor
102 and Lam Khoan had received a formal order of 
dismissal.
103  Appointing a man both personally unwilling and financially unable to 
fulfill the duties of his office met no one’s needs in Indochina’s colonial milieu. 
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Contested Elections 
Despite the careful orchestration of the electoral process, new Congrégational 
presidents did not always assume their offices without contestation. Oftentimes, 
members of a specific Chinese community were reluctant to accept a recently elected 
president.  At other times, the French objected to the Chinese leadership choice.  In 
either case, a contended election spawned bitter, and occasionally even highly 
personal, complaints and accusations about the character or leadership ability of the 
president-elect.  
Life within specific Chinese communities was occasionally beset by turmoil.  
Deep-seated rivalries frequently endured for years and communities divided into 
factions when popular candidates fought for dominance within the congrégation. In 
the case of Soc Trang’s Phuoc Kien community, these factions were particularly 
enduring and centered around two internal groups: the clique of Huynh Cánh and the 
clique of Huynh Thuy, who was also called Â-Suôi.  These two men were both 
prominent storekeepers with very honorable reputations: they both held 4
th-class 
patents and were registered in the 2
nd category on the tax rolls, meaning that although 
they were not the wealthiest of Chinese merchants in the Delta region, they were 
certainly well-to-do. Ironically, these feuding congregants were also close relatives, 
although the exact degree of their relationship is never made explicit.
104  At som e 
unknown point in the past, the two had fallen out with another and the resultant feud 
not only split the loyalties of the congrégation, but also instigated a pattern of intrigue 
and mud slinging that further inflamed the enmity of the two cliques.  Marcellot, the 
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Administrator of Soc Trang, reported that this pattern of competition and hostility had 
repeated itself for three consecutive years.  In 1894, Huynh Thuy lost the election; 
Huynh Canh lost in 1895.
 105  The cycle appeared endless. 
In fact, the two cliques clashed with such regularity that leaders of the Phuoc 
Kien congregation, assuming that discord and electoral disputes were inevitable, 
moved to ensure the integrity of the election well in advance of the actual vote.  To 
that end, they requested that the Administrator install an electoral office in the Khanh 
Hung communal house prior to the election and to appoint a committee to preside over 
the electoral office. The committee of six was chosen from among the oldest and 
youngest members of the electorate. The establishment of neutral ground in the form 
of the communal house held particular significance for this congrégation, as they 
actually possessed no pagoda. Additionally, the congregation agreed in advance to 
have only two candidates and one formal vote, in which a simple majority would 
determine the victor.
106  On October 26, 1895, the election took place and Huynh Thuy 
won the presidency.
107   
By November 5, 1895, the Huynh Cang clique had hired André Cremazy, a 
French lawyer practicing in Saigon, to pursue the matter with the Lieutenant 
Governor.  This letter was submitted under the auspices of 22 merchants residing in 
the city of Soc Trang and another 15 merchants living in Hoa Mý, a village in the Bây 
Xay district of Soc Trang, all of whom were apparently members of Soc Trang’s 
Phuoc Kien congrégation, and proffered several justifications for invalidating the 
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election results. First, claimed the losing side, Huynh Cang was the wealthy proprietor 
of his own distillery, while Huynh Thuy merely labored in someone else’s distillery 
and owned nothing himself. The distribution of votes reinforced Huynh Cang’s claims 
to financial superiority: according to the plaintiffs, Huynh Cang’s 113 votes came 
from Soc Trang’s respected merchants, whereas Huynh Thuy’s 130 votes were the 
voices “of coolies, [and] of rowers aboard the Chinese junks sailing from Soc Trang to 
Cholon: that is to say, people with no fixed address, scarcely any means of 
existence.”
108  According to the Cremazy, the nature of Huynh Thuy’s constituency 
violated Article 25 of the order of February 19, 1890, which stated that in order to 
vote, a Chinese man must have a verifiable place of residence.  After all, argued 
Cremazy, “it is impossible that the exhibitors and all of their companions, every 
merchant, most of whom are wealthy and the rest [financially] comfortable, upon 
whom exclusively rest all of the responsibilities of the congregation and upon the 
doors of whom one always knocks when heavy fines are imposed upon the 
congregation, are left at the mercy of people without steady work and whose situations 
cannot offer any security.”
109 In addition, the Huynh Cang clique pointed out that only 
two candidates’ names were submitted to the Lieutenant Governor for approval, which 
also directly contravened Article 25 of the order of February 19, 1890.  Essentially, 
they argued that the presentation of only two names failed to give the Lieutenant 
Governor an adequate choice of candidates for the position.
110   
These arguments accurately reveal the biases of both parties involved in the 
dispute.  Wealth, or the lack thereof, is an ever-present issue in colonial documents 
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written by either the Chinese or the French, permanently cementing its place as the 
premier qualification for leadership.  Colonial biases merely required a financial 
scapegoat in case of expensive wrongdoing on the part of congregation members; 
Chinese motivations were a bit more complex.  Unlike in China, where scholar-
officials stood at the top of the social hierarchy until the 20
th century, wealthy 
merchants and entrepreneurs formed the core of the social aristocracy.  Typically, 
truly talented intellectuals stayed in China where their skills were more valued.
 111  In 
the Nanyang network of businessmen and high finance, money and extravagance 
became the best measure of a man’s success.  In his study of Singapore and Malaya, 
Yen Ch’ing-hwang observes that “wealth was the main determinant of social mobility; 
those who possessed it moved up to the apex of the class hierarchy, and those who lost 
it descended even down to the bottom.”
112  By deriding Huynh Thuy’s economic 
status, Huynh Cang utilized the most lethal attack possible on his opponent’s fitness 
for rule.  
In the end, it seems that Huynh Cang’s efforts to replace Huynh Thuy as 
congregation president failed. The long and public skirmishes between the two men 
permanently soured any hope of either being able to lodge an effective protest against 
the election.  The fact that the congregation itself tried to circumvent the problem by 
approaching the French in advance to warn them about the looming electoral disaster 
only highlighted the unreliability of the protest.  Administrator Marcellot 
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recommended that the election results stand,
113 and no evidence exists to suggest that 
the Lieutenant Governor chose to countermand the local recommendation. 
Chinese elections in Soc Trang had been fractious and turbulent well before 
the Huynh clan arrived upon the political scene.  In the Cantonese presidential election 
in the autumn of 1893, the local administrator dismissed a congregational president, 
forcing his replacement by convening a new election.  In August 1893, Lý Học, the 
president of Soc Trang’s Cantonese congregation, organized a special meeting of all of 
the members of the congregation in an attempt to identify the guilty party in a recently 
committed theft. Soc Trang’s Administrator Bertin took umbrage at Lý Học’s 
presumption and sent a formal complaint off to Chief Administrator Nicolai inquiring 
into the legality of such a meeting in a Chinese congregation.
114 The sticking point, as 
Bertin saw it, was that the meeting had been convened with the intent of identifying 
the perpetrator of a crime.  In Bertin’s opinion, the criminal nature of the inquiry 
usurped the authority of the local administration, which had already initiated a judicial 
inquest into the offense. Nicolai replied that Lý Học absolutely had not exceeded his 
authority by gathering his congregation together to discuss the matter, but this reply 
failed to satisfy Bertin, who took his complaint one step higher to Cochinchina’s 
Lieutenant Governor.
115  He complained, “I do not have to bring up again the death 
threats uttered on this occasion against two Chinese of the congregation because the 
one theft was referred to justice, and the other, who was arrested on suspicion of 
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burglary. I had believed and I believe still that a congregation president who tolerates 
people who give rise to such meetings could not stay in office.”
116   
Despite the opinion offered by Nicolai, Bertin took it upon himself to suspend 
Lý Học from the office of president and, pending an official decision from his colonial 
superiors, he invited the congregation’s notables to appoint an interim leader to take 
Lý Học’s place. The congregation chose Diệp Hỷ as Lý Học’s replacement, but Lý 
Học had no intention of submitting graciously to this apparent injustice. Despite Diệp 
Hỷ’s official designation as the interim leader, Lý Học refused to relinquish the 
register and official papers of the congregation to him.  Bertin appears to have been 
enraged by Lý Học’s recalcitrance, writing, “In the face of the bad will of this man 
who has quite a bad reputation, I did not believe I had to bow.”
 117  He gathered about 
95 of the congregation’s notables together for a second time, permanently ousting Lý 
Học from his leadership position.  During the election, 15 or 20 of Lý Học’s staunch 
supporters refused to take part in the voting but the abstention of these partisans did 
not invalidate the election results. In the end, whether justly or unjustly, Lý Học lost 
the leadership position he had held within his congregation.
118  
What issues underlay Lý Học’s dismissal from office?  Although it is 
impossible to recreate with certainty the events in Soc Trang’s Cantonese 
congregation in 1893, this story does provide insight into general patterns of power 
and control in Cochinchina.  It seems apparent from the vitriol of Bertin’s writing that 
bad blood existed between the two men.  Both Lý Học and Bertin occupied positions 
in a colonial aristocracy.  Bertin’s authority derived from French power and his 
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position with the bureaucratic hierarchy of the colonial apparatus.  Lý Học, on the 
other hand, held authority as the chosen representative of his people in matters of 
citizenship and commerce, both with the indigenous population and with the French, 
by virtue of his status as Congregation president. Despite Lý Học’s local influence and 
the frequently laissez-faire approach taken by the French with regard to the internal 
processes of governance within the overseas Chinese communities, absolute colonial 
authority was the fundamental reality of congregational leadership in Indochina.   
When a Chinese leader found himself in opposition to a French Administrator, 
the result was a foregone conclusion.  The French conceived of the Chinese “right to 
rule” in very broad strokes, a situation which allowed them to find cause to remove 
Chinese residents from office or even to expel them from the colony if desired.  In 
other words, the nebulous definition of fitness (or unfitness) to rule meant that an 
offending Chinese leader had little hope of escaping French retribution.  In the case of 
Lý Học, Bertin sealed the president’s fate with three basic accusations.  He accused Lý 
Học of allowing criminals and swindlers to operate freely within the Cantonese 
congregation, he insinuated that Lý Học was a compulsive gambler who had long 
since lost the respect of his congregation, and, most devastatingly, he saddled him 
with the unforgivable peccadillo of incompetent bookkeeping.
119  By aiming for the 
colonial pocketbook, this accusation proved the most damaging indictment of Lý 
Học’s fitness for the presidency. From the perspective of the Lieutenant Governor’s 
office, the veracity of these accusations was more or less irrelevant.  In a congrégation 
with more than 100 active members, someone could always be found to replace a 
disgraced leader, and when the conflict reached the office of the Lieutenant Governor 
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in Saigon, the locally based French bureaucrat enjoyed an insurmountable advantage 
in terms of getting his way. 
1893 was a difficult year for Soc Trang’s Trieu Chau congregation as well. 
Sex, scandal, and crime marred the Trieu Chau elections, resulting in the mass 
interrogation of the majority of the Trieu Chau notables in an attempt to ferret out the 
truth from a quagmire of protests, insults, and lies. On November 29, 1893, the 
Secretary General in Saigon received a petition from 71 members of Soc Trang’s 
Trieu Congrégation protesting the election of Lý Hiệp Nguón as congregation 
president. According to the plaintiffs, they had not received fair notice of the election 
and, in any event, they were extremely dissatisfied with the choice of Lý Hiệp Nguón 
because he was “ignorant, illiterate, a gambler, and he was once condemned in front of 
the congrégation, accused by his son-in-law of having sexual relations with his [Lý 
Hiệp Nguón’s] daughter.”
120  The petitioners had already approached Bertin, Soc 
Trang’s administrator, with their grievances, but were told that the election was 
finished and had already been ratified and sent to Saigon; therefore, Bertin refused to 
acknowledge or act upon their request.
121 
Not surprisingly, the Lieutenant Governor inquired into the matter, and in the 
ensuing investigation, a number of interrogations occurred.  The first issue to be 
addressed concerned whether or not the community had been properly notified of the 
election.  Trần Minh Hương, the former chief of the congregation, was personally 
responsible for arranging the election of his successor.  According to Trần’s personal 
testimony, he issued the election notice on November 11, 1893, three days prior to the 
actual election.  He posted notices in Bố Thảo and Vủng Thơm, both areas with highly 
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concentrated Chinese populations, announcing that the election was to be held in the 
congrégation’s communal house at 7:00 am on November 14, 1893.  Furthermore, he 
hired a tamtam
122 to continually beat out the message of the election up until the 
morning it occurred.
123  Trần insisted that 238 voters came to the election and that all 
of them voted for Lý Hiệp Nguón; he maintained that the election was quite proper 
and any protest was baseless.
124  The Cochinchinese administration did not take Trần 
at his word. 
The French government in Saigon forwarded the Chinese complaints back to 
Soc Trang, apparently with instructions for Administrator Bertin to look into the 
problem. In mid December, Bertin attempted to gather together all of the Chinese 
plaintiffs to address their issues publicly and investigate the reasons underlying their 
complaints.  Although attendance at the assembly seems to have been mandatory, less 
than half of the plaintiffs appeared at the meeting. Despite the poor showing, the 
Administrator decided that the attending Chinese represented a sufficient quorum for 
probing into the dispute and the records of the ensuing interrogation shed some light 
on Sino-French interaction and values.
125  
The ease with which the Chinese plaintiffs went over the head of the 
Administrator to seek redress from Saigon must have galled Soc Trang’s 
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Administrator, and his impatience with what he perceived as “childishness” on the part 
of the Chinese is clearly evident. In his inquiry, Bertin asked, and received answers to, 
three basic questions: 
1: Were you summoned in due course to take part in the election? 
All responded, yes, posters were hung by the former president of the 
congregation in due course. We each informed one another. 
Some [of them] blame the former president for not coming to their 
residences to summon them himself.  (This is childishness that does not 
deserve a response.) 
2: Did you come to vote? 
Many answered no; some said that they came but that in the face of the 
newly adopted voting method, [they] refused to vote . . . What they call 
the new method is the measure that I have engaged for depositing the 
ballots in the ballot box for Inspection, and for counting the votes as 
one proceeds under the authority of French electoral laws. 
Once again, these are not very serious considerations.  
3: Then why do you protest against this election?  
We do not protest the election itself, neither against the method of 
proceeding, even though it is new. But we ask the administration to 
redo this election because Lý Hiệp Nguón does not please us for the 
reasons we explained in our petition to the Secretary General.
126 
In relaying these comments to the Secretary General, Bertin exasperatedly insists that 
all of this electoral conflict would have been avoided had the plaintiffs actually voted 
in the election that they all admitted to having been warned of well in advance of its 
occurrence. The letter to the secretary General ends with a pointed question: “On 
which legal flaw could we base a decision to cancel the controversial election?”
127  
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In his letter, Bertin comments that Soc Trang elections almost always resulted 
in protests based not on legitimate complaints concerning the nature or process of the 
disputed election, but on the fact that the plaintiffs personally disliked the choice of 
candidates.
128 In fairness to the Administrator, the two disputed elections administered 
during his tenure that have been discussed above do seem to fit the bill of personal, 
rather than procedural, disputes.  Even the disastrous conflict between the two Phuoc 
Kien cliques of Huynh Cang and Huynh Thuy centered largely around scarcely 
concealed personal loyalties and dissatisfactions.  In the Phuoc Kien instance, the 
engagement of a French attorney ensured that the election was disputed on procedural 
grounds, but the underlying factor was clearly an enduring personal enmity between 
the two candidates and their partisans.  It is not difficult to imagine that the Phuoc 
Kien dispute would have suffered from the same non-procedural flaws had the 
offended party sought redress personally, instead of through the colonial legal 
apparatus.  In either case, legal jargon proved unable to overcome the colonial records 
of years of public competition between the two cliques.  Likewise, the Saigon 
government generally proved immune to Chinese attempts to subvert the colonially 
imposed legal structure in order to meet individual needs.   
In a three-year period, the three great congregations of Soc Trang all endured 
electoral conflict of one sort or another.  While the concentrated scandal of 1893 to 
1895 was most likely exceptionally fractious, it is not hard to imagine the conflict and 
disputes that regularly tarnished Chinese elections across Cochinchina. Simply 
dismissing these conflicts as products of a disagreeable colonial administration seems 
inadequate, because this three-year period in Soc Trang covered the tenures of two 
different French Administrators.  Additionally, these documents indicate that electoral 
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protests within the Chinese community tended to meet with unfavorable results.  In the 
only instance in which an elected president was removed from office, the protest came 
as a result of his dismissal, rather than being the cause of it. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that strict regulations governing the organization of congregations contributed 
to the level of electoral unrest. After all, under the French system, districts like Soc 
Trang only warranted one congregation per language group. Conflicts within language 
groups but between native place groups must have been quite common – quarrels that 
might have been avoided had there been no cap on the number of Chinese 
congregations allowed in any given area. 
All of these conflicts and disputes serve to highlight the importance placed 
upon leadership selection by each congregation’s constituency.  Just as in modern 
times, a certain percentage of voters took elections very seriously indeed and were not 
above mud slinging or slander to try to tarnish the image of their opponents and 
thereby achieve victory.  The power entrusted to a congregation president was great, 
but the level of responsibility could not obscure the fact that congregation leaders, as 
well as a congregation’s most notable members, were fallible men.  The next two 
chapters will examine presidential authority and the specific cases of two prominent 
congregation members, one a president and one who was appointed to Cholon’s 
municipal government, in order to gain a better understanding both of the limits to the 
power bestowed by prominence within each Chinese community, and the limits of 
French patience outside of those same communities.  
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CHAPTER 3:  CONGREGATIONAL LEADERSHIP  
AND THE POWER OF THE CHEF 
This chapter examines leadership in Indochina’s Chinese congregations, 
paying special attention to the role of the congrégation president and the criteria by 
which he was chosen for office.  In the process, it seeks a clearer understanding of the 
breadth of a president’s powers, both within the Chinese community and within 
Indochinese society at large.  Along with the evaluation of the president’s authority, 
this chapter seeks to define the responsibilities of the president, including any 
penalties or administrative discipline to which the president might be subjected as a 
result of his failure to adequately or satisfactorily perform the duties required of him 
by the French administration. To this end, a portrait of Ignace Bou, the leader of Ha 
Tien’s Hainam congregation, will provide an example of precisely who these men 
were and how they both attained and maintained their power within the congrégation.   
The Fundamental Precondition for Chinese Leadership 
Extensive scholarship addresses native place organizations and their 
hierarchies and leadership in Mainland China.  Some historians have also examined 
these institutions in Southeast Asia, most notably in Singapore, Malaya, and 
Indonesia, and a third useful avenue for contextualizing issues of leadership in 
Chinese communities can be found in the many studies of local elites in mainland 
China during the 19
th and 20
th centuries.  A comprehensive survey of all of this 
literature would be a fitting topic for a separate book, but here, I shall only attempt to 
highlight the points most conceptually relevant to the subjects of this study:  the 
Chinese congregations of Indochina.   
Historiography on the subject of leadership, whether based in China or in 
Southeast Asia, can be best imagined as approaching the question from one of two 
perspectives:  either by studying the activities and careers of local gentry and elites, or  
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by pursuing a more institutional approach.  In their edited volume Chinese Local 
Elites and Patterns of Dominance, historians Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin choose 
the first approach, seeking to define the nature and power of local gentry in China by 
studying numerous individual local elite families and their responses both to the 
Chinese Imperial State and to peasant society.
129  Esherick and Rankin readily accede 
to the inevitability of hierarchy in state-society relations; however, they ascribe the 
prevailing scholarly assumptions about Chinese elite and the attributes that 
characterize them to European prejudice, namely Max Weber’s assumption that merit 
superseded wealth as a prerequisite for elite rule in China.
130  In fact, Esherick and 
Rankin point out that tension and competition between local elites on the one hand and 
the state, as represented by imperial officials, on the other signifies “a ‘dynamic 
oscillation’ between integration into the imperial system and autonomy from it.”
131 
Scholarship supports such a wide variety of interpretations of the issue that 
clarifying local elite status is a daunting task.  In his work on Chinese rebellions, 
historian Philip Kuhn discusses the militarization of local elites, a phenomenon he 
argues increased gentry power vis-à-vis the state and left local elites supreme in the 
face of the power vacuum created after the 1911 revolution.
132  Similarly, in her work 
on Taiwan’s Lin family, Joanna Meskill emphasizes the endurance of a local gentry 
family as a result of their willingness to enforce control over their local population and 
over local watering rights.
133  Historian Hilary Beattie’s study of Anhui province also 
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emphasizes the endurance of elite status over generations, although she attributes this 
longevity more to land acquisition, investment in family education, and careful 
stewardship of acquired assets than to any martial prowess.
134  These depictions of 
local gentry as a relatively static category do not go uncontested.  Historian Ho Ping-ti 
describes a very different phenomenon in his book, The Ladder of Success in Imperial 
China.  Using the framework outlined by Chang Chung-li as his foundation,
135 Ho 
emphasizes the probable existence of a great degree of social mobility into the Chinese 
elite.  To Ho, this social mobility and ability to rise to the status of local elite 
diminished concerns over the inequality of China’s rigid social hierarchy, thus 
allowing it to continue.   
For the purposes of my evaluation of an overseas Chinese community, 
however, historian Keith Schoppa offers the most useful explanation of local elite 
status in his study of China’s Zhejiang Province.  In this study, Schoppa emphasizes 
the varying and specialized nature of Chinese elites, suggesting that different types of 
elite emerged to meet the requirements of different areas of Zhejiang, a variation 
resulting in the existence of a highly commercialized and politicized elite in the 
thriving, populated areas of the province.
136  Rankin adds to Schoppa’s conclusions in 
her study of Zhejiang elite,
137 revealing “the elite’s readiness to adopt new 
associational forms – chambers of commerce, educational associations, and a host of 
other professional associations and special interest organizations – following the 
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removal of long-standing Qing prohibitions during the first decade of the twentieth 
century.”
138   
Thus, we see an emerging portrait of local elites in China: a community 
enjoying a considerable degree of social mobility and accepting of new entrants into 
the privileged class; a community possessed of great flexibility in terms of the 
establishment of and membership in new forms of social and professional 
organizations; and a community in which membership criteria differed according to 
the characteristics of the groups’ local political, social, and economic environments.  
What, then, does this complex picture of elites contribute to our understanding of 
overseas Chinese leadership in the South Seas? 
Although very few – if any – secondary sources speak directly to issues of 
leadership in Indochina’s Chinese congregations, an institutional approach to the study 
of leadership criteria in Chinese organizations in general has been undertaken by many 
scholars of those organizations in other parts of Southeast Asia, as well as in China 
proper.  Most notably, in his book Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial 
Singapore and Malaysia, historian Yen Ching-hwang points out that social relations 
determined by kinship and dialect ties composed only part of the overseas Chinese 
social milieu; he opines that class status and class affiliations also had great 
significance in ordering the overseas Chinese world.  He bases his fundamental 
analysis on two platforms:  firstly, that the overseas Chinese community was an 
immigrant community, a subordinate community in terms of local government, and 
largely an urban community; and secondly, that Chinese society divided itself into a 
three-class paradigm
139 which consisted of (from the top down) Shang (merchants), 
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Shi (educated elite), and Gong (workers). He further suggests – as did Ho Ping-ti, 
Keith Schoppa, and Mary Rankin in the case of local gentry in Mainland China – that 
great mobility and fluidity existed in this social structure, especially between the upper 
Gong class and the lower Shang class.
140  
In addition to profession, wealth and property ownership also served as a 
measure for social class and as an entrepôt into an entirely different lifestyle of leisure 
and plenty enjoyed only by the wealthiest echelons of the merchant class.
141  
According to Yen, this wealth-based class distinction proved important not only 
within the Chinese community itself, but also to colonial authorities.  Speaking of the 
British in the Straits Settlements, he writes, 
As wealth was an important prerequisite for Chinese community 
leadership, the wealthy capitalists were given leadership status, and 
those among them who were able, charitable, and with ambition would 
become leaders of the whole community.  In the choice of leadership 
for the dialect and clan organizations, the wealthy were readily 
accepted as leaders because they commanded high status and prestige 
in society and were able to make substantial donations when required. 
142  
For the wealthy, native place organizations also offered opportunities for leadership 
that led to increased visibility and greater prestige, not only within ones’ own dialect 
or kinship group, but also in the overseas Chinese community at large. In terms of the 
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leaders themselves, Yen names seniority, social standing, and integrity as the three 
most important criteria upon which leaders were chosen.
143   
In his epic study of Hankow, William Rowe also reluctantly acknowledges the 
importance of wealth in determining eligibility for leadership in the guilds of Hankow, 
writing that for huiguan seeking leaders, “personal wealth and professional success 
constituted the best evidence of the financial capability needed to manage the 
collective accounts.”
144  But despite admitting the interrelationship of wealth and local 
power, Rowe treats the notion of wealth as a golden ticket into huiguan aristocracy 
with some suspicion.  Rowe adeptly communicates the idea of a changing economic 
environment and its socio-economic repercussions within Chinese native place 
organizations, and while this notion accurately reflects aspects of Indochina’s Chinese 
kinship organizations, the model is not a perfect fit for colonial Southeast Asia.  Some 
scholars have portrayed wealth in the overseas Chinese community as a three- to four-
generation parabolic arch, where wealth accrues and vanishes, sometimes in less than 
a hundred years.  In this paradigm, familial ties could be extremely significant in the 
short term but were unlikely to endure for a dozen or more generations. Additionally, 
the goal for many overseas Chinese was to return to their native place to live out their 
retirements in familiar and comfortable surroundings. Also, trouble with the French 
authorities encouraged or even forced some powerful Chinese to leave their positions 
of authority and make new beginnings elsewhere.  
The notion of wealth and status determining eligibility for leadership within 
the Chinese community also finds support in the writings of anthropologist Lawrence 
Crissman.  Crissman maintains that the fundamental criterion for leadership is wealth.  
If this wealth is combined with a foreign education that allows the leader to 
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communicate freely with the government in charge, the community only benefits from 
that knowledge.  For an organization to wield any power in a local system, the leaders 
must have the money to gain access to positions of power throughout the community 
as a whole.  This leads nicely to Crissman’s second point on leadership, which is that 
leaders of the overseas Chinese community typically overlapped and were closely 
interrelated.  Wealthy leaders quite simply had greater access to membership on 
committees and on the governing bodies of the high-level organizations that 
represented the Chinese community as a whole.
145   
In Indochina, overseas Chinese themselves acknowledged wealth as a primary 
factor in determining both eligibility for and the potential for success as a 
congregation president.  When Lam Khoan attempted to resign the presidency of Gia 
Đinh’s Cantonese congregation shortly after his election to the post, he pleaded 
eloquently with Gia Đinh’s Administrator to allow his dismissal on primarily 
economic grounds. “The motives that have led me to this resolution are first, the 
modesty of my resources which will never allow me to meet the expenses that my new 
office will impose upon me, and also, the remoteness of my place of residence from 
the [congregation headquarters].”
146  Recognizing the financial burden colonial laws 
helped to impose upon presidents, as well, one imagines, as the futility of forcing 
someone to take a position of authority they themselves did not wish to occupy, the 
Lieutenant Governor agreed to Lam Khoan’s dismissal within a matter of days.
147 
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Although several factors were indispensable qualifications for rule, wealth is 
uniquely quantifiable.  Integrity, honesty, and social standing are a bit harder to 
measure than economic status, which is revealed through things as large as a vast 
financial network or as small as a merchant’s donations to the local huiguan. Both 
types of indicators might reveal a merchant’s economic status.  In the case of Ly 
Dang, the Cantonese merchant discussed in Chapter 4, his substantial economic 
domain was clearly detailed in French accounts of his bankruptcy.
148  On the other 
hand, the Kong-Fong-Tai Company, which was the business first started by Ly Dang’s 
father when he arrived in Cholon in the 1870’s, appears on a temple stele from 1898 in 
the second category of donations to Cholon’s Cantonese huiguan, yet another 
indication of the family’s local prestige.
149 Ly Dang’s early business partner, Phong 
Nhut, whose personal businesses are not as clearly delineated, also appears in 
historical records as the president of Cholon’s Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the 
mid-1910’s, thus indicating his own prominence in the economic life of Cholon’s 
Chinese community.
150 
Financial stability was an absolute necessity in the life of any overseas Chinese 
leader, primarily because those leaders had to set examples of generosity for their 
congregations when the community required certain facilities and when the native 
place needed relief or improvement. Of course, as historian Elizabeth Sinn has pointed 
out, philanthropy could exist alongside self-interest: “for individuals and groups who 
were marginalized, philanthropy was a means by which they could be elevated to 
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mainstream society.”
151  But also, in the French colonial arena, a congregation 
president was ultimately responsible for any remuneration that might be required by 
colonial authorities as a result of acts committed by congregation members.  In a 
colonial environment, Chinese traditions were not always allowed to endure.   
The Roles and Responsibilities of the Chef 
Colonialism’s economic imperatives further enhanced the power of the 
congrégations in the overseas Chinese community.  In 1884, the French instituted a 
head tax for “foreign asiatics” residing in Indochinese territory.  This tax existed for 
the explicit purpose of obtaining substantial revenue for the state from the resident 
Chinese population.  Under the congrégation system, the chef of the congrégation was 
given the responsibility of ensuring that all members of his congrégation paid the 
taxes that they owed.  Although the chef himself was exempt from this head tax, he 
was responsible for making up the difference between the amount owed and the 
amount collected out of his own pocket.  The French required the submission of 
updated congregation rolls by the president every three months, and the payment of 
taxes based upon those rolls, but other than that, the French eschewed involvement in 
the day-to-day functioning of each congregation, leaving the running of them largely 
up to the Chinese themselves.
152 
The  chef also bore official responsibility for his congregation members’ 
behavior.  The French administration reserved the right to hold the chef personally 
responsible for any malfeasance on the part of congrégation members; therefore, 
colonial law provided him with broad authority to sanction and punish errant 
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congréganistes.
153  Th e chef possessed authority extending from minor fines to be 
imposed upon wayward members all the way up to deportation for more serious 
offenses. A member of a congrégation could not immigrate to Indochina without the 
approval of the chef, nor could he depart the country without the chef’s written 
consent.  Any change of residence within the colony required the approval of all chefs 
involved in the move, and a chef’s repudiation of an individual resulted in that 
person’s immediate removal from the colony at the expense of the congrégation 
involved.
154  As the legal representative of the congregation, each congregation 
president possessed the right to institute legal proceedings in French court in the name 
of the congregation; conversely, groups or individuals seeking redress from the 
congregation could name the president as defendant when their complaints reached the 
court.
155   
Most significantly, colonial law guaranteed the chef  right of access to the 
French administration if he ever required assistance in managing or policing his 
congrégation. This power extended far beyond the authority typically granted to the 
colonial police because even though French law allowed police to intervene only upon 
the commission of illegal acts, the police could intervene at any time upon the request 
of the chef.
156  Under French law, members of a congrégation exercised only one 
formal restraint over the power of a chef de congrégation: the power of election.  In 
return, the price paid by the president could be stiff.  As Nguyen Quoc Đinh wrote, 
“All infractions of Indochinese law…committed by a congregation are imputed to its 
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president; he is the one who is personally incriminated: he is punished, and this may 
include depriving him of his liberty.”
157 
Not all presidential responsibilities involved legal matters.  As a function of its 
role as provider of mutual aid to its congregants, congregations assisted newly arrived 
Chinese with settling in to their new environment.  To this end, the congregation 
president was required to help members find work in the colony, and to stand as a 
guarantor with potential employers if required.  Additionally, the president was 
responsible for distributing loans from the congregation’s common fund to new 
arrivals or to indigent members in need.
158  
Nguyen Quoc Đinh emphasizes one of the primary difficulties facing a 
congregation president, especially in the larger cities.  Big businessmen and powerful 
industrialists often avoided roles as officers in the congregations because of the 
tremendous amount of time consumed by such responsibilities; however, even though 
they preferred to expend their time in pursuit of profit, they remained keenly aware of 
their status within the congregational hierarchy.  In other words, being wealthier and 
more powerful than the president from a business perspective, they felt no qualms 
about ordering the president around or disregarding his directives.  In that sense, the 
congregation president retained a certain degree of dependency upon wealthier 
members.  To combat this problem, French law granted the president the right to levy 
fines against intransigent members for all manner of unacceptable behaviors.
159  In 
practice, I have seen no evidence of such a fine being levied against a prominent 
congregant for, in effect, being bossy.  The political repercussions of such boldness on 
the part of the president would likely have been fatal.  Nevertheless, it was an option 
retained by the office of congregation president. 
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After being duly elected, the president remained in office for a four-year term.  
He could not abandon his office by simple resignation; outside of receiving special 
permission from the French administration, only death, departure from Indochina, or 
removal for criminal cause allowed the president to escape.
160  During this term, the 
president existed as the individual solely responsible for all activities of the 
congregation:  all money owed, all damages done, all costs incurred by the French, all 
taxes due.  Despite all of the privileges of the office, this last fact proved the downfall 
of many a congregation president.  Ignace Bou, the president of Ha Tien’s Hainam 
congregation, was no exception to this rule, and it is to him that we now turn our 
attention. 
The Fall from Grace of Ignace Bou 
It seems unlikely in the extreme that large numbers of congrégation officers in 
Indochina enjoyed literati status back in their Chinese native places; however, the 
inclusion of education and social standing as primary factors in assessing an 
individual’s suitability for leadership certainly applied to the Indochinese case as well.  
Arguably, the imposition of colonial systems in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia 
resulted in a redefinition of the “Shi” ideal among members of the overseas Chinese 
community, as familiarity with Confucian classics fell behind knowledge of French, 
English, and Dutch in terms of practical benefits to everyday life. In the instance of 
Ignace Bou, the elected president of the Hainam congrégation in Cochinchina’s Ha-
Tien province, the man’s ability to speak and write French contributed greatly to his 
effectiveness as a congrégational leader, as well as to his ability to manipulate the 
French colonial system to the benefit of his congregants.  
                                                 
160 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 120-121.  
77 
In August 1896, the president of Hainam’s congrégation in Ha-Tien, a man by 
the name of Lam Khai Bui, resigned his presidential office and returned to Hainan 
Island to attend to funeral arrangements for his recently deceased mother. That Lam 
Khai Bui intended to depart Cochinchina for an extended period of time seems quite 
clear from his letter.  Although he could conceivably have requested that his vice-
president assume presidential responsibilities for a brief period, he specifically 
requested permission to resign instead, implying that his return to China was a long-
term relocation.
161  
The Cochinchinese administration granted Lam a compassionate dismissal and 
initiated procedures to fill the unexpectedly vacant presidential post, but they 
immediately encountered confusion when the man chosen to head the Hainam 
Congrégation until the next scheduled election in 1898 officially represented himself 
under three different names. The first two names, Y-Hap-Vo and Y-Hiệp Võ,
162 
represented the Chinese and Vietnamese pronunciations of his name and thus 
occasioned little French interest. The problem arose with the third name, Ignace Bou, 
which was the nominative most often used by the man when communicating with the 
local and regional French administrations.
163 
The Lieutenant Governor of Cochinchina hesitated to approve Ignace Bou’s 
appointment as congregation president for fear that some malevolent ulterior motive 
might underlie his use of several names.  Instead, he contacted the Administrator of 
Ha-Tien to request more information on the president-elect.  In this report, a bit more 
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information about Ignace Bou’s experience and life come to light. First of all, Bou was 
Roman Catholic, baptized by priests who also gave him his name, Ignace. As it is 
impossible to say whether Bou was baptized at birth or was converted to Catholicism 
later in life, we do not know if Ignace Bou was actually his original name.  The same 
problem holds true for the Chinese and Vietnamese transliterations of his name,
164 
which were alleged to be a sinicization and a vietnamization of the Christian name 
Ignace.  Despite an absence of clarity on this matter, he most likely kept his original 
surname, Bou.
165  Secondly, Ignace Bou owned his own company, an ownership he 
did not share with any significant partner, and worked for his own profit, rather than 
owning a company subordinated to other corporate interests in Indochina or in China 
proper. 
Thus, despite the brief concern caused by his name, the Lieutenant-Governor 
of Cochinchina formally declared Ignace Bou the President of Ha-Tien’s Hainam 
congregation on October 13, 1896.
166  His election as interim president suggests that 
he was a well-respected member of Ha-Tien’s Hainam Congrégation and this 
impression is reinforced by the report submitted by the Administrator of Ha-Tien, who 
vouched for his suitability as president and offered no suggestions of previous 
inappropriate activities or acquaintances on Bou’s part.
167  Most significantly for the 
purposes of this discussion, Ignace Bou was not a newcomer to the overseas Chinese 
political arena. He had already enjoyed at least one term of office as a congregational 
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president in Ha-Tien province’s city of Honchong,
168 a position from which he 
formally resigned in 1895.
169   
Ignace Bou’s tenure as Congregation president in Honchong reveals a number 
of interesting facets of congregational politics and life.  In the spring of 1895, Ignace 
Bou wrote a letter to the French Administrator of Ha-Tien requesting the authorization 
to increase the common taxes imposed upon all congregation members from the 50 
cents originally allowed to an even piastre per person.
170 He based this request upon a 
table of congregational expenses he compiled for the Administrator’s perusal, in 
which the congregation’s overhead expenses were explicitly detailed.  These expenses 
were as follows:
171 
 
1 vice-president in Hatien  200$
1 bookkeeper 
1 orderly 
276$
1 cook and 2 coolies  250$
Purchase of rice and other foodstuffs  300$
Purchase of tobacco, tea, and alcohol  50$
Festivals at the pagoda  50$
Price of repatriation, burial, and food for prisoners  100$
Completion of a new pagoda  100$
Annual subsidy for the maintenance of the pagoda  200$
For a total of:   1606$
The above table provides us with an excellent general overview not only of the 
expenses weathered by a congregation in Cochinchina, but also of that congregation’s 
cultural, social, and colonial responsibilities and how each impacted the organization’s 
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annual budget. The figures provided by Bou indicate that, for this Hainam 
congregation, 21.88% of the annual budget went to pagoda-related expenses, including 
the celebration of Hainanese rituals and local holidays.
172  Although the rice and 
assorted foodstuffs most likely played some role in these celebrations, they are not 
explicit reminders of and connections to native place and culture as are pagoda-related 
activities, and so those expenses, along with the purchase of tea, tobacco and alcohol, 
have been relegated to the category of social expenses, which also occupied 21.88% of 
the total annual budget.  As the following photograph indicates, congregation temples 
housed cultural treasures from each native place.  Proper adornment and maintenance 
of these meeting halls could be quite expensive, as could appropriate offerings for 
local deities and ghosts. 
 
Figure 7 Inside a temple
173 
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The final category of colonially mandated expenses includes not only cost of 
repatriation, funerals, and prison food, but also the salary of an accountant, whose job 
was to ensure the congregation’s freedom from French displeasure over tax and 
residency discrepancies. This category potentially totaled as much as 23.5% of the 
congregation’s annual budget.  While this detailed information might not seem 
particularly interesting to the casual reader, the percentages shown here give some 
indication of the importance of French demands upon the congregation when 
compared to the more traditional social and cultural roles of the organization in 
general. The fiduciary parity conferred upon colonial requirements, although essential 
to the smooth functioning of the congregation within a colonial environment, still 
demonstrates the financial commitment required of each congregation to French law. 
Honchong’s Hainam congregation totaled 1300 members, which, when 
compared to the 1606$ piastres of annual expense, clearly represents more than one 
piastre per member.  In that light, Ignace Bou’s request to raise the common tax seems 
quite reasonable, but the Administrator of Ha-Tien had other ideas about Bou’s 
underlying motivations. On May 8, 1895 in a letter to the Governor of Cochinchina in 
Saigon, the Administrator wrote, 
The congregation of Hainam includes 1300 individuals, each of whom 
should pay more than one piastre if the figures indicated above were 
exact.  But the president of the congregation does not say that 150 large 
planters in Honchong each remit from 20$ to 30$ piastres per year to 
him; that for any requests for licenses for cutting or other [requests] 
addressed to the administration, he receives around 50 cents; that for 
every passport he demands the same amount plus the price, 
etc…etc…It is also probable that the amount of the expense for food 
(600$) is diminished considerably by the voluntary contributions of the 
numerous members of the congregation which it is obliged to receive at 
its table. 
As for the price of food for Chinese arrested for defaulting on their 
residence cards and then released after payment of rates, refunds are 
always pursued by the congregations that pay in advance which has the  
82 
effect, in most cases, of [resulting in] no charge [to the congregation in 
question.]
174 
This 1895 letter was just the beginning for Ignace Bou. The man’s financial troubles 
achieved legendary proportions by the end of his tenure as congregation president, and 
these troubles eventually led to his flight from the colony to avoid prosecution by the 
French for what they perceived as deliberate fraud.  The tale of Bou’s downfall 
sharply defines the opposing interests of the French colons and local Chinese 
residents. All of the trouble began with a change in the local Administrator.   
In 1904, Ha Tien’s Administrator summoned a meeting of members of all 
Chinese residents in the district in order to verify the congregational registers, and 
thereby ensure that each congregation was being taxed appropriately. Based on this 
meeting, for 1905, the rolls for the two Hainam congregations of Ha Tien and Phu 
Quoc were reduced from 2000 members, a number Cudenet suggested had been 
arbitrarily assigned by his Administrative predecessor, LaGrange, to 1412 members.  
LaGrange had, in the past, been accused of abusing his authority by applying it 
arbitrarily and without due consideration. According to LaGrange’s residual estimate, 
the combined congregations totaled 2031 in 1905. Cudenet himself took action to 
avoid a similar criticism of capriciousness. “I contented myself with 1412 Chinese 
whom, in November and December, I saw for myself and who gave me their cards 
against the receipts.  Is this arbitrary?”
175 
The Administrator’s defensiveness arose from a complaint sent in August 1905 
by the French Attorney, Cuniae, on behalf of Ignace Bou, complaining that Cudenet 
used his authority arbitrarily and brutally to fix an improper number upon the Chinese 
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community in Ha Tien, thereby causing them to bear an impossible tax burden.
176  
Cudenet blamed the entire fiasco on Article 4 of the law of February 19, 1890, which 
decreed that immigrants could be removed from a congregation’s tax rolls if there was 
proof that they had departed the colony. Citing this law, Bou insisted that Ha Tien’s 
Hainam congregation only contained 680 members, despite what Cudenet maintained 
was clear evidence to the contrary.  This alleged dishonesty not-withstanding, the 
Administrator claimed that he intended to ask for a dispensation for the 114 counts of 
unpaid registration tax that he believed the Hainam congregation still owed, although 
he did not publicize this fact “in order not to stem the zeal of the agents charged with 
tracking Chinese fraud.”
177 Bou’s own guilty conscience, implied the Administrator, 
led him to attack the tax changes so vociferously.
178   
Despite Ignace Bou’s charges against him, Cudenet was most disturbed by the 
allegations of brutality and dishonesty proffered by the lawyer Cuniae. “I well know 
the legends that are passed on from generation to generation in certain colonial 
chambers: civil servants in the Colonies are true petty tyrants for whom 
misappropriation of public funds, abuse of power, etc, etc, are common currency.”
179  
Cudenet did not bother to insist that his own character was above reproach; instead, he 
urged the lawyer to make good on his threat to take legal action against him.  
Consequently, I have the honor to ask you, Sir Governor, to call back 
Mr. Cuniae [and tell him] . . . that if his customer Ignace Bou considers 
[himself] hurt by a tax roll established arbitrarily, he is free to ask the 
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courts to apply article 174 of the Penal Code to the Administrator of Ha 
Tien. 
Also, I shall exercise my right (article 373 of the same code) by asking 
of Justice that Mr. Cuniae give me satisfaction for the slanderous 
imputations contained in the letter addressed to you by him.
180 
That Cudenet’s bitterness was directed not at Ignace Bou, but at Cuniae, the French 
attorney working for the Chinese president, seems quite telling.  The Administrator 
never acknowledges that in this case, the Chinese leader employed the Frenchman, 
and only the insult that the Frenchman delivered hit the mark.  It is quite clear from his 
letter that Cudenet was fundamentally indifferent to any opinion, good or bad, that a 
Chinese resident had of him. That being said, Cudenet’s rebuttal rings with indignant 
sincerity, and it is hard to imagine that his writing was mere performance and he was 
actually corrupt.  Implications of his corruption seem even more dubious when viewed 
in the light of more than 10 years of tax disputes while Ignace Bou headed the Hainam 
congregation.  The fact that Bou apparently chose to flee the colony shortly after the 
incident described above further emphasizes the likelihood that Cudenet was the more 
scrupulous of the two.  
Bou’s disappearance from the Colony seemed to take everyone by surprise.  In 
August 1905, he sent a formal request to the Lieutenant Governor, asking that he be 
allowed to return to Hainan to take care of pressing business he had there.   
Specifically, he maintained that his presence in Hainan was required in order for him 
to liquidate the interest he held in Hainan’s maritime shipping operation. According to 
Bou, the Administrator of Ha Tien had endorsed his request to return home.
181  Bou’s 
desire to leave the colony for a month required the approval of the Lieutenant 
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Governor because his absence left Ha-Tien’s Hainam congregation without formal 
leadership. Apparently, Bou never returned. 
By September 1905, the colonial government had taken action to reduce the 
taxes owed to them by Hainam congregation.  Initially, the French recouped 370$18 
piastres by confiscating a portion of Ignace Bou’s pepper harvest;
182 however, even 
after that seizure, Ha Tien’s Hainam congregation still owed the French government 
the staggering sum of 7,363$50 piastres. By this time, Administrator Cudenet was 
actively colluding with the Lieutenant Governor to recoup the colonial losses.  Ignace 
Bou appeared to have fled the colony to escape the inevitable financial repercussions 
of his lax accounting practices and the French strove to recover the money owed them. 
At first, the local Administration considered recouping its losses by seizing all of 
Ignace Bou’s goods and property and then auctioning off that property to the highest 
bidder.   
Though this plan seemed sound, it had two major flaws.  In the first place, the 
Ha Tien area had suffered fairly significant financial losses in 1904 and 1905.  A 
November 2 cyclone destroyed large portions of the pepper crop, and the impact of 
that natural catastrophe was trebled by an enormous depreciation in the price of 
pepper, which went from 35-40 piastres per picul in 1904, to a mere 25 piastres per 
picul in 1905.
 183  Additionally, members of the Chinese community were traditionally 
reluctant to engage in a bidding war over property confiscated by the French from a 
member of their own community. This left the Colonial Administration facing the very 
real possibility that even were they to auction off the goods, nobody would be willing 
to buy them.  Alternatively, Cudenet suggested that the Administration recoup its 
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losses by fining each member of the community a portion of the tax amount 
outstanding, an amount to be determined based upon each individual’s financial 
situation. He argued against a punitive tax increase, suggesting that increasing local 
taxes to salvage the owed sum, especially in light of Ha Tien’s disastrous year, “would 
be urging them to immigrate to Cambodia, where the tax rate is lower and where 
numerous uncultivated plots of land exist, suitable to be converted into pepper 
plantations.”
184 
In Ha Tien’s political report from March and April 1906, the Assistant 
Administrator Granboulan reported that except for the Hainam congregation, all of Ha 
Tien’s Chinese congregations had paid their personal registration taxes in full. The 
Hainam congregation owed a total of 6,920$00 piastres to the colonial government, 
768$50 piastres of which consisted of unpaid head taxes from 1904 “for which 
[official] dispensations will certainly be necessary by the end of the year.”
185  While 
this resolution might have signaled the end for the president’s ambitions in 
Cochinchina, Ignace was apparently unwilling to admit defeat.  The disgraced leader 
attempted unsuccessfully to maintain his influence in Ha-Tien through his son, who 
joined the congrégation’s presidential race upon the departure of his father.  In this 
instance, the nullification of the election results by Cochinchinese authorities reveals 
the impact of colonial values and interests upon the functioning of Ha-Tien’s Hainam 
congrégation.  Practices that might have been customary in China were forced to 
contend with French hegemony in order to survive, leaving a potential gap between 
what Ha-Tien’s Hainam community might have chosen for itself, and what actually 
resulted from their decision-making process. 
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Conclusion 
In her book, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 
historian Ann Stoler has discussed issues of colonial hegemony and indigenous 
resistance to the colonially-imposed labor paradigm, citing the phenomenon of 
avoidance as a primary means of labor resistance to colonial control.
186  Histori an 
Michael Adas makes a similar point in his article “From Avoidance to Confrontation,” 
which focuses largely upon colonial Burma and Java.
187  Although Stoler and Adas are 
interested in avoidance as practiced by the most subaltern populations of Southeast 
Asia, within the paradigm of colonialism, overseas Chinese were also subordinated to 
colonial will, making the question of confrontation or avoidance equally applicable to 
them.   
Although overseas Chinese leadership typically enjoyed elite status in French 
Indochina, Indochina’s most powerful Chinese often avoided presidential office – and 
thereby colonial entanglements – as well, unwilling to burden themselves with the 
many inconveniences the presidential office entailed.  In this way, Indochina’s most 
powerful Chinese avoided French control by ostensibly remaining outside the official 
congregation structure.  In fact, this distance from community control was somewhat 
imaginary.  Wealthy and powerful congregants were known to treat their congregation 
presidents like lackeys, convinced that they ruled by the sufferance of their social and 
economic betters.  Colonial authorities attempted to mitigate this problem by making 
the congregation president a direct representative of the French with direct access to 
the colonial hierarchy, a commission that included the right to levy fines upon 
recalcitrant congregants; however, the very existence of this authority likely created 
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more problems for the hapless president than it solved.  After all, pulled between 
French colonial authorities and the Chinese elite of his own congregation, the life of 
the president had little to recommend it. 
This is not meant to imply that a congregation president wielded no authority.  
In fact, a skillful president could catch the French in the trap of their own colonial 
imperatives, as was the case with Ignace Bou and Ha Tien’s Hainam congregation.  
When the years long legal battle over the congregation’s head tax was finally decided 
in favor of the local administration, Ha Tien’s administrator found himself unable to 
fine the Hainam congregation for its delinquency. Colonialism’s most pervasive 
imperative, the crowning glory or catastrophic downfall of many a colonial official, 
was profit.  In Ha Tien, this reality proved to be the saving grace of the congregation.  
The border between Cochinchina and Cambodia in the area of Ha Tien was, for all 
intents and purposes, completely imaginary.  Oppressive or punitive fines imposed in 
Cochinchina would quite likely have forced a high percentage of Ha Tiens Hainanese 
across the border into Cambodia, severely impacting the revenue available to Ha 
Tien’s administration.  Unwilling to lose Chinese revenue, even to the Protectorate, Ha 
Tien’s Administrator begrudgingly abandoned any attempt to punish the congregation 
for the misdeeds of its president.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE BANKRUPTCY OF CHOLON’S LY FAMILY, 1871-1913 
Those who made good in one way or another are remembered; far more 
numerous, and, for the countries of Nan Yang as a whole, far more 
important, are the hundreds of thousands of forgotten men, those who 
died as they lived in poverty, or returned penniless to China.  
T’ien Ju-k’ang, The Chinese of Sarawak
188 
In June of 1913, the bankruptcy of a prominent Cantonese businessman by the 
name of Ly Dang illuminated the complex networks connecting Chinese businesses 
across Southeast Asia and in China proper.
189 Ly Dang was a true entrepreneur, a 
scrappy and resilient individual who, upon encountering financial ruin, gathered up the 
pieces of his shattered financial empire to make another run at success. He was also a 
savvy businessman who sought to extend his interests beyond the traditional realms of 
import-export companies and transportation firms and make his fortune by exploiting 
internationally significant trades and opportunities for riskier, but substantially greater, 
profit.  
Ly Dang’s story is enthralling for several reasons.  First, it offers a rare 
glimpse into the life of a Chinese entrepreneur living in Cholon during the twilight of 
the old empire and the birth of the new Chinese Republic. It also provides a tentative 
map of the growth of Chinese business networks across local, regional, and even 
international boundaries.  Of the big picture, Ly Dang’s pecuniary experiences expose 
the vulnerability of Southeast Asian economic enterprises to politics, climate, culture, 
and foreign intervention at both local and international levels. As for Indochina’s 
Chinese community, Ly Dang’s story rests on a foundation of business relationships 
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and inextricably intertwined trade networks that reveal tantalizing hints of the breadth, 
depth, and scale of the ties between Chinese native-place communities that stretched 
from China to Indochina and perhaps beyond.  
By examining the rise and fall of this particular Chinese merchant, this chapter 
will explore Ly Dang’s own networks in greater detail, not only addressing how he 
used firms and relationships to face the circumstances or contingencies that arose, but 
also evaluating how well his particular use of firms and networks served him over the 
years.  In the course of this analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of Ly Dang’s firm 
and network strategies will be evaluated, taking into account the specificities of Ly 
Dang’s colonial environment.  In some respects, the most interesting facet of Ly 
Dang’s life is the constant swinging between success and failure of his pecuniary 
pendulum.  Typically, scholars read only of men who succeeded.  In the case of Ly 
Dang, we see an excellent example of a man who experienced both wild success and 
catastrophic failure. For the purposes of this investigation of networks and hierarchies, 
it is worthwhile to explain both his successes and his failures. Ly Dang’s Indochinese 
roller coaster ride began before he himself ever left his native place of Canton; like 
other children of Chinese immigrants and fortune-seekers, Ly Dang’s story begins 
with his father.   
Ly Dang Senior Sets the Course: 
In 1871, Ly Dang’s father, also named Ly Dang,
190 left Guangdong and moved 
to Cochinchina, where he laid down roots and established his own business. His firm, 
the Kong-Fong-Tai Company, concerned itself with the importation of goods from 
China, and he maintained the connections to his native place by affiliating himself 
with the Cantonese Congregation of Cholon. After laboring diligently for a number of 
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years, Ly Dang Senior’s business in Cholon attained such a level of stability and 
success that he sent back to China, requesting that his sons join him in Cochinchina.  
The two sons, Ly Hieu So
191 and Ly Dang
192, joined their father in Cholon and worked 
alongside him to make the family business prosper.   
Over the years, the business became increasingly successful, and as the family 
prospered, Ly Dang Senior expanded its influence by purchasing shares in other 
Southeast Asian companies throughout Cochinchina and Cambodia. This expansion of 
influence occurred as a result of Ly Dang Senior’s ability and willingness to provide 
venture capital to support the economic endeavors of his Cochinchinese business 
associates.  By the time of the old man’s death in 1893, in addition to their ownership 
of the Kong-Fong-Tai Company, the family owned portions of the Vinh-Duc-Phong 
Company, a firm based in Phnom Penh with branch offices in Cholon; the  Ly-Mau-
Long Company, also of Phnom Penh; the Ly-Wo-Hing house of Cholon; the Quan-Lai 
Company of Chau Đoc; and the Kong-Foc-Long Company of Canton.  Additionally, 
during his time in Cochinchina, Ly Dang Senior had gradually acquired property 
throughout the cities of Cholon and Phnom Penh. The expansion of Ly Dang Senior’s 
business was not haphazard; instead, it followed a common pattern of growth relying 
upon the two factors most critical to overseas Chinese business development in 
Indochina:  native place ties and the established pathways of major regional marketing 
routes.  
Enmeshed in the social and economic safety net provided by Cochinchina’s 
Cantonese communities in the late 19
th century, Ly Dang Senior did not live a solitary 
life.  From the beginning, he enjoyed the support of his native place kinsmen, the 
members of Cholon’s Cantonese congrégation.  This support was far more than 
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nominal.  Not only did the congrégation help him settle in Cholon, find property, and 
establish his business, but as Ly Dang Senior prospered, he himself rose in 
prominence within the congrégation, building personal networks and establishing 
relationships inside Cholon that gave him access first to regional Cochinchinese 
networks and later to larger, more international networks.  As his prosperity increased, 
Ly Dang Senior used those same particularistic ties to expand his interests by entering 
into partnerships with other members of Cholon’s Cantonese congrégation; however, 
admittance to Cholon’s inner sanctum was just the beginning.  From there, Ly Dang 
Senior gained access to the regional and international Cantonese networks that 
provided the foundation for his success.  After spreading from Cholon to Phnom Penh 
and Chau Đoc, Ly Dang Senior reached his own corporate pinnacle.  His financial 
odyssey finally took him back to his native place when he assumed partial ownership 
of the Kong-Foc-Long Company of Canton.  
What made Ly Dang Senior’s business expansion so successful?  Much of the 
existing scholarship on Chinese business emphasizes the uniqueness of the network-
based Chinese business model in comparison to the hierarchical model presented by 
Western firms in China.  As historian Wong Siu-lun writes,  “In the Chinese case, 
entrepreneurs tend to dominate the market by activating particularistic ties such as 
regional networks rather than by building up large, impersonal corporations.”
193 
Historian William Kirby also makes this point, claiming that “with its own 
organizational structures and values rooted in networks of family and regional ties, 
what we may call a ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ resisted the corporate 
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structure.”
194 While the importance of networks to Ly Dang Senior’s business cannot 
be overstated, it would be a mistake to assume that these networks themselves did not 
represent a formal business structure with its own firmly established hierarchy. This 
type of formal hierarchy was embedded in the very structure of the Chinese 
congrégation, an organization where wealth and seniority determined social 
prominence, and thereby decided leadership as well.  
Some background on Chinese congregational networks facilitates a better 
understanding of the cultural web in which Ly Dang Senior enmeshed himself.  The 
connections emerging from the institution of the congrégation were multifaceted. 
These connections ranged in scope and scale from small, personal connections 
between local Cantonese
195 businessmen in Cholon to relationships between 
Cantonese merchants across the five territories of Indochina.  From these business and 
political contacts, relationships back in the native city of Canton evolved, and all of 
these relationships, from the perspective of the Ly family, functioned within the 
context of Cochinchinese-based systems of status and prestige.  Some of these systems 
resembled generic overseas Chinese institutions quite closely, while others, because of 
the long tenure of Chinese merchants and settlers in Indochina, as well as the vagaries 
of French colonial rule, were unique to Indochina’s overseas Chinese population. 
For the purposes of this story, congrégations possess great significance in 
several respects.  As the cornerstone of Chinese social, cultural, religious, political, 
and economic life in Indochina, congregational membership allowed overseas Chinese 
to tap into a vast network of personal connections that could assist them in any aspect 
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of their legal, professional, or personal lives. Intra-congregational contacts assisted 
Chinese with such things as character references for the colonial government, capital 
accumulation for local land and real estate deals, and all sides of the labor issue, from 
helping a new arrival find employment to assisting a wealthy business owner acquire a 
workforce for his factory or corporation.  Inter-congregational contacts, for example, 
contacts between Cantonese congregations in Tonkin and Cochinchina, not only 
assisted members with capital acquisition for business ventures, but also allowed 
increased access to regional markets by providing a reliable conduit for the collection 
of raw materials or the distribution of goods.  
Besides the aforementioned roles, congregations fulfilled two additional 
functions whose importance cannot be overestimated. First, as Chinese organizations 
that were formally sanctioned and mandated by the French colonial government, 
congregations legitimized their members in colonial eyes and the importance of 
congregations in Indochina’s Chinese community ensured that matters important to 
the congregation received, at the very least, a hearing by colonial officials.  Secondly, 
congregations served as direct conduits for contacts with their native places, meaning 
that a congregation did not just have a personal relationship with its native place, but 
enjoyed ties backed by the political and economic authority of the Chinese province 
from which it hailed. Despite the common assumption that overseas Chinese funneled 
money back to their native places in the form of unidirectional remittances to help the 
locality prosper, in the case of Indochina, private interests based in Chinese native 
places also occasionally contributed capital directly to Indochinese business ventures.  
More to the point, companies based in Indochina and their sister companies in Canton 
or Hong Kong frequently shared ownership among the same handful of Chinese 
businessmen, some of whom resided permanently in Indochina and some of whom 
remained permanently in China proper.  
95 
Networks alone did not determine the paths of Ly Dang Senior’s financial 
expansion.  Or perhaps more accurately, Chinese networks themselves developed 
along paths predetermined by geography and the natural flow of capital. The 
colonially established political boundary separating Cochinchina and Cambodia had 
little to do with history, or even with economic reality. Historically, Mac Thien and his 
original band of Chinese pioneers had settled in the coastal areas of the present day 
Ha-Tien province, carving out a territory that included significant parcels of land on 
both the Cochinchinese and Cambodian sides of the border.
196  Though later political 
boundaries divided this territory into two parts, merchandise and capital still surged 
across the political boundary with great ease.  Cholon was the urban center into and 
out of which the vast productive capacity of the Mekong Delta flowed.  Even cities 
such as Phnom Penh paled in comparison to the networking nexus present in Cholon, 
and Ly Dang Senior’s expansion up the Mekong waterways to the Cambodian capital 
represents not only the natural flow of relationships, but also the fundamental realities 
of geography and marketing at work in the region.   
In short, for Ly Dang Senior, partnership in various firms was not simply a 
matter of a gentleman’s agreement.  Based on the concrete examples provided by Ly 
Dang the son, partnership, in the form of shared corporate ownership, resulted only 
when a new member offered substantial capital investment into the mix. The official 
purchase of “shares” in other firms represents a far more formal approach to business 
in general and to partnership in particular than is indicated by the phrase “social 
networks.”  On the one hand, Ly Dang Senior stood as the sole master of his firm, his 
personal financial domain, but on the other hand, this firm existed as merely a single 
nexus, albeit a noteworthy one, in the web of the Cochinchinese Cantonese network.  
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Perhaps more importantly, Ly Dang Senior’s interests fit into the extensive regional 
networks of the Nan Yang Cantonese, a group whose significance in regional trade 
increased tremendously after Canton became China’s premier foreign enclave, thereby 
establishing the Cantonese in the compradorial role that gave them such a mercantile 
advantage.
197  In this context, tactically and strategically, the Kong-Fong-Tai 
Company became Ly Dang Senior’s hierarchical base from which to access the 
financial networks most closely associated with himself, thus providing his original 
firm with a safety net and source of capital that acted as added insurance in the 
capricious financial environment of colonial Cochinchina. 
Ly Dang Junior Takes the Helm 
In 1893, Ly Dang and his brother Ly Hieu So finally had the resources to take 
their own chances with the family fortune. The shares in multiple businesses across 
the region and the ownership of significant real estate in Indochina ensured that Ly 
Dang Senior’s death not only left the two sons with substantial wealth, but also gave 
them the means to maintain and even increase their prosperity if they had the wits and 
good fortune to do so. Upon the death of their father, the two sons took their 
inheritances and followed separate but parallel paths.  Ly Hieu So returned to China to 
take the wheel of the Kong-Foc-Long Company, one of the Cantonese companies in 
which Ly Dang Senior had purchased a percentage prior to his demise. After a short 
time managing the Kong-Foc-Long Company, Ly Hieu So founded another 
corporation, the Kong-Hoi-Yun Company based in Hong Kong. As for Ly Dang, he 
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remained in Cholon and took control of the family assets in Cochinchina and in 
Cambodia.   
Like his brother back in Canton, Ly Dang met with great success in the early 
years of his business. This success is most clearly quantifiable in the case of the Kong-
Fong-Tai Company, which was the business first started by Ly Dang’s father when he 
arrived in Cholon in the 1870’s.  The name Kong-Fong-Tai appears in the second 
category of donations to Cholon’s Cantonese huiguan on a temple stele dating from 
1898, yet another indication of the family’s local prestige;
198 however, 1898 was 
personally momentous for Ly Dang in other ways.  In that year, he joined together 
with four of his local business associates, men by the names of Nam Hee Emile, Chou 
Hap, Phung Nhut, and Chuang Hoi, to found a special association named the Kong-
Cheong-Seng Society.
199 This group existed for the dual purposes of purchasing the 
Ksach-Kandal cotton factory in Cambodia from its French owner, M.M. G. Praire and 
Company, and developing the cotton factory’s production and operation for profit.   
The Kong-Cheong-Seng Society not only represented Ly Dang’s first formal 
personal economic venture, but it also represents a significant step in terms of his 
networking capacity and his own economic independence. Kong-Cheong-Seng was 
not held together by kinship as many of Ly Dang’s earlier endeavors had been; rather, 
native place and connections within the Cholon Chamber of Commerce formed the 
basis for the Kong-Cheong-Seng partnership. The establishment of this company hints 
at Ly Dang’s future goals and intentions; it is easy to imagine the hope and optimism 
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with which he embarked upon his financial future at this time, the initiation of his first 
major interaction with the colonial economic system. By forming the Kong-Cheong-
Seng Company with his partners, he had committed himself, either consciously or 
subconsciously, to remain in Indochina.  Staying in Cochinchina was not necessarily 
an obvious step; after all, his brother Ly Hieu So chose to return to Canton time and 
time again. For this reason, it seems appropriate to express Ly Dang’s decision to 
remain as a commitment.   
At its inauguration, the Kong-Cheong-Seng Company possessed a total capital 
of 240,000 piastres, a sum to which Ly Dang himself had contributed 96,000 piastres. 
In between his efforts to acquire the Cambodian cotton factory, Ly Dang directed the 
rest of his capital towards purchasing prime real estate and property in the city of 
Cholon. Ly Dang’s business associates were not selected at random.  Although some 
of the names are unfamiliar, at least one of his compatriots, Phung Nhut, went on to 
become the leader of the Cantonese tongxianghui in Cholon in the early 20
th century.  
Phong Nhut, whose personal businesses are not as clearly delineated as Ly Dang, also 
appears in historical records as the president of Cholon’s Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in the mid-1910’s, thus indicating his own prominence in the economic life 
of Cholon’s Chinese community.
200  By entering into partnership with these men, Ly 
Dang managed to combine the values of firm and network by taking his relationships 
with these respected Cantonese businessmen and coalescing them into a legally 
binding corporate form.  In this instance we see that this Chinese corporation, wholly 
owned by Cholon Cantonese businessmen and sanctioned by the colonial 
administration, successfully used both networks and firms to get itself off of the 
ground. 
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Although Ly Dang might not have realized it at the time, his decision to remain 
in Cochinchina was geographically significant as well. Ly Dang Senior’s business 
expansions spread west along the Delta waterways to Chau Đoc and then into 
Cambodia.  Ly Dang the son continued this trend when he involved himself in the 
affairs of the Ksach Kandal cotton factory.  This meant that in addition to the family’s 
standard import-export trading in Phnom Penh, Ly Dang undertook a business whose 
foundation was production, necessitating a much greater involvement in the affairs of 
the region.  No longer simply a wealthy shopkeeper or industrial tycoon, Ly Dang now 
had to work with raw materials, manual laborers, temperamental equipment, and the 
vicissitudes of the Cambodian agricultural system. Ly Dang’s clientele dramatically 
changed from its original base of Chinese living abroad and indigenous people who 
wished to buy Chinese products.  
Although the founding of this company indicates the importance of networks 
to Ly Dang’s business, the operation of it required a hierarchical approach, the 
establishment of a firm.  The implementation of corporate processes, specifically 
vertical integration from manufacture to purchasing, could not have been successfully 
undertaken without the presence of a formally established managerial hierarchy; 
however, the corporation really represented a more complex synthesis of both network 
and hierarchy. Marketing and distribution required access to the vast Cantonese trade 
networks stretching across East and Southeast Asia, an access which in turn assured 
the factory’s ability to market its goods across Indochina and overseas to Japan. 
Until his 1913 bankruptcy, his financial record suggests that Ly Dang managed 
to combine firm and network with great skill. In the years immediately following a 
series of financial missteps in 1902,
201 Ly Dang’s businesses were successful across 
the board; however, his greatest success by far came from the cotton factory, which 
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thrived under his leadership.  Venturing into business with his Cantonese compatriots 
gave Ly Dang access to a broader financial world by using the ever-reliable 
springboard of native place networks. Also, by consolidating his hold on the cotton 
factory, Ly Dang was arguably following in the footsteps of his father by operating a 
firm of his own within a larger native place network. Far from moving away from his 
reliance on the network value of his other investors, the Ksach-Kandal consolidation 
represents Ly Dang’s apparently successful attempt to move up the hierarchy of the 
network to a place of greater regional prominence. In other words, rather than being 
content with his role as a two-bit player in the regional economy, Ly Dang positioned 
himself to become a leader whose prestige, both among colonial officials and back in 
Canton, offered him previously unimagined opportunities.  This attempt succeeded 
admirably.  
On the business front, Ly Dang surpassed the aspirations of his father by 
increasing on a grand scale the level at which the family business operated. In the late 
19
th-century, Ly Dang Senior began to branch out, seeking other avenues for profit in 
places like the Mekong Delta, Canton, and Cambodia, but he never really appears to 
have made that final critical step into getting involved with production and 
commodities that trade on an international scale.  Ly Dang Senior had transportation 
and import-export shops; Ly Dang the son ventured into trade in commodities that 
were staples and necessities on an international level. His 1898 purchase of the Ksach 
Kandal cotton factory marks his first step into dealing in international commodities. 
He produced cotton, a global staple, and he intended it for sale overseas, 
understanding that the biggest market for his product was Japan.  Ly Dang controlled 
and directed a lengthy production process involving spinning, weaving, packaging, 
selling, and shipping Cambodian cotton; his primary market was overseas.  In this 
endeavor, Ly Dang departed from his early reliance upon native place networks to  
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establish a real firm requiring a formal managerial hierarchy to operate successfully.  
In other words, he used his networks as a springboard to develop firms with broad and 
diverse reach, in the process enhancing his own wealth and prestige within the 
network. 
Ly Dang Jr. Ventures into Politics 
Ly Dang’s success in Indochina extended beyond typical business-related 
categories; the evidence suggests that Ly Dang was successful on the political front as 
well. In overseas Chinese society in general, wealth and property ownership served as 
a measure for social class and as an entrepôt into an entirely different lifestyle of 
leisure and plenty enjoyed only by the wealthiest echelons of the merchant class.
202 
According to historian Yen Ching-hwang, who researches colonial Malaya, this 
wealth-based class distinction proved important not only within the Chinese 
community itself, but also to colonial authorities.  He writes, 
As wealth was an important prerequisite for Chinese community 
leadership, the wealthy capitalists were given leadership status, and 
those among them who were able, charitable, and with ambition would 
become leaders of the whole community.  In the choice of leadership 
for the dialect and clan organizations, the wealthy were readily 
accepted as leaders because they commanded high status and prestige 
in society and were able to make substantial donations when required.  
To the British colonial government, merchants as a class were desirable 
and useful since they could directly contribute to the growth and 
prosperity of the colonies.
203  
This was not a phenomenon unique to British colonies; Chinese merchants in 
Indochina received preferential treatment at the hands of the French as well.  As with 
most colonial phenomenon, this license proved to be double-edged.   Colonial favor 
granted financial and authoritative benefits to certain members of the Chinese 
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community, but colonial disfavor could be harsh and merciless.  Chinese leaders were 
often held responsible for the misdeeds of the Chinese community at large, an 
accountability that occasionally brought a crushing economic burden to bear upon the 
“favored” Chinese merchant. 
French police intelligence records verify that Ly Dang maintained an intimate 
involvement with the political affairs of the Chinese Republic and had relationships at 
the very highest levels.  For example, in November 1912, Ly Dang received a 
telegram from the “Governor of Canton” himself,
204 requesting that Ly Dang lead the 
effort to procure money from Cholon’s Cantonese community.  The telegram 
requested this money for the purpose of helping China face the difficulties that had 
befallen her in conflicts with Russia over Mongolia. Ly Dang’s concern with an event 
happening in Mongolia, thousands of miles to the north of his own native place of 
Guangdong, serves as a reminder of the burgeoning nationalistic sentiments and 
loyalties felt by these overseas Chinese businessmen.  This event also underscores Ly 
Dang’s prominence in the Chinese community. He personally organized a meeting to 
collect money for China’s cause, and that meeting occurred in the Cholon’s Cantonese 
Pagoda on Rue de Canton on November 24, 1912.
205 According to the Sûreté report on 
the gathering, Ly Dang met with considerable success and collected substantial sums 
of money for the cause. 
This prominence did not evolve solely as a result of Ly Dang’s prestige within 
Cholon’s Cantonese community. Many of the most prominent members of Chinese 
congrégations were involved in secret society activities, and often, the upper echelon 
of overseas Chinese in Indochina enjoyed powerful roles in both the secret societies 
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and the congrégations with which they were affiliated.  In these instances, 
congrégation leaders wielded public and private authority that cemented their place in 
colonial, indigenous, and Chinese politics.  Wealth and standing within a congrégation 
often translated to prominence or even dominance of a Chinese secret society, granting 
depth as well as breadth to the authority wielded by a prominent individual.  Ly Dang 
exemplifies this situation. 
Before the 1911 Revolution, Ly Dang’s reputation in Canton had been 
something less than honorable.  In the spring of 1908, at the behest of the Viceroy of 
Canton,
206 the Cochinchinese government initiated an investigation into the activities 
of Ly Dang and his brother Ly Hieu So, who had been accused of subversive activities 
by the Viceroy administering Canton.
207 At the time of the investigation, Ly Dang sat 
on Cholon’s city council, and enjoyed great respect in Cholon as a result of his 
business acumen, not to mention his general wealth and success.  His brother, Ly Hieu 
So, despite having returned to Canton at the turn of the century, managed interests for 
or assisted in the business affairs of his brother at various times throughout Ly Dang’s 
long career in Indochina.  Both men were well known members of Cholon’s 
Cantonese community who had free access to the perks and privileges of status within 
the congrégation; however, despite the appearance of leading exemplary public lives, 
both men were inscribed upon the rolls of “Bao-Binh-An’” a Chinese secret society.
208 
Ly Dang himself was alleged to be one of the major leaders of the secret society who 
had been responsible not only for instigating at least one major collective action, a 
boycott of American products in 1905, on behalf of the society, but also for enforcing 
                                                 
206 Literally translated from the French, “Viceroy of Canton” is a reference to another position within 
the Chinese provincial administration that is difficult to reliably identify. 
207 Doc.1044, 9 September 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 20072. 
208 Letter No. 678 from the Chief Constable of the city of Cholon to the Central Police Superintendent 
in Saigon, 19 April 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 20072.  
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the boycott within the local Chinese community.
209 As a French investigator phrased 
it, Ly Dang and Ly Hieu So’s “watchword was scrupulously observed because of the 
fear which they knew how to inspire through their continuing relations…with Chinese 
revolutionaries.”
210  In fact, the political acumen of the two brothers eventually caused 
the Viceroy of Canton to request their formal extradition, a request denied by the 
F ren ch  due to a l ack of  concl usi ve evi dence.  Not onl y  were th ey  am on g th e top 
contributors to the revolutionary cause, but Ly Dang’s prominence was such that he 
was rumored to have hosted Sun Yat-sen himself, known by his code name “Takano,” 
either in Indochina or in his native Canton.
211 Ly Dang’s membership in a secret 
society afforded him significant political power, not only within his Cochinchinese 
community, but with Cantonese at large, and this power bloomed directly from the 
extensive Cantonese networks, both open and clandestine, that operated throughout 
Asia and beyond. 
                                                 
209 Police Report dated 4 May 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 20072. The reasons for the boycott are never 
explicitly stated, but the timing of the Indochinese-based boycott, in 1905, combined with the fact that 
Ly Dang was Cantonese, suggests persuasively that this boycott occurred in protest of the 1904 renewal 
of the Sino-American Exclusion Treaty of 1894, which prohibited Chinese immigration into the United 
States.  Anti-American protests and boycotts severely impacted U.S.-based business and commerce in 
China in general, but were particularly far-reaching in Guangding, the province from which most 
Chinese immigrants to the United States hailed.  The circumstances and details of this particular boycott 
are discussed at length in Edward Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution:  The Case of Kwangtung, 
1895-1913 (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1975), 83-90. 
210 Doc. 79c, 24 June 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 20072.  It seems safe to conclude, based on preceding 
sections of this letter, that the “revolutionaries” to which the Lieutenant Governor refers are, in fact, 
members of a secret society.  In archival sources, members of secret societies are often counted as 
revolutionaries, a phenomenon which seems particularly appropriate in the case of the Chinese as so 
many of the Chinese secret societies in Indochina were devoted to overthrowing the Qing dynasty.  As 
Ly Dang himself donated huge sums of money to both the revolutionary cause and later to the new 
Republic, and as he kept company with a number of prominent Chinese revolutionaries up to and 
including Sun Yat-sen, it is probably safe to assume that he was a member of a revolutionary secret 
society. 
211 Note from Chief Constable dated April 7, 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 20072.  
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Ly Dang’s public role as a leader of Cholon’s Chinese community goes 
without question.  He donated to charitable causes, involved himself in the political 
affairs of China, sat on the city council, and managed a business empire that stretched 
across the Mekong Delta and reached from Canton to Cambodia. Although he never 
filled the office of congrégational president, he did occupy other prominent leadership 
roles in Cochinchina, and he also possessed significant authority within his 
congrégation. He demonstrated this authority in numerous ways, not the least of which 
was his ability to call meetings of all Cantonese congrégation members whenever he 
felt it warranted by local or international events.
212 Unfortunately, colonial life was 
fraught with risk. After 1909, his cotton business fell into a steep decline from which 
Ly Dang found himself unable to recover. Despite his prominence and stature, in the 
end, he lost everything he had.   
Ly Dang Jr.’s Sinking Fortunes 
Emboldened by his success in the cotton and real estate markets, in 1900, Ly 
Dang turned his attention towards a new project. Creating yet another business, the 
Kong-Chai-Yun Company, Ly Dang worked to gain entry into the lucrative 
Indochinese salt trade.  Around 1900, the French Colonial Government auctioned off a 
contract guaranteeing the right of exploitation for the salt of Cochinchina to a 
Frenchman named Canavaggio.  Ly Dang hoped to control the transportation and 
distribution of Cochinchinese salt by entering into an exclusive contract between Mr. 
Canavaggio and the new company, Kong-Chai-Yun.  In order to accumulate the 
capital necessary to support his bold plan, Ly Dang was forced to rely upon his 
                                                 
212 CAOM, INDO GGI 19223; CAOM, INDO GGI 20072. In the case of Indochina, the most wealthy 
or powerful members of a congrégation often abstained from the office of congrégation president in 
favor of less powerful – though still prominent – members of the congrégation. In practice, this meant 
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brother, Ly Hieu So.  Ly Dang offered up 50,000 piastres of his own money to the 
Kong-Chai-Yun Company, while Ly Hieu So, acquiring loans on behalf of his brother 
based upon the resources of his own firms in Canton and Hong Kong, provided an 
additional 300,000 piastres to support his brother’s scheme.  The following 
photographs give us some insight into the mechanics of salt mining in early 20th 
century Indochina.  In particular, the exhibited methods of transporting salt by hand 
reveal the labor- and time-intensive nature of the task. 
   
Figure 8 Salt mining
213 
Although Ly Dang’s plan seemed initially promising, two unfortunate 
circumstances conspired against his success.  First, the French Colonial Government 
increased the tax on salt by $.10 per 100 kilograms, greatly impacting the profits of the 
Kong-Chai-Yun Company.  More disastrously, within two years of committing his 
money to Canavaggio, the French colonial authority cancelled the Frenchman’s 
contract, leaving Ly Dang and Ly Hieu So in dire financial straits.  Ly Dang’s foray 
into the Cochinchina salt industry showed an even higher degree of involvement with 
European interests than the cotton factory because in this case, Ly Dang entered into a 
formal contract with Canavaggio, the French owner of the salt concession. A contract 
by nature implies hierarchy, the formality of firm as opposed to network. The salt 
                                                 
213 http://www.postcardman.net/salt.html. Feb 12, 2006. http://www.postcardman.net/salt.html. Feb 12, 
2006.    
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concession points to the most glaring weakness of any of Ly Dang’s endeavors.  What 
the colonial government gave, it could easily take away, rendering both firms and 
networks impotent in the face of colonial might – or just colonial capriciousness. 
Altogether, the Cochinchina salt disaster resulted in a loss of 290,000 piastres 
for Ly Dang, a significant sum of money that had catastrophic consequences for the 
family’s interests in Asia.  Ly Hieu So’s Canton-based company, Kong Foc Long, had 
provided the lion’s share of the money for the salt venture as a loan.  When the news 
of the Kong Chai Yun Company’s collapse reached the business managers of the 
Kong Foc Long Company, the managers understood that this signaled financial ruin 
for them as well and they fled, embezzling 85,000 piastres from the crippled firm as 
they departed and plunging the brothers even further into debt.  
By the close of 1902, Ly Dang and Ly Hieu So faced financial liabilities in the 
amount of 470,000 piastres.  They narrowly escaped total ruin by making special 
arrangements with their creditors to extend the time allowed to repay the money they 
owed. One can only assume that native place connections and loyalty provided a 
haven for the two brothers as they sought to repay their massive liabilities. The 
bankruptcy report specifically says that Ly Dang’s creditors made a special 
arrangement with him whereby he would receive an extension of the time allowable 
for the repayment of his loans.
214 As the report also implies that Ly Dang borrowed 
significant sums of cash from companies and interests in Canton and Hong Kong, it 
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to what we can only assume to be hundreds of thousands of piastres, as the liquidation of all of his 
assets, including both goods and properties, was insufficient to keep him from insolvency.  
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seems reasonable to assume that these companies, perhaps feeling a generosity 
towards Ly Dang inspired by the ties between them (network), allowed him time and 
freedom to recoup his losses and defend his good name. Inevitably, this generosity 
contains an element of self-interest because any firm would choose to recoup what it 
could from a bad loan rather than lose the whole amount, but the fact remains that Ly 
Dang’s creditors offered him an extension as opposed to a stint in debtor’s prison. To 
that end, the two brothers undertook a major restructuring of the family’s assets.   
Ly Hieu So closed his businesses in Canton and Hong Kong and moved back 
to Cochinchina, where he took over the task of managing the Ksach-Kandal cotton 
factory.  He remained in this position for three years until he decided to move back to 
China once more.  Upon deciding to return home, Ly Hieu So and his brother reached 
some sort of private agreement whereby Ly Dang would become the sole owner of all 
of the family’s interests in Cochinchina.  In addition to liquidating his business assets, 
Ly Hieu So sold much of the property he owned in China, allowing him to pay off his 
share of the debt, an amount totaling 30,000 piastres.  After settling their business 
affairs, Ly Hieu So moved back to China where he became a physician, establishing 
his own medical practice which was still operational at the time of his brother’s 1913 
bankruptcy.  As for Ly Dang, he remained responsible for paying back 440,000 
piastres to his creditors.   
The debacle of the Kong Chai Yun Company’s salt venture illuminates both 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Ly family enterprise. The brothers diversified 
their investments and interests by establishing a number of different firms that were 
not only based in different cities, but also pursued entirely different businesses; 
however, the ever-present problem of capital remained. To solve this particular 
difficulty, one company lent money to another, thus creating one of Ly Dang’s most 
serious financial Achilles’ heels.  By having one firm lend money to another, Ly Dang  
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and his brother tied the lending firm to the borrowing firm’s fate.  If, as in the case of 
the salt venture, the borrowing firm collapsed, the lending firm was quite likely to 
follow the borrowing firm into bankruptcy. In the case of the Kong Chai Yun 
Company, this flaw proved even more disastrous because of the nature of the lender.  
Kong Foc Long, the lending firm, belonged to Ly Hieu So, who offered the staggering 
sum of 300,000 piastres to his brother. In this case, the relationship extended far 
beyond particularistic ties into actual kinship, the loyalty of a younger brother to his 
elder brother. No doubt, this relationship increased both firms’ potential liabilities. As 
for the question of why they bothered to have separate firms in the first place, it seems 
likely that different partnerships also had different strengths and weaknesses. After all, 
in Ly Dang’s initial involvement with the Kong-Cheong-Seng Society, the investors 
agreed upon the specific goal of purchasing a cotton factory. Logically, what better 
place would there be for firms to get capital than from other firms in the group?
215  
In 1903, the rest of Ly Dang’s businesses in Indochina were working quite 
smoothly.  He borrowed 96,000 piastres which he used to purchase the shares of three 
of his business partners in the Ksach-Kandal cotton factory enterprise.  His remaining 
partner, Nam Hee Emile, retained a share of the cotton factory until 1905, when Ly 
Dang paid 48,000 piastres to buy out Nam Hee Emile’s ownership as well.  From 
April 1905, Ly Dang became the sole proprietor of the Ksach Kandal cotton factory.  
The reorganization of Ly Dang’s financial affairs suggests a reorientation of the 
balance between firm and network in his corporate dealings.  By slowly buying out his 
partners and consolidating his hold over the Kong-Cheong-Seng company, Ly Dang 
appeared to move away from the network and toward hierarchy; however, this move 
                                                 
215 Ly Dang’s financial track record suggests that he did not eschew the use of banks; however, his 
liability with the Bank of Indochina at the time of his bankruptcy was such that he likely found himself 
unable to borrow significant sums of capital from any source outside of his network.  
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to financial independence does not necessarily mean that Ly Dang disparaged the 
value and usefulness of his networks in general. 
Beginning in 1910, Ly Dang once again faced calamitous circumstances 
beyond his control. The Ksach Kandal cotton factory enjoyed one primary market for 
its cloth: Japan.  When business was good, the Japanese market served Ly Dang quite 
well but disaster struck in 1910 when strikes and anti-Japanese boycotts led by the 
Chinese raged across Indochina and the other nations of Southeast Asia. The Chinese 
boycotted Japanese goods and the Japanese returned the favor, refusing to purchase 
any goods made in China or by Chinese interests elsewhere. While this boycott had 
serious consequences throughout the region, it proved disastrous for the Ksach Kandal 
Cotton factory because, at that time, Cambodian cottons were sold almost exclusively 
on the Japanese market.  As a result of these boycotts, the factory operated 50,000 
piastres in the red for the year 1910.  
The Japanese boycott was the first hit in a series of blows that devastated the 
Cambodian cotton mill and ultimately caused Ly Dang’s bankruptcy. Circumstances 
did not improve for Ly Dang in 1911 when abnormal rains fell much earlier in the 
year than expected, completely annihilating Cambodia’s entire cotton crop. Ly Dang, 
like most participants in agriculturally based industries, had already dedicated to other 
projects a portion of the money he expected to earn during the 1911 season.  This 
situation left him with an additional 107,000 piastres loss by the end of that year. 
His 1911 debt signaled the beginning of the end for Ly Dang’s business 
ventures.  As his losses increased, his available credit decreased, and his attempts to 
raise private funds to sustain the factory were hampered when he defaulted on 
promised purchases and deliveries.  In the end, he was forced to take out loans and 
advances on property and goods already mortgaged to the full extent of their value.  
As a result, interest payments combined with regular payments on loans to equal an  
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amount so great that it covered all of his assets completely, effectively crippling Ly 
Dang’s financial empire.  A better harvest in 1912 resulted in a profit of around 80,000 
piastres for the Ksach-Kandal cotton factory; unfortunately, this amount was 
insufficient even to cover the interest that Ly Dang owed to his creditors. Throughout 
the 1912 season, Ly Dang struggled to find a solution to the mounting catastrophe but 
he was eventually forced to acknowledge the inevitable. Chased by creditors and 
plagued by payments he had no chance of making, Ly Dang formally declared 
bankruptcy in May 1913.
216 
Over a nine-year period extending from 1903 to 1913, Ly Dang had managed 
to repay 430,000 piastres of his 440,000 piastres debt.  By his 1913 bankruptcy, he had 
only failed to repay 10,000 piastres of the original money he had lost during the 
Cochinchina salt disaster.
217  Unfortunately, his total financial situation was much 
more serious.  In order to recoup his original debt as quickly as possible, Ly Dang had 
borrowed even more money in order to have capital to use in his assorted business 
ventures.   In a letter to the Governor General written on May 19, 1913, Indochina’s 
Prosecutor General estimated that Ly Dang’s financial liabilities exceeded one million 
piastres.  He owed the bulk of that money to two different creditors: 600,000 piastres 
to the Bank of Indochina, and another 80,000 piastres to the Chinese manager of the 
cotton factories of Haiphong and Nam Đinh.
218  The Bankruptcy Tribunal estimated 
his total debt at 1,360,000 piastres, and although he possessed assets totaling 
1.112.000 piastres, approximately 600,000 piastres of those assets were guaranteed by 
mortgages held in Saigon and in Phnom Penh.  The Bank of Indochina also claimed 
                                                 
216 Telegram N°79-C, CAOM, INDO GGI 19223 
217 Mémoire Sommaire, CAOM, INDO GGI 19223. 
218 Letter N°236. CAOM, INDO GGI 19223.  
112 
that large sums of Ly Dang’s available capital had been sent back to China in the form 
of donations intended to help the new Republic.
219 
The course of Ly Dang’s bankruptcy sheds a bit of light on the issue of firm 
versus network in his financial life.  The tremendous debt owed to the Bank of 
Indochina evidences a more corporate leaning, suggesting that Ly Dang adhered to a 
formal, more Western hierarchical structure and even interacted with western colonial 
entities in his quest for profit.  On the other hand, the hefty sum Ly Dang owed to the 
Cantonese cotton firms in Haiphong and Nam Đinh shows that he had not abandoned 
his reliance on regional Cantonese networks.  The importance of networks finds 
further emphasis in the assertion that Ly Dang remitted considerable donations to the 
new Chinese Republic. The critical point to understand when dealing with 
Cochinchina’s Cantonese networks is that networks were both economic and political.  
Economic power required political power, and vice versa, a situation further 
complicated by the fact that neither economic nor political power were attainable in 
French Indochina without some cooperation with the colonial government. In view of 
Ly Dang’s burgeoning influence and growing status in Cholon's Chinese community, 
Ly Dang’s frequently alternating reliance upon firm and network becomes much more 
understandable. 
In terms of Ly Dang’s bankruptcy, another type of hierarchy assumed a central 
role in the dissolution of his corporate interests: the French colonial government.   
Using the Government of Cochinchina’s administrative hierarchy, the French 
investigated Ly Dang’s liabilities and the reasons underlying his financial collapse.  
They interviewed his creditors and, through the courts, arranged the dismantling and 
sale of his empire.  The colonial administrative hierarchy was, in all respects, far more 
formal and rigidly structured than the Cantonese networks that typically competed but 
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occasionally cooperated with it.  While personal connections in both Indochina and in 
France contributed significantly to a French colon’s success in the colony, individual 
rank within a meticulously organized and hierarchical system of agencies and 
organizations largely defined one’s power in the colony.  This same pyramid of 
administrative authority formally defined the procedures to be followed by the 
administrative hierarchy in the event of any number of political or economic 
occurrences, including Ly Dang’s bankruptcy.  Although this hierarchy was patently 
colonial rather than Chinese, it still played the most significant role in managing Ly 
Dang’s collapse. 
Cholon’s Chinese Community Rallies Around Ly Dang 
The very colonial government responsible for many of the vicissitudes of Ly 
Dang’s financial empire also oversaw its dissolution.  The French administration 
quickly appointed a bankruptcy manager to see to the sale or auction of all of Ly 
Dang’s property, goods, and merchandise, but Cholon’s Chinese networks supported 
Ly Dang until the very end.  Bales of cotton in storage in Cambodia sold quite easily 
to French buyers but when the French administration attempted to liquidate Ly Dang’s 
property in Cholon, they ran into difficulties. The circumstances of Ly Dang’s 
bankruptcy were subject to review by a French tribunal attached to Saigon’s 
commercial court. During the investigation, Ly Dang was imprisoned for an indefinite 
length of time pending the court’s final judgment.  When the agent responsible for 
liquidating the contents of Ly Dang’s Cholon properties approached the Chinese 
community looking for buyers, he met with little success. “Having anticipated that 
several of Cholon’s storekeepers would be likely to [buy the contents of Ly Dang’s 
shops], they did not want to make us offers, fearing, no doubt, the difficulties and the  
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cost [associated with] the bankruptcy and with Ly Dang’s incarceration.”
220  The agent 
in charge, A.F. Decoly, goes on to say that they have not given up hope of finding a 
buyer willing to purchase the goods before they go to auction. He insists that if the 
French are forced to sell the goods at auction, they will not recoup enough of their 
value, adding that he “has it on good authority that [an auction] would be boycotted by 
Chinese buyers.”
221 This interesting conclusion to the agent’s letter reinforces Ly 
Dang’s prominence within the higher circles of Cholon’s Chinese community.  It also 
reveals a tantalizing hint of the solidarity of Cholon’s Chinese population by 
highlighting their unwillingness to take unfair advantage of one of their own.  
While Ly Dang’s story has frequently shown the weakness of the network in 
terms of its competitiveness on an international scale, the final disposition of his 
property shines as a premier example of the loyalty of Cholon’s Cantonese community 
at large. Ly Dang found some moral support in his Cochinchinese community, which 
refused to purchase from the French the goods sitting on the shelves of Ly Dang’s 
shops and warehouses.  Other reasons could exist for the refusal of the Chinese 
community to profit from Ly Dang’s misfortune; however, it would be very difficult 
to say that the small-scale boycott offered up by Cholon’s Chinese community showed 
no solidarity with the unfortunate, imprisoned Ly Dang.
222  In fact, the consistency of 
the boycott suggests that Cholon’s Cantonese community enjoyed access to a broad 
reaching network that was at least semi-structured, if not formally established. 
Catalyzing and enforcing a citywide boycott required complicated planning and 
logistics suggestive of a network that not only extended broadly across the fields and 
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professions of Cantonese Cholon, but also reached deeply into the community to touch 
Cantonese from every walk of life. 
Curiously, some speculation circulated about the true nature of Ly Dang’s 
pecuniary collapse. The French subjected Ly Dang and Ly Hieu So to numerous 
investigations, particularly after the collapse of their empire due to bankruptcy in 
1913, when it was alleged that the two men had possibly falsified the bankruptcy in 
order to avoid repaying their creditors.
223 Ly Dang’s involvement in the Bao-Binh-An 
society stood as the cornerstone of these allegations. French investigations identified 
many discrepancies in Ly Dang’s financial past, but formal secret society association 
was never proven, and the French, in part because of Ly Dang’s extremely high profile 
in Cholon and Saigon, eventually allowed the brothers to continue on their way;
224 
however, regardless of the bankruptcy’s legitimacy, there was little doubt that the two 
Ly’s had engaged in rather underhanded activities, strongly indicating their attachment 
to some form of clandestine organization.  Perhaps this explains the limits to the 
solidarity shown by Cholon businessmen.  They refused en masse to participate in the 
dismantling of Ly Dang’s empire, but local networks did not extend far enough to 
intercede by lending him money and stopping the dismantling in the first place; 
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INDO GGI 20072.  
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however, if Ly Dang’s bankruptcy were, in fact, illegitimate, the apparent non-
responsiveness of the Chinese community takes on a different meaning. 
Coincidentally, Ly Dang’s bankruptcy and the 1930’s collapse of Singapore 
icon Tan Kah Kee parallel one another in a number of striking ways.  Both individuals 
were successful businessmen who raised enormous sums for political causes back in 
China.  Both also suffered through bankruptcies that some speculated were less than 
genuine.  In truth, with the passage of nearly 100 years, it is impossible to verify Ly 
Dang’s bankruptcy, leaving us only with speculation.  That being the case, this paper 
operates under the assumption that Ly Dang’s financial collapse was genuine, as were 
the causes leading to it. This is the only position for which we have considerable 
documentary verification. 
Conclusion 
Scholars of business in China typically couch their arguments in terms of 
hierarchies or firms, which are considered “Western” by nature, and networks, which 
are considered “Chinese” by nature; however, how do these notions apply to overseas 
Chinese business in Southeast Asia? In his book Encountering Chinese Networks, 
historian Sherman Cochran problematizes these categories, writing, “By drawing a 
seemingly timeless distinction between Western businesses with hierarchies and 
Chinese businesses with networks, they have run the risk of essentializing Western 
and Chinese businesses…it does not allow for the possibility that a corporation 
(regardless of whether it was owned by Westerners, Japanese, or Chinese) learned to 
deal with and make use of both hierarchies and networks.”
225 Using Cochran’s 
statement as a point of departure, the goal of this chapter has been to examine the 
notions of firm and network as they operated in French Indochina at the turn of the 
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19
th century by taking a closer look at the life and businesses of the Cantonese 
merchant, Ly Dang. 
Some China specialists have suggested that Chinese merchants managed to 
stay in control of local business arrangements regardless of the authority imposed 
upon them by Western corporate hierarchies.  As Sherman Cochran summarizes, 
“Never, they have maintained, did western (and other non-Chinese) corporations in 
China wrest control over marketing from Chinese merchants at any time during this 
period.”
226  While writings from scholars such as Rhoads Murphey, Hao Yen-p’ing, 
and Dwight Perkins might support this claim as it relates to private Western firms, the 
question takes on new shades of meaning when applied to Indochina, where, in some 
cases, the line between “corporate” and “colonial” did not exist at all.  This begs the 
question, how did Chinese businessmen and networks persevere in the face of colonial 
pressure, whether legal, political, or economic? 
The endurance and success of Cantonese entrepreneurship depended largely 
upon the deep roots the Cantonese community had across the region, with other urban 
Cantonese, local and regional colonial authorities, and even Chinese and French 
administrators on the international level.  These roots existed in the form of a three-
part pyramid of networks and hierarchies encompassing everything from a friendship 
between two Cantonese shopkeepers in the rural Mekong Delta to a community’s 
ability to engage on its behalf the authority of the Chinese Consul in France.  The 
pyramid consisted of informal Cantonese networks, Cantonese networks and 
hierarchies that mediated with French Authorities, and networks and hierarchies under 
French Colonial rule. 
Informal Cantonese networks served as the first and most basic building blocks 
of an overseas Chinese business empire in Indochina. Without the basic relationships 
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formed between local businessmen in Indochina, relatives or acquaintances from back 
in Canton, and the partnerships that emerged as a result, the quest for financial glory 
would have been doomed from the start. In Ly Dang’s case, he maintained the 
network-based components of his business by cultivating close connections with his 
native place, a relationship forged by his father in the previous century and kept alive 
for a number of years by the personal and fiduciary investments of his brother, Ly 
Hieu So, in the cities of Canton and Hong Kong.   
Ly Dang continued his reliance upon native place connections and informal 
networks when he encouraged the growth of his financial empire across Indochina, 
owning businesses or being invested in companies that stretched across Cochinchina 
along the major waterways west into Cambodia as well.  While his father, Ly Dang 
Senior, began this process of diversification, Ly Dang himself continued it by 
acquiring shares in new industries and companies whenever he felt inclined; however, 
Ly Dang extended his own business network far beyond the traditional import and 
export services established by his father.  Much of this expansion, as in the case of the 
Kong-Cheong-Seng Society which allowed Ly Dang to purchase the Ksach-Kandal 
cotton factory, developed through Ly Dang’s association with Cholon’s Cantonese 
congrégation and by means of the relationships he developed there. In these ways, 
although he was exceptionally successful, Ly Dang typifies the overseas Chinese 
businessman in Indochina. He took full advantage of accessible local and native-place 
networks and used them as the springboard to make his fortune. 
Although informal Chinese networks remained quite discrete, Chinese 
interaction with French authorities did occur. Formal Cantonese networks and 
hierarchies mediated with French authorities when necessary to protect individual 
Chinese businessmen or the Chinese community as a whole.  Typically, this mediation 
occurred under the auspices of the congrégation, which was the organization  
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responsible for initiating and enforcing the boycott on Ly Dang’s repossessed goods at 
the end of his Indochinese business career. Important congrégation members often 
held significant positions in local, French-created civic government,
227 thus giving 
them greater leverage when conflicts emerged. Congrégations maintained their roles 
as the 19
th century flagships of Sino-French mediation in Indochina, and not until the 
1920’s did Chinese Chambers of Commerce begin to usurp congrégational authority. 
Hierarchies under French Colonial rule also played substantial roles in 
overseas Chinese business life.  Ly Dang consistently tried to broaden the scope and 
range of his businesses, stalwartly branching out into regions and trades he sought to 
control to his benefit.  This branching out forced Ly Dang into a position of great 
vulnerability.  Political conflict, natural disaster, and fickle colonial administrations 
possessed a great capacity to damage or destroy Ly Dang’s carefully devised plans. 
This vulnerability to events occurring in nations across the globe proves that Ly Dang 
undertook a process of internationalization with his businesses, but it also reveals the 
immense fragility of his empire, which, despite the deep roots Ly Dang possessed in 
informal Chinese networks and even Chinese organizations capable of mediating with 
the French, could be destroyed by flood, treachery, or the indifferent French colons.   
Kinship and particularistic ties within overseas Chinese business endeavors 
maintained an enduring importance that colonial authority could not overshadow; 
however, the French colonial government possessed the authority to severely restrict 
the effectiveness of local business ventures, which, on a case by case basis, essentially 
limited Chinese networks to the realm of personal significance (whether personal 
relationships or personal finances) as opposed to corporate; however, despite these 
colonial limitations, Ly Dang’s career seems to have followed the pattern first 
suggested by Cochran at the beginning of this chapter. Ly Dang achieved his financial 
                                                 
227 Such as Ly Dang’s position on Cholon’s city council.  
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success because, using Cochran’s words, he “learned to deal with and make use of 
both hierarchies and networks.”
228 Operating a French salt concession or running an 
international cotton factory in Cambodia required the cooperation of French 
authorities.  When that cooperation was withdrawn, as in the case of the salt 
concession, financial catastrophe resulted. On the other hand, successfully utilizing 
both business models proved to be a bit of a sticky wicket; in fact, in this regard, Ly 
Dang’s ultimate failure seems to have arisen as a direct result of his inability to 
compensate for the weaknesses of these two business styles, or to meld them together 
seamlessly within a colonial context. 
                                                 
228 Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks, 6.  
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CHAPTER 5:  OUR BROTHERS’ KEEPERS: MUTUAL AID IN THE 
CONGREGATIONS 
Like the huiguan and gongsuo that predated them, Congrégations fulfilled a 
number of vitally important functions for the communities in which they were located.  
Far more than simple guilds meant to encourage business and stimulate trade, Chinese 
congrégations existed as the keystones of Indochina’s overseas Chinese communities, 
governing, or at the very least taking a hand in, every aspect of overseas Chinese life.  
Thematically, the roles and responsibilities of the congrégations fall into three basic 
categories: social and cultural responsibilities, political and governance 
responsibilities from the Chinese perspective, and responsibilities required of the 
Chinese community by the French administration.  Though they represent a 
convenient way of approaching the many functions undertaken by Chinese 
congrégations, in actual fact, these categories were far from discrete. The spheres of 
responsibility for fulfilling social, cultural, and political functions within a 
congrégation often overlapped and large areas of contested responsibility existed, 
especially with regard to French demands on the resources and leadership of the large 
urban congrégations.  
Overseas Chinese lived lives fraught with danger and uncertainty.  The natural 
disasters that destroyed crops and leveled factories also took lives, and in the 
Indochinese wilderness, injury, plague, and death were always lurking just around the 
corner.  For Chinese expatriates who had left their native places in search of profit, 
fortune was a fickle friend.  Despite the proximity to China, many overseas Chinese 
never made it back to the villages they called home.  Even for those who survived 
colonial life, financial misfortune could strike unexpectedly.  No one could predict 
when bankruptcy or illness, fire or death, might leave an individual in desperate need 
of material assistance.  In these times, Chinese congregations assumed their mutual aid  
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functions, acting as social insurance for their members abroad.  While these charitable 
functions are interesting in their own right, the anecdotes emerging from these roles 
also give us insight into areas of cooperation and conflict between the overseas 
Chinese and the French.  Congregations participated in local and international disaster 
relief, supported congregational hospitals, and dealt with all of the issues surrounding 
death, including cemetery operation, burial, and the repatriation of bones.  These are 
their stories. 
Poverty Relief and Local Disaster Relief 
While congregations concerned themselves with events back in China, they 
also provided relief to victims of “backyard” disasters.  Floods and epidemics were 
commonplace, but even more frequent and frightening were the fires that raged across 
Cholon’s quays on a regular basis.  The French admiralty commented upon these 
horrific events as early as March 13, 1867, when the Captain in charge of Cholon’s 
military forces reported a blaze at 3:45 in the morning on the Quai de Mytho that was 
shocking in its intensity.  “Indeed, flames of considerable height rose in the air and 
cast upon the city a light that would have made one suppose that a whole district was 
on fire.”
229  A similar fire occurred in 1868, and in 1907, in a mere 17 day span, two 
different fires killed or wounded dozens of Chinese and Vietnamese and destroyed 2 
companies, causing in excess of 700,000 francs in damage.
230 
In these types of situations, whether they affected the congregation specifically 
or the Chinese community at large, congregations often intervened to help their 
countrymen in need.  Most often, this assistance came in the form of donated goods or 
community fundraising, but occasionally they contributed labor or services as well.  In 
                                                 
229 Military Commander of Cholon to Commandant of Troops in Cochinchina, 13 March 1867, CAOM, 
INDO GGI 12697. 
230 Lieutenant governor to Governor general, 15 March 1907 & 2 April 1907, CAOM, INDO GGI 
17642.  
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the dead of night on the 14/15 of February 1879, a fire exploded behind the brick 
houses on the Quai de Binh Cay.  Sixteen brick sheds
231 were destroyed, but the quick 
action of the congregations saved the many residences in the area.  Although all of the 
congregations arrived with their pumps to combat the blaze, the Phuoc Kien 
congregation received high praise for arriving the earliest and, therefore, doing the 
most good at the scene.
232  
International Disaster Relief 
Responsibilities of the congregation extended well beyond events in the cities, 
or even the countries, in which the congregations were based.  The status of a 
congregation depended not only upon its political and economic equity in its adopted 
country, but also upon the way in which people from the congregation’s native place 
viewed the organization.  Wealthy overseas Chinese individuals enhanced the prestige 
of a congregation by pursuing such tasks as building schools or large houses in their 
hometowns,
233 but the surest way to foster goodwill in one’s native place was to rise to 
the occasion during times of need.  Remittances catalyzed by disaster were considered 
acts of necessity more than generosity, and were used to alleviate grim conditions 
caused by plagues, famine, flooding, or other unpredictable catastrophes. 
In 1902 and 1903, a famine in Canton stirred the Cantonese congregations of 
Saigon and Cholon to action to alleviate the suffering of their brethren.  This famine 
occurred as a result of sudden increase in rice prices, leaving many poor Cantonese in 
                                                 
231 By this, I mean huts made of straw that were used to house bricks. 
232 Administrator of Cholon’s Weekly Report, 15 February 1879, CAOM, INDO GGI 10588. 
233For example, historian Madeline Hsu tells the story of a Cantonese businessman who, upon making 
his fortune on the west coast of the United States, returns to his native county to build seven identical 
townhouses, all in a row, for his seven wives in China.  Madeline Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of 
Home: Transnationalism and migration Between the United States and South China, 1882-1943 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).  
124 
dire straits.
234  These efforts of the Cantonese community were led by six prominent 
Chinese, including Phung Nhut, at the time a city councilor who would eventually 
become president of Cholon’s Cantonese Congregation and of the Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce.
235  The Cantonese requested and received permission from the 
Lieutenant Governor to start up a fund based on collections received from Cantonese 
donors throughout the metropole “in order to help our fellow countrymen.”
236  This 
petition is particularly interesting because of the light it sheds upon intra-Cantonese 
competition in the Nanyang, as well as upon the awareness had by the Cantonese of 
colonial rivalry.  After explaining the dire situation in Canton and requesting 
permission to take up a collection for relief, the petitioners add, “We have the honor to 
send you the present request to obtain permission to open said subscription in Cholon 
and Saigon, following the example of what has been done in Singapore, in Penang, 
and in the Malay States.”
237   
First, the fact that the Cantonese mentioned the similar subscriptions already 
underway in the Malay Peninsula suggests that they keenly felt the need to jump on 
the native place bandwagon to avoid being completely overshadowed by huiguan in 
other places.  There can be little doubt that the Cantonese community in Singapore 
commanded greater respect and authority back in Guangdong than did the Indochinese 
Cantonese congregations.  The same is probably true for the combined influence of the 
                                                 
234 Letter from the Mayor of Cholon to the Lieutenant Governor, 17 Octobre 1902, TTLTQG2, 
GOUCOCH IA.8/082(6). 
235 Other prominent Cantonese signing the petition included Tchang Hsueh Lin, Han K’un, Wang Hsieh 
Hieu, and Lin Wen Chu (I found at least two of the signatures on the petition to be illegible). Petition 
from Cantonese Community to the Lieutenant Governor, 30 Mars 1903, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IA.8/082(6). 
236 Petition from Cantonese Community to the Lieutenant Governor, 30 Mars 1903, TTLTQG2, 
GOUCOCH IA.8/082(6). 
237 Petition from Cantonese Community to the Lieutenant Governor, 30 Mars 1903, TTLTQG2, 
GOUCOCH IA.8/082(6).  
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Malayan huiguan versus those of the Indochinese Cantonese; however, that does not 
mean that Indochina’s congregations, and specifically the congregations in 
Cochinchina, were insignificant.  As this dissertation has already demonstrated, they 
held significant corporate and real estate assets in Guangdong and in Hong Kong, not 
to mention the influence they were occasionally able to wield with French authorities, 
an influence Cantonese living in British ruled areas were clearly unable to match.  It is 
not surprising, therefore, that Cochinchina’s Cantonese felt a bit of competition with 
their Malayan counterparts and worked hard to be taken seriously, both in their native 
counties and among their brethren based in different overseas locales. 
Secondly, this final appeal shows great sophistication in terms of the manner in 
which it approached the Cochinchinese administration.  While the French showed no 
indication of wanting to deny this request, in general, any appeal brought to the French 
could be a bit of a crapshoot.  While colonial authorities nearly always upheld colonial 
law, interpretations varied widely, and permission was often withheld based on 
technicalities that had more to do with colonial capriciousness or paranoia than with 
any particular aspect of Indochinese legislation.  That being said, French sensitivity 
with regard to the success of the British in Asia knew few bounds.
238 If the British felt 
secure enough to allow such a subscription to occur, and to seem compassionate and 
beneficent in the progress, then what possible reasons could the French devise for 
refusing to do so?   
Of course, Cantonese efforts to help their brethren were also occasionally 
appreciated by the colons.  In 1907, Cantonese businessmen in Cholon, again faced 
with severe famine in the native place, “decided to donate 100 tons of rice to the 
                                                 
238 This sensitivity, its origins, and history have been amply documented in Cady, The Roots of French 
Imperialism.  
126 
French hospital in Canton for free distribution to the sick and needy.”
239  The French 
Consul quickly telegrammed his thanks for the gift and asked that his gratitude be 
conveyed to the donating Chinese;
240 however, gifts in colonial times occasionally met 
with logistical hurdles and this particular remittance was no exception. At that time, 
due to vagaries in the international market, rice was cheaper in Hong Kong than it was 
in Saigon.  In the end, the Cantonese businessmen chose to send 2000 piastres to the 
French Consul in Canton with a letter asking him to use the money to buy the same 
amount of rice that Cholon’s Cantonese originally had intended to ship to their 
compatriots.
241  
In fact, in 1935, charitable activities undertaken by the Chinese community 
received a valuable boost with the efforts to create an official committee intended to 
oversee and organize the aid and relief efforts administered by Cochinchina’s Chinese.  
The General Committee to Aid the Victims of China was led by a 13 member 
commission consisting of two members each of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
the Sept-Pagodes, the Dietary Limitation Committee, the General Committee of the 
KMT in Indochina, the General Syndicate of Chinese Workers, and the Chinese 
School Union, plus one representative of the Chinese press.
242  The Dietary Limitation 
Committee first proposed the establishment this charitable board, and under the 
patronage of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, it was quickly inaugurated, in part to 
help aid the victims of the terrible floods that swept China in 1935.  This disaster is 
particularly interesting from the standpoint of the organization of Indochina’s Chinese 
                                                 
239 Telegram N°378 from the Governor general to the French Consul in Canton, 28 April 1907, CAOM, 
INDO GGI 20310. 
240 Telegram N°4 from the Consul of France in Hong Kong to the Governor General, 1 May 1907, 
CAOM, INDO GGI 20310. 
241 Telegrams N°s 629 & 630 from the Governor General to the French Consul in Canton, 18-19 June 
1907, CAOM, INDO GGI 20310. 
242 Note N°4110 from the Governor of Cochinchina, 9 August 1935, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IIA.45/215(E.111).    
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community because while 10,000 piastres were to be sent to aid the victims, more than 
half of that sum was to be taken from the funds held in reserve for the Dietary 
Limitation Committee in an account in Hong Kong.
243   
During the Sino-Japanese War, charitable remittances increased significantly 
in frequency and scale.  Small fund-raising efforts occurred year round in the overseas 
Chinese community, especially around the anniversaries of tragic days or events in 
Chinese history.  In 1938, when flooding on the Yellow River again devastated 
northern China, the Chinese Association of Egg Merchants raised 4000 piastres to help 
the flood victims.  Also in 1938, the Chinese Consul in Hanoi began soliciting funds 
to use to purchase cholera vaccines to help with the epidemics raging through China.  
His efforts raised 30,000 piastres for the cause.
244  The boost given to charitable 
participation in Indochina’s Chinese community during the war was doubtless due 
more to the increased politicization of the community as a whole than to any increase 
in generosity among the population at large, but while the war and her victims might 
have stirred the overseas Chinese to contribute, this largesse was merely the 
continuation of a long history of benevolence when it came to helping their 
countrymen in need. 
Chinese Hospitals  
For Indochina’s overseas Chinese population, illness and hospitalization were 
also matters that fell into the bailiwick of the congregation.  Congregationally specific 
hospitals provided financial benefit to their members by giving them access to 
reasonable and, for them, recognizable health care, but the benefits for culture and 
morale were even greater.  For the Chinese in general, treatment at an institution 
                                                 
243 Note N°3961 from the Governor of Cochinchina, 2 August 1935, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IIA.45/215(E.111).   
244 Summary of Anniversary of Sino-Japanese hostilities in Shanghai, 13 August 1938, TTLTQG2, 
GOUCOCH IIA.45/254(4).    
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whose medical practices resembled those with which they were most familiar must 
have been comforting.  The added benefit of health practitioners speaking an 
individual’s own dialect not only must have been comforting, but also must have 
reduced the potential for misunderstandings and serious mistakes with regard to 
diagnosis and treatment.  Cultural benefits aside, however, the realm of health care 
was openly contested by Chinese practitioners and sufferers, and the French, who 
viewed public heath as a matter of critical concern to the colonial apparatus.   
Major congregations often sought to construct hospitals of their own to deal 
with the growing demands of their communities in the area.  In the case of the Trieu 
Chau congregation, they chose, under the direction of their president, Tiêt Hung Loi, 
to build a hospital on the site of their former congregational cemetery.
245  For the 
Trieu Chaus, the desire to build a hospital was particularly pressing because the 
Cantonese and Fujianese congregations already operated hospitals in Cholon; 
however, it had taken the Trieu Chaus many years to reach the implementation stage, 
primarily because of French resistance.  As the President of the Municipal 
Commission explained things, “[The Trieu Chau congregation] had even acquired land 
bordering the Low Road for that purpose; but, [such an institution] being inappropriate 
for this location because of the immediate proximity to European houses, I decided 
that this congregation must abandon the project.”
246 Building a hospital on the grounds 
of the old cemetery seemed less offensive to the French, however, who were not 
bothered by the inauspiciousness or irony of the situation.  “On the contrary, the 
ground presently under consideration is very well situated for the construction of an 
establishment of this kind; it is, in effect, in the Chinese hospital district, far from any 
                                                 
245 Letter from the President of Cholon’s Trieu Chau congregation to the President of the Municipal 
Commission, 17 July 1915, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.8/1814(7). 
246 Letter from the President of the Municipal Commission to the Governor of Cochinchina, 19 August 
1915, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.8/1814(7).  
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European houses.”
247  This time, the request to open a Trieu Chau hospital was 
approved.
248 
Eventually, the furor to open Chinese hospitals reached such a height that an 
order of the Governor was promulgated simply to regulate the establishment, function, 
and medical limits of these institutions.  For example, no Chinese hospital was 
allowed to knowingly admit or tend to any patients infected with plague, cholera, or 
small pox.  The new laws applied to all congregational hospitals, and existing 
hospitals, irrespective of the duration of their previous operations, had only one month 
to reapply for an operating permit as required by the new guidelines.
249  The purpose 
of this new legislation was to tighten control, not only over the administration of the 
Chinese hospitals, which rested in the hands of each congregation, but also over the 
quality and style of medicine practiced in each place, because the Chinese hospitals 
were deemed “hotbeds of epidemic right in the middle of Cholon.”
250  The solution to 
this problem was first suggested as it pertained to Cholon’s Cantonese hospital, an 
institution whose financial snafus were apparently quite notorious as evidenced in an 
exchange between the President of the Municipal Commission and the Congregation 
President:   
You know as well as I that the situation of Cholon's Chinese hospitals, 
and most particularly of the Cantonese hospital, cannot continue 
without compromising their very existence. I indicated to you most 
notably that the Cantonese hospital, having no civil status, had 
purchased the grounds on which [the hospital] is built in the name of a 
congregation president and, because of the bankruptcy of the 
                                                 
247 Letter from the President of the Municipal Commission to the Governor of Cochinchina, 19 August 
1915, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.8/1814(7). 
248 Arrêté by the Governor of Cochinchina, 25 August 1915, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.8/1814(7). 
249 Arrêté by A. Le Fol, Governor p.i. of Cochinchina,  30 September 1926, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
VIA.8/314(2). 
250 Letter to the Governor of Cochinchina from the President of the Municipal Commission, 27 July 
1926, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH VIA.8/314(6).  
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congregation president, these grounds risked being sold as bankruptcy 
property.
251 
The solution to these woes, while of undetermined origin,
252 seems to have 
been inspired.  By converting all of the Chinese hospitals into charitable associations, 
each group suddenly became a civil entity completely under the supervision of the 
Cochinchinese administration, more specifically, the Office of Public Health and 
Hygiene.
253  This not only allowed for the regular inspection of Chinese hospital sites, 
but also required a higher level of training, either in Paris or at Hanoi’s Medical 
College, an improvement widely anticipated to increase significantly the quality of 
treatment received at Chinese hospitals in which the care was often considered, in 
European eyes, deplorable.
254  Improved care, of course, benefited both concerned 
parties; however, for the Chinese, the more attractive element was, no doubt, the 
sudden ability to remove their hospitals from the colonial chopping block.  Hospitals 
were a cornerstone of the mutual aid network established by each Chinese 
congregation to support and succor its Indochinese population.  As such, they were 
extremely important to the status and morale of the congregation as a whole, and were 
also legitimate organizations of charity, in that they provided care for subethnic 
brethren of all social classes and with all sorts of maladies.  The Chinese accepted the 
new rules regarding charitable associations and although the rules caused some 
                                                 
251 Letter from the President of Cholon’s Municipal Commission to the President of the Cantonese 
Congregation, 9 July 1924, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH VIA.8/314(1).   
252 Most likely, the French arrived at the charitable organization solution indirectly, as a way to reduce 
complaints about the state of hygiene and supervision in the Chinese hospitals.  This probability is 
supported by the fact that Cholon’s city administration went to great lengths to convince the Chinese 
that altering the nature of the hospitals would benefit them tremendously and would be a good deal for 
all parties concerned. 
253 Letter from the President of the Municipal Commission to the Governor of Cochinchina, 26 March 
1928, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH VIA.8/314(1).   
254 Letter from the President of Cholon’s Municipal Commission to the President of the Cantonese 
Congregation, 9 July 1924, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH VIA.8/314(1).    
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bureaucratic difficulties when the Hakka Congregation attempted – with eventual 
success – to open their own hospital,
255 they seem to have been a successful 
compromise. 
Quite apart from the French belief in Chinese susceptibility to plague, death, 
and general contagion, an issue that will be discussed at length in the latter half of this 
chapter, the colonial administration begrudged every penny it spent on behalf of 
people for whom other guarantors could be found.  In other words, paying health care 
costs for a indigenous mendicant was one thing, but paying for a Chinese resident of 
Indochina was quite another.  For any Chinese resident, businessman, or worker, one 
of two circumstances had to be true: either the individual resided in Indochina legally, 
in which case the relevant congregation was responsible for all matters concerning his 
residency, activities, and state of moral and physical well-being; or he resided in 
Indochina illegally, in which case he still belonged to a specific Chinese subethnic 
group, which had legal representation in the form of a congregation, which could be 
held responsible for all matters concerning his residency, activities, and state of moral 
and physical well-being.  In either case, it became clear early on during their colonial 
tenure that the French Administration would refuse to pay if someone – anyone – else 
could be found to foot the bill. 
By 1882, this issue had risen prominently into colonial consciousness when the 
matter of hospitalization costs for Chinese detained, either for lacking their residency 
cards or for failure to pay the head tax, gained attention with the budget for the Cho-
Quan detention facility.  Chinese congregations were already held responsible for 
reimbursing Cochinchinese authorities for the price of food consumed while in prison; 
                                                 
255 Assorted letters, 1925 – 1928, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH VIA.8/314(1).    
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however, in a plan that garnered wide praise from his superiors,
256 Cochinchina’s 
Chief of Immigration proposed additional levies against the congregations.  
I speak to you of prisoners … who enter the hospital during their 
detention. Because of the higher daily cost of treatment (0,27$), even 
though I deduct the prison food (0,10$), it seems as though Chinese 
prisoners do not pay the hospital expenses where the result is that our 
[cash] receipts, dwindling, stop completely for the individuals who cost 
us three times as dearly.
257   
Accordingly, he proposed that each congregation be held responsible also for 
reimbursing the administration for the cost of hospitalization for any Chinese 
imprisoned on any immigration violation. It took only 5 days for this new measure to 
be enthusiastically approved.
258 
Other health related disputes marred the relationship between the Chinese and 
the French as well.  On March 15, 1910, Truong Thai, the Cantonese director of the 
rice works operated by the Ban Thai Seng rice company in Cholon’s Binh-Đông 
neighborhood, wrote a strongly worded complaint to Cholon’s Provincial 
Administrator, protesting the unfair treatment he felt his company had received at the 
hands of the French.  On March 14, two doctors employed by the French 
administration had appeared at the company to investigate a case of bubonic plague 
that had been discovered in a patient at the Cantonese hospital.
259  This Cantonese 
worker, a man by the name of Lâm Yên,
260 had listed the Ban Thai Seng rice works as 
                                                 
256 The widespread approval for this plan is apparent in the margin notes handwritten by various 
officials on the body of this letter.  Letter from the Chief of Immigration, 8 September 1882, 
TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.8/112(4). 
257 Letter from the Chief of Immigration, 8 September 1882, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.8/112(4). 
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259 The exact diagnosis can be found in the letter written by Dr. Dhoste, one of the visiting physicians, 
concerning the incident at hand.  Letter from Dr. Dhoste to the Director of the Municipal Hospital, 14 
March 1910, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.8/142(8d). 
260 There is some dispute as to his actual name.  The letter sent by the Chinese foreman refers to him as 
Lam Dieu, but all of the colonial documents regarding the incident label him Lâm Yên.  Whatever his  
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his primary residence when he checked in to the Cantonese hospital with the plague.  
The scenario that unfolded caused great distress to the Ban Thai Seng proprietors.
261 
The attending French physician, Dr. Dhoste, asked the businessman Truong 
Thai if a man by the name of Lâm Yên worked for their company.  Not recognizing 
the name, Truong Thai told Dhoste that he would check the employee register and let 
him know for sure.  After careful perusal of the records, Truong Thai ascertained that 
Lâm Yên had worked for the company – for a single day in August of the previous 
year.  Dhoste allegedly told Truong Thai that he knew nothing of the Ban Thai Seng 
register and preferred to trust in the name written in French and given to him on an 
index card by the Cantonese Hospital.  According to Dhoste’s instructions, he was to 
close the rice works, disinfect the premises, and inject all of its workers against the 
plague.  During this process, the rice works would be shut for many days and the Ban 
Thai Seng Company would have to bear the entire cost of the disinfection.
262 
The Ban Thai Seng managers questioned why the Cantonese hospital would 
have provided such an erroneous statement and suggested that they all travel to the 
hospital in person to clarify the matter.  At the hospital, the patient Lâm Yên had 
deteriorated and was unable to speak; however, the men were able to locate the keeper 
of the Cantonese hospital registry, who informed them that Lâm Yên had been 
delivered to the hospital by a laundryman who lived on a different street from the rice 
works and worked for a different company.  Pleased to be proven right but angered by 
the misinformation, the Ban Thai Seng managers asked to be taken to the Sui Xuong 
                                                                                                                                           
true name might have been, it seems safe to assume that the name used by the French was the one that 
appeared on his immigration documents; therefore, I will refer to him as Lâm Yên for the duration of 
this story. 
261 Letter from Truong Thai to the Administrator of Cholon Province, 15 March 1910, TTLTQG2, 
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house on the Rue des Marins to confront their accusers and seek restitution.  At that 
point, Dhoste allegedly dismissed them, saying that this conflict did not concern him 
and that the Chinese should work it out amongst themselves.  Recognizing the 
enormous financial burden presented by a factory closing and the cost of anti plague 
measures, the managers asked Dhoste how to settle the affair.  He told them he had no 
more time to waste with them and an agent would appear at the company within 24 
hours to commence the disinfection.  The company owners, faced with imminent 
disaster, thus threw themselves upon the mercy of Cholon’s provincial 
administrator.
263 
The outcome of this conflict is quite instructive as it reflects upon Sino-French 
relations in the colony. The Provincial Administrator, E. Rivet, initiated an inquest 
into the affair to see justice done.  The results of the inquest for the Ban Thai Seng 
Company are not absolutely certain, but the documents definitely imply that the case 
was not decided in their favor.  On the one hand, Drouhet, the mayor of Cholon, 
castigated the two investigators, Dhoste and Janin, for overstepping their authority and 
for their boorish behavior in completing a task that should have been achievable 
“without incurring judgments as offensive as those [incurred by] Mr. Rivet.”
264  
However, he also stated clearly that he did not believe that the Ban Thai Seng 
compradors had been honest in their assertions regarding Lâm Yên’s employment with 
their firm.  This implication of dishonesty, echoed in another letter by Cholon’s 
Administrator,
265 suggests that the Ban Thai Seng Company lost its appeal and was 
subjected to disinfection; however, the harsh words reserved for the two medical 
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investigators suggest that the Mayor and the Provincial Administrator were not as 
certain of their verdict as they seemed to be, and that the integrity of the colonial 
administration, having been brought to bear by the two physicians, could not be 
overturned, regardless of the truth.  This is not meant to imply that Rivet and Drouhet 
knew that the allegations were false.  I merely suggest that they were more concerned 
about the incident reflecting weakness on the part of the colonial administration than 
they were about the reality of the incident.
266   
Cemeteries, Burial, and Death  
For overseas Chinese, services associated with death and burial possessed 
mythical importance as they touched upon one of the most fundamental aspects of 
Chinese religion and custom:  death.  One of the most essential functions of 
Indochina’s Chinese congregations was their ability to manage logistics for members 
who died far from their native soil.  Congregations provided a sort of burial insurance 
for their members.  A major perk of the congregation system was that it either 
arranged for the repatriation of deceased members or granted them access to local 
burial grounds specific to each subethnic group.  In other words, if a Chinese resident 
could not be buried back in his native place, at least he rested among his compatriots.  
As historian Elizabeth Sinn notes, “With such a system in place, even deceased 
migrants could return home to repose in peace and receive offerings from descendents 
for generations to come, thus fulfilling the grand Chinese ideal of ‘returning to the 
roots’.”
267 
                                                 
266 Also remarkable is the concern exhibited by Mayor Drouhet about the impression left by the doctors 
upon the Chinese businessmen. Mayor Drouhet’s concern for the offended feelings of the Cantonese 
could certainly not be considered typical.  He was a friend to the rich, including the wealthy Cantonese 
brothers Ly Dang and Ly Hieu So,
,and a benefactor to the less fortunate. Among his accomplishments 
was the creation of many hospitals and schools dedicated to the community and Cholon’s Chinese 
community remembered him fondly many years after his return to France. 
267 Sinn, “Moving Bones,” 3.  
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Figure 9 Chinese Tomb
268 
Despite the ultimate goal of returning to ones native place, the realities if 
colonial life and death meant that burial – whether temporary or permanent – on 
Indochinese ground was often inevitable.  As the above photograph indicates, local 
Chinese dead were often interred in Chinese style tombs, replete with stele detailing 
the lives and lineages of the deceased.  The extent of this system is evident from a map 
of Saigon and Cholon dating from 1923.  On this map, each of the five congregations 
possessed land on the outskirts of town
269 used as congregation specific burial 
grounds.  The Trieu Chau, Phuoc Kien, Hakka, and Hainam cemeteries were all 
located together in an area bounded by train tracks to the west, Boulevard Armand 
Rousseau to the east, Rue de Polygone in the north, and Rue de General Bayllé to the 
south.  The Cantonese cemetery was also located west of Boulevard Armand Rousseau 
but some distance from the other cemeteries.  Although no information as to the exact 
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well inside the city limits.  To the best of my knowledge and based upon personal exploration of the 
area, none of the original cemeteries remain; in fact, the land for them has been covered by new 
construction, although many of the bodies were likely relocated to cemeteries further outside of town in 
the 1930’s or 1940’s.  
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number of graves in each cemetery is available, based upon size of territory, the 
Cantonese, Trieu Chau, and Fujianese cemeteries were the largest.
270 
On September 9, 1918, the members of the Hygiene Commission of Sađec met 
on an iron bridge overlooking the Rach Rang River to discuss the establishment of a 
Fujianese cemetery in the village of Tân Phu Đong.  The cemetery was to be built 
according to the specifications of French law: “outside of the city and in a rice field … 
enclosed by walls of brick … it can be found around 100 meters from the Rach Rang 
bridge in the countryside and a certain distance from the waterways or [human] 
residences.”
271  Despite the fact that the proposed cemetery violated no French 
regulations, the committee responded to the request with some doubt.  M. Mandon, 
Sađec’s Provincial Agent, noted, “Burials can be made without inconvenience at this 
place, but the transfer and reburial of mortal remains would be dangerous to the public 
health.”
272  Huynh Thuan, the representative of Sađec’s Phươc Kiên congregation, 
spoke quickly to clarify the rights of the congrégation. “The graves of dead Chinese 
[already] exist next to the chosen place. Requests could occur to transfer the human 
remains of these Asiatics into the projected cemetery.”
273  The local administrator, 
unable to perceive any legal reason why such a cemetery should be prohibited, agreed 
to allow both the creation of the cemetery and the transfer of remains between the new 
and old cemeteries, provided that no plague or other threat to public health existed at 
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the time.  The committee forwarded the request to establish a new Phươc Kiên 
cemetery on to the Governor, and it was approved on September 12, 1918.
274 
The significance of this anecdote lies in the thick layers of bureaucracy 
surrounding the establishment of a Chinese cemetery.  If the affected Chinese 
community guaranteed to abide by all of the applicable legislation surrounding mortal 
remains, what underpinned the reluctance and suspicion of the French administration 
when it came to legislating Chinese death?  The answer to this question lies in French 
stereotypes as they concerned the overseas Chinese.  Viewed largely as low class 
coolies and mendicants, Chinese were seen by the French as unsanitary, unhealthy, 
and dangerous to the public welfare.  Cholon’s interlocking system of canals, known 
at the time as the Arroyo Chinois, was characterized by congested waterways, 
crowded houses, and narrow winding canals, and it proved a perfect breeding ground 
for all manner of unpleasant pestilences, a condition that certainly owed as much or 
more to geography and poor urban planning as it did to economic class or any other 
ethno-cultural concerns. 
Additionally, the frequent epidemics ravaging China during the late 19
th and 
early 20
th centuries made French colonizers even more paranoid about the possibility 
of having something like cholera, small pox, or another potentially deadly plague enter 
Indochina by boat. Years of travel by sea had already educated European powers as to 
the exponentially increased risk of contagious disease aboard overcrowded ships; 
when science combined with class-consciousness, ethnocentrism, and racism, the view 
of Indochina’s Chinese as filthy and disease-ridden was the inevitable result. These 
stereotypes doubtless found further reinforcement in the dilemmas faced by other 
colonial European powers in Southeast Asia.  In Singapore, for example, the British 
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struggled to control epidemics which were so widespread that Chinese deaths from 
syphilis and other diseases actually managed to offset the massive influx of Chinese 
immigration into the region.
275  Pictures showing hillsides scattered with the coffins of 
plague victims, such as the following etching from Francis Garnier’s 1867 trip through 
Tonkin and Yunnan in the aftermath of a Chinese cholera epidemic, did little to 
reassure the French about the Chinese prevalence for disease. 
 
Figure 10 Francis Garnier Etching: Road between Yunnan and Tong Tchouan 
during the Plague and the Cholera
 276 
Inevitably, plagues borne by indigenous people killed Frenchmen just as 
readily as those springing from the Chinese quarter.  In May of 1897, for example, a 
terrible outbreak of cholera ravaged Cochinchina.  “The sanitary state of Cochin China 
has not improved. The cholera epidemic raging in the native population claimed some 
victims among the Europeans of Saigon and in the districts of Soctrang, Bentré, and 
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Bienhoa.  Schools in Bienhoa and Gocong must be dismissed for about ten days. It is 
feared that the plague will continue its devastation if the rainy season is late in 
coming.”
277  The reasons underlying the French focus upon the Chinese as harbingers 
of plague are probably three-fold.  First, most Chinese lived in urban areas in 
Indochina, thus posing more of a health threat to the European population, which also 
enjoyed an urban concentration.  Secondly, thousands of Chinese passed into and out 
of the colony, to and from China, every month.  With the publicization of frequent and 
widespread epidemics in that country, as well as the generally deplorable sanitary 
conditions on the ships transporting people in and out of the Celestial Empire, it is not 
particularly surprising that French authorities in Saigon and Cholon, where the lion’s 
share of the immigration occurred, became extremely concerned about epidemics.   
Finally, there is a sense in the French sources that the Chinese population resided in 
Indochina at the sufferance of the French government.  No such claim could be made 
for the indigenous population who, in any case, rarely traveled throughout Southeast 
Asia and therefore posed little risk of anything but homegrown epidemics.   
If burial and reburial caused unease among French administrators, the 
repatriation of bones was absolutely alarming.  Repatriation, of necessity, required 
skeletons and coffins to be hauled around the countryside and through the city streets 
to get to the boats that were intended to return them to China, giving them ample 
opportunity to infect whole villages and cities with potentially deadly diseases.  The 
Order of 12 December 1889 generally placed tight restrictions upon the mass 
exhumation of Chinese dead and also put forth the basic statutes governing Chinese 
burials, exhumations, and the repatriation of remains back to China. Accordingly, any 
large-scale action along those lines required special dispensation from the 
Cochinchinese government.   
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On July 29, 1892, Cholon’s Cantonese congregation sought just such a 
dispensation.  Phan Hoai, president of Cholon’s Cantonese congrégation, along with 
Cham Ling and Lưu Luc, both city council members, sent a letter to the mayor of 
Cholon in which they requested permission to repatriate bones to China.  “ It is our 
custom,” they wrote, “to raise up the bones of Chinese dead for more than five years 
and to transport them to China to inter them in their native soil.  This is a sacred 
custom which is religiously observed by every congregation.”
278 The Cantonese 
notables go on to describe how each set of bones, upon being exhumed, will be placed 
in a small box made of solid wood and tightly sealed.  Eventually, all of the small 
boxes would be placed in larger boxes designated for shipment to each of the Chinese 
provinces in which the bones were to be permanently interred.
279   
While the plan for repatriation appeared unobjectionable on the surface, the 
Cantonese apologetically went on to reveal the catch.  The Chinese planned on 
repatriating “many hundreds” of their compatriots; following the specific French 
instructions about the types of wood allowed for the boxes, the disposition of the 
empty graves after the exhumations, and the disinfection of all of the graves, coffins, 
and other affected areas would have been impossible.  Accordingly, they sought to 
“obtain permission [from the Governor of Cochinchina] to proceed with these 
exhumations in the same way as in preceding years and to make an exception for the 
particular case [of this repatriation].”
280  Except to say “many hundreds,” the 
Cantonese congregation offered no specific numbers when it spoke of its plans for 
exhuming and transporting its native sons and daughters back to China; however, to 
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give an idea of the magnitude of this endeavor, a major repatriation such as the one 
planned by the Cantonese had not occurred in Cochinchina since 1887.  At that time, 
1607 coffins had made their way back to China.  With population increases in the area, 
Merlande, the mayor of Cholon, proffered a projected estimate for the 1892 
repatriation of more than 2000 bodies to be exhumed in Cholon alone.
281 
The Cantonese sought broad spectrum relief from the restrictions put forth in 
the order of 12 December 1889, but while local administrators seemed to understand 
the magnitude of the problem, they were unwilling to compromise to most of the 
points of contention.  Cholon’s Mayor Merlande proffered his opinion to the 
Cochinchinese government, writing,  
I can only go along with their conclusions that appear to me to be able 
to be accepted without resulting in any danger to hygiene or to the 
public health. I only suggest replacing the disinfecting mixture for use 
inside the coffins with some lime. These [coffins] contain only bones, 
because the Chinese take great care to remove, immediately upon 
exhumation, anything that still adheres to [the bones]. It is better, I 
believe, to fill all the space with some lime, and to reserve the 
disinfecting mixture for use upon the large external box. The walls of 
this [large box] and the internal coffins, (made of sao wood and solidly 
secured with iron bands) should be at least 2.5 cms thick. If these 
regulations are adopted, it would be indispensable to bring them, by a 
circular, to the attention of M.M. the Administrators, so that they can 
see to their strict enforcement in their respective districts. [Also, we 
could] prohibit the shipment of coffins from the interior to Cholon, 
where true congestion might result. They could be transported either to 
Go-vap, where the congregation possesses a cemetery, or to another 
village selected by the administration where they would await their 
dispatching to China. I do not need to emphasize, Sir General 
Secretary, the political importance attached to this grave question of 
exhumations, which has, for the Chinese, a significance so essential 
because it touches upon the cult of death.
282 
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In fact, the Cochinchinese Council of Hygiene and Public Health followed 
Merlande’s recommendations nearly to the letter.  As he had requested, the council 
ordered that the Cantonese congregation build a hut in the Plain of Graves that would 
be used to store, sort, and pack the bones prior to sending them back to China.  This 
plan kept the macabre spectacle far from Cholon’s busy streets, doubtless a great relief 
to the mayor.  As the following picture indicates, Chinese funerals were often 
extravagant affairs, with throngs of mourners, sign bearers, and noisy bands filling the 
streets and blocking passage down busy roads until their march to the temple or 
cemetery was done.  However, the council added one more failsafe to the plan for 
repatriation. They required the presence of one or more European police agents to  
 
 
Figure 11 Funeral Procession
283 
oversee each exhumation in order “to prevent the opening of graves less than five 
years old and to stop the exhumation of mortal remains whose state of conservation 
presented a risk of dangerous vapors.”
284   
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The conflict between colonial legislation, colonial stereotypes, and Chinese 
cultural and religious practices is highlighted by the struggle over Cantonese 
exhumations in 1892 and 1893; however, the documents also hint at a separate 
phenomenon which speaks to the significance of congregations in general, as well as 
to the hierarchy of individual congregations within the rubric of each subethnic place.  
When the Mayor of Cholon sent his opinion of the Cantonese repatriation to the 
Cochinchinese administration, he suggested that the administration “prohibit the 
shipment of coffins from the interior to Cholon, where true congestion might 
result.”
285  This clearly implies the incipient arrival of bones into Cholon from all over 
Cochinchina, an idea also borne out by the Lieutenant Governor’s eventual decision 
with regard to the repatriation. 
Geography plays some role in this phenomenon.  After all, the Mekong 
waterways flowed out to sea in a place most convenient for access to Saigon and 
Cholon; however, the significance of the Cholon congregation in planning and 
initiating the repatriation strongly suggests that the Cholon congregation held a 
position of great authority within the hierarchy of Cantonese congregations in 
Indochina.  Although the documents we have examined so far have only dealt with 
Cochinchina, other tantalizing hints of the scale of this endeavor exist.  These include 
a letter sent to the Resident Superior of Cambodia by Fourés, the Lieutenant Governor 
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of Cochinchina, which conveys the terms enumerated in the Cochinchina Council of 
Hygiene and Public Health’s response to the exhumation request.
286  This is certainly 
the same exhumation because the deadline for completion of the task is identical.
287 
The argument for geography and the significance of the Mekong waterways 
holds true for Cambodia as well; however, the fact that the Cholon-based congregation 
bore responsibility for dealing with the French administration unquestionably 
emphasizes that congregation’s authority.  The congregation in Phnom Penh could 
easily have arranged an exhumation on its own.  As with the Cholon congregation, it 
had easy access to a center of French Administration in the form of the Resident 
Superior, and even though the Resident Superior of Cambodia rested beneath 
Cochinchina’s Lieutenant Governor on the ladder of French administrative authority, a 
direct conduit to French government still existed in Phnom Penh.  This suggests that, 
when faced with an issue of concern to Indochina’s Cantonese at large, Cholon’s 
Cantonese congregation was, whether formally or informally, the official 
representative of Indochina’s Cantonese community to the French State. 
The last major appearance of the cemetery issue occurred in 1936, just three 
months before the deadline for moving all of the Chinese cemeteries to an area further 
outside of town. In this instance, the leaders of all of Saigon-Cholon’s congregations 
met to discuss the feasibility of completing the task by the required date.  To assist 
them in this endeavor, the congregation leaders asked the Chinese Consul in Saigon to 
join them on a trip out to the new cemetery site, a place considered problematic by the 
congregations because the “ground was far too uneven and in need of filling in 
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numerous places.”
288  The congregation leaders hoped that the Chinese Consul would 
intercede for them with the French government on two points: first, that the deadline 
for the transfer of graves be extended to January 1937, and second, that the 
government assist them with the cost of the mass exhumations and transfers.
289  
Just as congregations oversaw the arrivals of Chinese citizens into Indochina, 
they also bore responsibility for their departures, whether as immigrants, skeletons, or 
ghosts.  The nearly universal desire of overseas Chinese to be buried on their native 
soil assumed major proportions in Indochina where disease, poverty, and back-
breaking labor caused the demise of many Chinese too poor to return to China prior to 
their deaths or to afford the repatriation of their remains in the event of their passing.  
Not surprisingly, this desire to return home extended out from the major market 
centers of Cholon, Saigon, and Hanoi into the rural provinces.   
In her work on San Francisco’s overseas Chinese community, Elizabeth Sinn 
describes Hong Kong as an “in-between” place, defining this idea as “localities which 
are neither the sending nor the receiving country but transit points where multiple 
migratory trajectories intersect… Embodying both centripetal and centrifugal forces, 
in-between places played a special part in defining the shape and texture of the 
Chinese diaspora.”
290  Sinn’s concept, while referring specifically to large entrepôts 
such as Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong, could perhaps be used to shed some 
light upon Saigon-Cholon as well.  As a major repatriation point for Cochinchinese 
and Cambodian bones, Cholon did serve as a nexus of exchange, a place from which 
                                                 
288 Extracts from the report of Agent “LOTUS”, 23 March 1936, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IIA.45/215(E.111).   
289 Extracts from the report of Agent “LOTUS”, 23 March 1936, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IIA.45/215(E.111).   
290 Sinn, “Moving Bones,” 2.  
147 
people ventured out in life, and through which they returned to China, whether in life 
or in death.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to illustrate the congregation’s oversight of all 
aspects of the mutual aid process.  Whether the issue was disaster, death, or illness, 
congregations worked closely with their congregants and with the French to find the 
solutions most beneficial to their community.  Additionally, congregations sought to 
share the burden of cost with the French, a matter that gained importance as the 
expense of French requirements grew.  For reasons of public health, French authorities 
meticulously regulated all aspects of sickness and death.  The added cost of these 
regulations was inevitably passed on to the congregation.  This created friction 
between the Chinese and the French, a friction that was often resolved through 
mediation with the congregations.  By investigating Chinese desires, French 
requirements, and the final solutions, Chinese success at wringing concessions from 
the French becomes more apparent.  The mutual aid functions of the congregation 
were at once troublesome and essential.  By providing a sort of social security net to 
prevent total disaster from befalling their congregants, congregations truly proved 
their worth to the overseas Chinese community.  
148 
CHAPTER 6:  PRESERVING CHINESE CULTURE:  COMMEMORATIVE AND 
EDUCATIONAL PURSUITS IN THE CONGREGATIONS 
While congregations performed mutual aid functions that assisted overseas 
Chinese through the most critical periods of their lives, they also enjoyed social 
responsibilities, nurturing the very souls of their communities by taking responsibility 
for religious and secular festivals, political commemorations, and the education of 
young Chinese students in Indochina.  The first and foremost obligation of any 
congregation in Indochina was to provide a meeting place for its congregants.  Thus, 
Chinese congregations were responsible for constructing and maintaining temples and 
other cultural sites for their dialect community.  In keeping with this particular 
obligation, congregations were also charged with celebrating native-place holidays 
and ensuring the observance of local religious festivals.  As the colonial period 
progressed, locally-oriented cultural responsibilities began to assume a more 
nationalistic flavor as congregations took on the task of collecting remittances, first for 
Qing and anti-Qing activities, and later for the new Republic.  
A final social arena in which congregations involved themselves was 
education.  While this might not seem like a true social or cultural responsibility, I 
have included Chinese education in this category because of the vast cultural 
differences between the Chinese in each of the Indochinese congregations. These 
overseas Chinese might have shared a nationality, but for the most part, they did not 
share a spoken language.  The values and concerns of each dialect group differed, as 
did the gods they worshipped and the professions they tended to pursue.  For this 
reason, the establishment of schools unique to each native place or dialect represents a 
concerted effort to indoctrinate young Chinese students in the ways of their native 
place in spite the cultural confusion engendered in the young people as a result of 
living overseas and at a time of great susceptibility in the students’ lives.  
149 
The significance of Chinese youth and the importance of education were also 
acknowledged by the French, as evidenced by their own intense concern for Chinese 
instruction.  Two French schools intended solely for Chinese students, the Ecole Pavie 
in Hanoi and the Lycée Franco-Chinois in Saigon, will be examined in more detail in 
the last part of this chapter.  This investigation will not only reveal the French 
motivation behind establishing Chinese schools, but will also show us yet another 
nexus of interaction between the Chinese in Indochina and the French. 
Cultural Functions 
Despite the many other functions it embraced, congregations were first and 
foremost places of gathering and celebration.  As has been discussed previously, the 
Chinese translation of the word congrégation is huiguan, a word that literally means 
“temple.”  The construction and maintenance of temples was a matter of prime 
concern to each congregation; after all, without temples, they would have nowhere to 
meet or to carry out their other non-spiritual agendas.  Worship within each temple 
was quite a personal matter for a community, which meant that daily celebrations and 
small observances rarely appeared on the colonial radar screen.  Large festivals, on the 
other hand, which involved fireworks, parades, and celebrations that spilled out into 
the streets, often impacted the cities in which they occurred.  Because of this impact, 
archival documentation concerning larger festivals or ceremonies exists in three 
forms; archives either contain requests for permission to hold festivals, reports of 
unsavory or illegal incidents that transpired at celebrations, or intelligence on festivals 
or commemorations that were deemed by colonial authorities to be politically 
sensitive, or perhaps even subversive.   
In Indochina, as was the case in many of Southeast Asia’s colonies, functions 
of economy and mutual aid overshadowed the more spiritual roles of the huiguan in 
the public eye, and this phenomenon became more marked as time passed.  A colonial  
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environment required institutions capable of performing intermediary roles, whether 
politically, economically, or personally.  In Indochina, the vital necessity of mediation 
took precedence over daily piety, at least in the big picture.
291  The very nature of 
huiguan observances also changed dramatically as the 20
th century progressed.  The 
colossal, and even cataclysmic, events of the early 20
th century shifted the huiguan’s 
focus from the mundane to the monumental.  Parades for Mazu lost ground to massive 
pan-Chinese nationalist movements and the idea of a “Chinese” spirit overtook many 
of the intricacies of subethnicity in the process.  This is not meant to imply that each 
subethnic community lost the specificities which made it unique – i.e., Mazu retained 
her cultural and religious significance – however, new global political influences 
required the attention of the Chinese community as a whole and the community 
responded to that need with enthusiasm.  
Around the turn of the 19
th century, the majority of the festivals appearing in 
archival sources are local Buddhist festivities or funerals for local figures.  In the 
1920’s, Sun Yat Sen became the central figure in annual remembrances pursued by the 
community.  By the 1930’s and 1940’s, however, the outrage of all of Cochinchina’s 
Chinese focused on very public protests and commemorations opposing the Sino-
Japanese War and the horrors of the Japanese occupation.  This transformation is 
illustrative of how, for the overseas Chinese, subethnic identity was quickly – if 
temporarily – subsumed by the global challenges facing China, but more importantly, 
it strongly suggests that, during a period of time in which China found herself 
                                                 
291 That worship remained essential to these communities is evident by the fact that these temples are 
still in active use today.  Whether in Hanoi, Haiphong, Saigon, Cholon, or the remoteness of the 
Mekong Delta, worshippers stream (or meander, if the temple is less popular) into and out of these 
temples all day, burning their joss sticks or teaching their children to pray.  This is particularly 
interesting in the case of Cholon’s temples, which have often effectively been abandoned by the 
Chinese who established them.  The pious functions of these pagodas endure long after the majority of 
the community has departed.  
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occupied and attacked from all sides, the overseas Chinese community took up the 
mantle of her defense, not only with vast expenditures intended to support the 
republic, but also by allowing their regional drama to become international drama.  
They changed the scripts of the more traditional public theater that had been directed 
at the priorities and revered subjects of their native places and enacted performances 
on a global stage designed to attract the world’s attention.
292  This is a story of change.   
 
In 1891, in far north Tonkin near the Chinese border, failure to communicate 
his intentions resulted in a stiff penalty for the vice-president of the Chinese 
congregation of Kỳ Lưà.
293  At four in the morning on March 21, a firework display 
concluded the funeral ceremony of a recently deceased local man.  Unfortunately for 
the congregation, the Chinese had not received permission beforehand for the part of 
the ceremony involving munitions.  When the detonations began in the wee hours of 
                                                 
292 The notion of protests as public street theater is explored in great detail in Jeffrey Wasserstrom, 
Student Protests in Twentieth-century China:  The View from Shanghai (Stanford, CA:  Stanford 
University Press, 1991). Wasserstrom deals with Chinese secondary and college students in his book, 
but his notion that students learned protest techniques from traditional Chinese and Western ceremonies 
and turned those borrowed “scripts” to their own advantage seems equally applicable to Indochina’s 
overseas Chinese community.  Especially in Saigon-Cholon, the sheer spectacle of many overseas 
Chinese observances – with, for example, grim-faced mourners adorned in black crepe marching in an 
endless line past the black shrouded portrait of Sun Yat-sen – argues persuasively that Cochinchina’s 
overseas Chinese understood the power of public theater, both as commemoration and as protest.  
Wasserstrom’s observation that “demonstrations that mimic official forms and procedures…[represent] 
a symbolic attempt to subvert or take control of the ceremonies and stories elites use to justify their 
rule”(p. 285) also deserves closer attention.  While it is arguable that GMD-led commemorations in 
Indochina were intended to reinforce the dominant paradigm (that is to say, the GMD as elite), the 
colonial environment and strict regulation by the French of Chinese observances meant that parades, 
demonstrations, and boycotts organized by any Chinese in the face of French prohibitions were, in fact, 
forms of subaltern resistance to colonial dominance. 
293 No particular subethnic or dialect group affiliation is given for this particular vice-president.  As 
discussed in the elections chapter of this dissertation, Tonkinese congregations, due to the smaller 
resident Chinese population in the north, were not always divided by dialect, as were the large 
congregations of the south.  It is possible that this vice-president belonged to one of those plural groups.  
It is also possible that his affiliation was just not mentioned.  
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the morning, the civil guard only knew that large explosions were rocking the town.  
Additionally, the explosions were made, apparently, by “firecrackers of exceptional 
caliber,”
294 meaning that before the cause of the racket could be accurately 
ascertained, an entire troop of the civil guard was banging on the village door trying to 
enter.  Unfortunately, the village was in such disarray that it took more than twenty 
minutes for someone to open the door and let the guard into the town.
295   
This last fact, in particular, seems to be the reason behind the 50 piastre fine 
levied by the local resident.  The Resident’s protest practically glows with chagrin 
when he castigates the hapless vice-president for failing to get permission for the 
display in advance, writing.   
I blame the vice-president of the congregation for two things: the first 
being to fire the firecrackers without permission when permission is 
always given, when it concerns ritual holidays or custom, by the 
Residence, which warns the military authorities to avoid 
misunderstandings; the second is to have surveillance that night in the 
village that was so badly organized that 20 minutes were needed for the 
police to notice that regular forces required entry.
296 
In this case, it seems safe to say that the Chinese suffered far more as a result of the 
embarrassment they caused the young administrator by revealing local military 
inefficiency than they did for any law breaking. 
In 1900, the Cantonese congregation
297 in Haiphong sought to avoid 
difficulties with local French administrators by seeking permission in advance to 
                                                 
294 Letter from the Resident in Langsơn to the Resident Superior in Hanoi, 25 March 1891, TTLTQG1, 
RST 29005. 
295 Letter from the Resident in Langsơn to the Resident Superior in Hanoi, 25 March 1891, TTLTQG1, 
RST 29005. 
296 Letter from the Resident in Langsơn to the Resident Superior in Hanoi, 25 March 1891, TTLTQG1, 
RST 29005. 
297 The congregation is never specified in the documents; however, because all of the arrangements 
were made in Hong Kong and the monks were to be coming from Hong Kong, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the Cantonese congregation was the one involved.  
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celebrate their intended event.  They hoped to bring five Buddhist monks into 
Haiphong to officiate their annual “Grand Buddhist Festival.”
298  Unfortunately, 
colonial biases intervened.  At the time, immigration from Hong Kong was considered 
a public health hazard, no doubt due to rampant epidemic in the region.  The first 
request to allow the arrival of these monks was flatly denied.  When the congregation 
responded by asking what they could do to alleviate the health concerns of the 
administration, the Resident Superior dashed their hopes.  He insisted that the only 
way the monks would be allowed into the country was if they submitted to a 12-day 
quarantine to ensure that were not carriers of any plague.
299  Whether or not the 
congregation went ahead with their plans is unknown, but this anecdote does reveal 
the many hidden pitfalls of congregational worship. 
Even before the widespread politicization of the Chinese community in the 
1920’s and 1930’s, not all festivals involving Chinese were religious.  A large market 
fair planned in 1903 emphasized the importance of Chinese in the economic life of 
Cầu-đỏ province.  In a letter sent to the Resident Superior in Hanoi, Cantonese 
shopkeeper Lục Đạt Tsiêu offered his own opinion of how the festival should be run.   
The Resident of Cầu-đỏ province, to gather together all of the 
storekeepers and bearers of goods and animals from provinces near and 
far at Cầu-đỏ’s big market fair, is going to inaugurate a holiday with 
public entertainment. To make this gathering great in public opinion, I 
found a very effective and advantageous means to benefit the 
administration and to compensate for expenses caused by this 
gathering: that is, to authorize the games of chance.
300 
                                                 
298 Once again, the exact festival is not specified but because the issue seemed pressing and negotiations 
to bring in the monks were occurring in mid-August, the large annual celebration was most likely the 
mid-Autumn festival (Zhongqiujie). 
299 Letter from the Residence Superior, 17 August 1900, TTLTQG1, RST 8905.   
300 Letter from Lục Đạt Tsiêu to the Resident Superior, 29 August 1903, TTLTQG1, RST 4827.    
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Lục  Đạt Tsiêu proceeded to outline a detailed plan to introduce gambling to the 
festival and thereby recoup the cost to the administration of holding the fair in the first 
place.  Now, Lục  Đạt Tsiêu had already approached Cầu-đỏ’s Resident with this 
request and had been told that the Resident lacked the authority to allow such 
activities and any such requests would have to be made to his superiors.  This 
circumstance suggests two things:  first, that Lục Đạt Tsiêu was important enough 
within the community that the local Resident was reluctant to deny his request 
outright, and second, that Lục  Đạt Tsiêu felt comfortable enough to scrawl out a 
handwritten note seeking permission from the Resident Superior to alter the festival, 
ostensibly to alleviate the financial burden on the French government, but most likely 
to increase the enjoyment of the many Chinese merchants and traders who would be 
present at the festival. 
By the mid-1920’s, public Chinese festivals had assumed a more somber air.  
Ceremonies commemorating Sun Yat Sen’s death occurred annually and were allowed 
by the French administration because of “the importance of the Chinese colony of 
Cochinchina, which can be estimated at around 300,000 inhabitants.”
301  During the 
1925 commemoration, a majority of businesses were closed on the evening of April 11 
and not reopened until April 14.  A number of flags were also kept at half-mast during 
that time.  An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese attended the actual ceremony itself, 
at which time they marched past a large portrait of Sun Yat Sen which was on display 
in the Great Room of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce building.  No speeches were 
given, but back cotton armbands were available for purchase, and every participant 
received a small portrait and biography of Sun Yat Sen.
302  As even the French noted 
in the event report, “these ceremonies…seem to have as much a political character as a 
                                                 
301 Letter to the Governor General, 30 June 1925, CAOM, INDO GGI 17514. 
302 Letter to the Governor General, 16 April 1925, CAOM, INDO GGI 17514.  
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religious [one].”
303  Also of interest is the fact that this commemoration was not led by 
the congregations directly, but was instead directed by a steering committee appointed 
by the congregations and led by a single individual, Tran Kiet Du.  Although the 
following pictures depicts the arrival of an imperial mission into Cholon, it still 
conveys a sense of the political authority wielded by Indochina’s overseas Chinese, 
who were courted on all sides by political factions from China who traveled overseas 
seeking moral and material support for their many different causes. 
 
Figure 12 Imperial Mission
304 
By the 1930’s, the typical gathering seems to have assumed a more serious, 
and an even more overtly political, character.  In a two-month period in 1938, French 
intelligence reported two patriotic gatherings of Chinese.  The first, occurring on May 
9, was a meeting intended “to commemorate the 23
rd anniversary of China’s national 
humiliation.”
305  A number of local dignitaries attended this meeting, including Chau 
                                                 
303 Letter to the Governor General, 16 April 1925, CAOM, INDO GGI 17514. 
304http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://hinhxua.free.fr/autrefois/chinois/Cholon_la_processi
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305 Letter from the Police commissioner, 22 June 1938, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IIA.45/254(4).  
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Khai So, the Cantonese Party Executive; Hua Nai, pupil to the Chinese Consul;
306 Wu 
Ning Hing, the Trieu Chau Guomindang Secretary; and Dac Dinh, President of 
Cholon’s Hainam congregation.  Each of the dignitaries gave a speech reminding the 
audience that on that day, 23 years ago, the Japanese had forced Yuan Shikai to sign 
the 21 unequal treaties that “caused great damage to China and a humiliation 
unparalleled.”
307  In the face of this national trauma, the speakers called for 
“solidarity, and [appealed] to the patriotism of their fellow countrymen to erase this 
shame.”
308   
A few weeks later, on June 22, 1938, the Fujianese School, with the help of 
many of the area’s other Chinese schools, staged yet another patriotic event, this time 
a fundraiser.  The evening’s program took place in Cholon’s China Theater.  In 
addition to patriotic comedies, this event provided exhibitions of Chinese martial arts, 
as well as traditional Chinese singing and dancing performed by school children.  The 
Chinese Consul attended the event, which raised 2000 piastres for the Chinese 
ministries, and most of the other Chinese dignitaries in Saigon and Cholon attended as 
well.   
Events like these evidence the fact that, on the public stage, the focus had 
shifted from the affairs of individual congregations and the private interests of 
subethnic place, to the larger issues confronting China, issues of vital interest and 
importance to every subethnic place.  The prominent involvement of young students in 
these affairs also indicates the pervasiveness of nationalist concerns within the 
Chinese community.  Events such as the program held at the Ecole Foukien were not 
the somber provenance of politically aware adults worried about their nation’s fate; 
                                                 
306 This title literally reads “Élève-Consul de Chine,” and I am unsure if this means that Hua Nai was 
the student of the Chinese Consul, or actually his understudy.  
307 Letter from the Police commissioner, 22 June 1938, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IIA.45/254(4). 
308 Letter from the Police commissioner, 22 June 1938, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IIA.45/254(4).  
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instead, they sought to educate and involve the entire Chinese community, young and 
old, in the struggles of the Chinese nation. 
As the 1930’s ebbed, commemorations and nationalistic demonstrations 
became even more pointed and endemic.  Pamphlets and tracts designed to encourage 
the participation of all overseas Chinese in patriotic demonstrations circled freely 
around the dates of major incidents in China.  One of the largest demonstrations 
occurred on July 7, 1938, the first anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.  
Newspapers and other printed media had already published formal announcements 
made by the “National Salvation Union,” demanding that July 7 be a day of 
mourning.
309  One such advertisement read: 
 
COMMEMORATION OF THE JULY 7, 1937 INCIDENT 
With the approach of the sad anniversary of the occurrence of the Lou 
Keou Kiao Incident
310 on July 7, 1938, the National Salvation Union, to 
honor the memory of the officers and soldiers fallen upon the field of 
honor and that of the civilian victims of the bombardments, has made 
the following decisions: 
Chinese immigrants in Cochinchina are invited to sign over one day’s 
worth of salary or income for the sake of national salvation; 
The Consul is requested to inform the local government that all Chinese 
businesses will be closed this day as a sign of mourning. 
Five big meetings will occur, alternating between the Chinese theatres 
of Saigon and Cholon, and all of the Chinese colony may participate 
freely. 
On July 7, from 6 am to 6 pm, Chinese immigrants throughout 
Indochina should wear black crepe armbands. 
All festivities will be suspended. 
                                                 
309 Note from the Governor General, 1 July 1938, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IIA.45/254(4). 
310 This is a reference to the Lukouqiao, or Marco Polo Bridge, Incident that began the Sino-Japanese 
War.  
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The National Salvation Union has already printed a 
circular inviting all Chinese groups to carry out these 
directions.
311 
The seriousness of the emotion surrounding this event in Chinese history cannot be 
overlooked and the heartfelt interest in China’s plight shines through in the circulars 
devoted to achieving pan-Chinese solidarity on the anniversary of the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident.  One circular declares, 
The invaders have occupied our territory, violated our sovereignty and 
massacred our civilian population. We will never forget the enormous 
sacrifices made by the soldiers at the front and we must express to them 
our deepest sympathy.  On the occasion of the anniversary of July 7, 
think on this tragedy and fervently swear to revenge those who died 
and to carry out thei r duty .  In the face of  grave nati onal peril , our 
fellow countrymen abroad must increase their efforts to fulfill our 
mission of restoring our nation and our race.
312 
Flyers such as these clearly communicate the connection felt by overseas Chinese to 
events in China.  Also apparent from this text is the notion that when China could not 
help herself, her citizens abroad must come to her rescue.  Chinese everywhere, it 
seems, had a moral obligation to save the nation, and to save the entire Chinese race, 
irrespective of dialect or subethnic place identity. 
These activities enjoyed a widespread following.  In Cầnthờ, all of the Chinese 
congregations asked their members to close their businesses for the day, an event that 
drew nearly unanimous participation.  In addition to donating a day’s income, 
Cầnthờ’s Chinese also donated half the cost of a day’s expenses, money that was 
                                                 
311 Translation of article from the Information for Cochinchina’s Chinese, 1 July 1938, TTLTQG2, 
GOUCOCH IIA.45/254(4). 
312 Circular addressing Chinese immigrants on the occasion of the first anniversary of the July 7 
Incident, 6 July 1938, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IIA.45/254(4). This flyer is particularly remarkable 
because it was signed by five prominent local Chinese.  Most such circulars were anonymous because 
of the unwelcome French attention generated upon an individual who became politically involved.  The 
open nature of these commemorative activities further underscores the significance of this event and its 
remembrance in overseas Chinese eyes.  
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added to the 1000 piastres that had already been raised by the community to succor the 
victims of the Sino Japanese War.
313  Also, in the Cantonese temple, 280 people, 80 of 
whom were students at local Chinese schools, listened to speeches and observed a 
moment of silence in honor of the war’s victims.
314  In Bac Lieu, local French 
authorities refused the congregations permission to hang national flags to 
commemorate the day, but the Chinese did close their shops, wear crepe armbands, 
and distribute flyers.
315  In Saigon and Cholon, in addition to the business closings, as 
many as 10,000 Chinese from all of the congregations paraded through the Chinese 
Consulate in Saigon from 7 o’clock in the morning to 5 o’clock in the afternoon, 
paying their respects to a portrait of Sun Yat Sen hanging there.
316   
Failure to participate in these events meant incurring the displeasure of the 
local Chinese community.  The proprietor of the Hiêp-Loi Restaurant was beset by a 
group of 20 Chinese men because of his failure to close shop.  In the ensuing scuffle, 
1a number of chairs and tables were overturned, although no one was hurt.
317  In  
Cholon, passers by roughed up a Chinese tailor named Trac Binh-Trung when they 
discovered that he had been selling black armbands for his own profit, rather than to 
benefit national salvation.  The hapless Trac Binh-Trung’s troubles did not end with a 
beating at the hands of his countrymen, however.  When local police arrived to break 
up the fight, they determined that Trac Binh-Trung’s residency permit had expired, 
and he was carted off to detention.  Also in Cholon, a group of passing Chinese threw 
stones at a brothel on Cây-Mai street that had remained open despite the ban, and a 
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number of traveling restaurateurs were forced to suspend business after being 
confronted by groups of Chinese.
318   
In his 2003 book, Chinese Capitalists in Japan’s New Order, historian Parks 
Coble discusses the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the narrative of the heroic 
Chinese capitalist, commenting that “at the turn of the [20
th] century, remembrance of 
the war has become a touchstone of Chinese identity, a point of unity between Chinese 
in the People’s Republic and those living outside.”
319  While this point is a fascinating 
reflection on current attitudes in the People’s Republic, the narrative of the Chinese in 
Indochina suggests something even larger.  Not only does it suggest that the Sino-
Japanese war became a benchmark of Chinese identity almost immediately after the 
initial Japanese attack, but it also implies that compliance with anti-Japanese 
collective action served as a yardstick for patriotism and “Chinese-ness” for 
Cochinchina’s overseas Chinese as well.  The significance still accorded to the 
Japanese occupation sixty years or more after its occurrence, as well as its indelible 
imprint on the minds of ethnic Chinese around the world, speaks persuasively of how 
powerful the feelings and reactions to China’s national humiliation and shame must 
have been while China was still enduring them. 
But in spite of the impression left by these solemn events, not every Chinese 
political anniversary was an occasion for sorrow.  For example, on May 5, 1938, 30 
Chinese from different congregations, unions, and schools met to celebrate the 17
th 
anniversary of the establishment of Sun Yat Sen’s Chinese Revolutionary 
Government.  Far from the solemn mourning exhibited in many political meetings at 
the time, attendees at this function listened to a speech telling them of the many trials 
and tribulations experienced by Dr. Sun on his road the Chinese independence.  They 
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were reminded of the many services Dr. Sun had offered his country and encouraged 
to remain patriotic and true to his ideals, especially in the face of the troubles currently 
besetting China.
320 
Education: The Funding, Establishment, and Operation of Schools  
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of overseas Chinese organizations in 
general is the concerted effort they directed towards maintaining the social and 
cultural integrity of their settlements abroad.  Overseas Chinese connections to native 
place did not freely give overseas Chinese a base of support for business ventures and 
a place of retreat in the event of disaster; in return for this nurturing, these ties 
implicitly required that overseas Chinese communities retain as many as possible of 
the linguistic, cultural, and social practices of the native place.  One of the most 
efficient ways to achieve this cultural continuity was through the establishment of 
Chinese schools.  Not only did schools provide the fundamental language training 
required to keep young Chinese students living abroad functionally literate in Chinese 
and fluent in their native tongues, but, as schools were typically affiliated with specific 
congregations, they ensured that many of the cultural and religious practices were 
transmitted as well.   
The significance of these schools to the overseas Chinese community is borne 
out in numbers.  By 1929, somewhere in the vicinity of 130 private Chinese schools 
existed in Cochinchina alone, and requests to open them came in at such a pace that 
French authorities found themselves buried beneath applications they had increasingly 
less time to process.
321  These functioning schools proved to be the least of French 
concerns.  As early as 1925, the French began a campaign against unauthorized 
Chinese schools as a result of independently derived concerns about the issue on the 
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parts of the Residents Superior in Tonkin and in Cambodia.  Hanoi’s Governor 
General demanded detailed intelligence estimates of the pervasiveness of these 
institutions, concerned by the risk they posed to public order, particularly if they 
became politically adversarial.
322  
In Indochina, congregations and schools enjoyed a unique relationship that not 
only nurtured the youngsters from each native place and ensured the perpetuation of 
Chinese language and cultural among children whose actual experience in their 
homeland was often quite limited, but also, by encouraging multidirectional ties 
between the colonies and the native place, strengthened the relationship between each 
native place and the congregation that called it home.  This strengthening of ties 
occurred in a number ways.  Most commonly, instructors from the native place were 
brought to Indochina to direct local schools or to teach, especially at the elementary 
level; however, congregations also worked to strengthen education back in the native 
place, offering more than teaching jobs to their fellow countrymen when the situation 
allowed.  In both situations, the symbiotic relationship between congregation and 
native place offered benefits to the homeland as well as to the expatriate community. 
In 1902, Cholon’s Phuoc Kien congregation sought permission to open a 
collection among its members in order to raise money for the establishment of a 
school in Amoy where young Chinese students would learn to speak French.
323  At the 
time, the sole non-Chinese school in the city was an American-sponsored school with 
English as the primary language of instruction.  Cholon’s Phuoc Kien community felt 
that the establishment of such a school would serve to enhance the trade in Indochina 
and improve commerce by strengthening ties with the French.
324  From the French 
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perspective, closer ties with Chinese resident in Indochina and an improved image 
among the Fujianese had much to offer; however, Cochinchina’s Lieutenant Governor 
remained quite skeptical of the undertaking, concerned that curriculum at the school 
would be completely outside of French control, and therefore, suspect.
325  
Surprisingly, the opportunity to attempt to balance out English-speaking influence in 
Amoy was not much of a concern for the Lieutenant Governor.   
 
Figure 13.  Ecole de Foukien Building, Cholon, 2002
326 
As the above photograph indicates, Cholon’s Fujianese community 
successfully established a school for Fujianese children in the city of Cholon; 
however, a French-oriented Fujianese school in Amoy offered certain benefits as well. 
From the Fujianese perspective, the advantages of such a school and the accessibility 
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it provided to French language instruction seem clear; however, the benefits for the 
Phuoc Kien congregation in Cholon were not insignificant either.  By creating a 
school to which the congregation’s name would certainly be affixed, the congregation 
ensured good publicity in the native place.  After all, the quantity, frequency, and 
significance of remittances played a major role in determining local prestige.  More 
practically, the ability to speak a colonial language did wonders for an individual’s 
success in the colonial environment.  Easy access to French instruction in Amoy 
virtually guaranteed a steady influx of young laborers and fortune seekers capable of 
dealing personally with the vicissitudes of the French administration in Indochina. 
Requests for permission to establish, direct, or teach at a Chinese school 
reached colonial desks most frequently, and although these requests have the 
appearance of mere formalities, certain impressions gleaned from them cast light upon 
the complex, and even transnational, connections involved in primary and secondary 
Chinese education in Indochina.  The height of the Chinese school movement appears 
to have been from 1926 to 1929.  Although it is difficult to say for certain why 
Chinese schools were most prolific during these particular years, regional politics 
certainly played a major role in this phenomenon.  In Guangzhou and Nanjing, the 
Guomindang Party’s calls for Chinese solidarity and for the material and ideological 
support of the overseas Chinese community at large must have influenced the 
increasing numbers of Chinese schools. Furthermore, the gradual politicization, not 
only of China, but of Southeast Asia’s overseas Chinese communities as well, was 
reaching its height, and wars waged on Chinese soil had not yet refocused Indochina’s 
overseas Chinese community exclusively towards national relief, supporting the war 
efforts, and opposing the Japanese invasion.   
Internal Chinese politics had a history of disrupting study abroad for Chinese 
students.  In one particular case, that of the Chinese student Tchêng Tchong Hoa, the  
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massive upheavals that occurred in China during the 1911 revolution forced him to 
abandon his education at the College of the Protectorate in Tonkin in order to return to 
China to help his family, which had been ruined by the events of the revolution.
327  
The situation did not improve as the century progressed.  The abrupt and bloody split 
in 1927 between the Communists and the Guomindang in China meant that young 
Chinese students were likely safer in Indochina than in major Chinese cities, 
particularly Canton, the city through which many of Indochina’s Chinese reached the 
colonies.
328  In fact, this event was likely responsible for much of the increased 
demand for Chinese education in Indochina. Chinese schools also became one of the 
focal points for the guoyu movement in Indochina.  By unifying the national spoken 
language, the chances for greater national unity and pan-Chinese solidarity increased.  
Chinese schools and associations seemed the most logical places to pursue the task of 
linguistic standardization.
329 
The most interesting transnational connections are seen, not in the curriculums 
of various Chinese schools in Indochina, but in the process of establishing them and 
hiring people to teach at them.  A Chinese congregation or Chinese school in 
Indochina required a teacher or director for their school.  They found the person they 
were most interested in hiring and determined whether or not the individual was 
qualified to perform the tasks of the job.  If they were deemed acceptable by the hiring 
institution, their dossier was forwarded to French authorities, most often the Governor 
General.  The French government examined the applicants for security issues or 
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criminal histories.  If they had clean records, the dossier was forwarded to the French 
Consul governing the area from which the applicant received his diploma.  Practically 
speaking, this step usually involved the application being sent to the French Consul in 
Canton.  After the Consul in Canton, the French Consul in Fuzhou was the most likely 
recipient; however, occasionally, the packets went all the way to the French Legate in 
Peking, or even more rarely, back to France, if the applicant had been educated in 
Europe. 
Upon receipt of the packet, the French Consul in China was responsible for 
verifying the diploma or degree that the applicant professed to have.  In some cases, 
the Consul had only to inquire at the relevant school to have the diploma or years of 
study confirmed,
330 but confirmation was not always an easy process.  After 
contacting the schools attended by the applicants and receiving, or failing to receive, 
confirmation of the applicant’s course of study, the French Consul then forwarded that 
information back to the Governor General, who issued the order that qualified the 
individual to teach or to open his own school.  If the applicant attempted to obtain 
qualification without the support of his congregation or a hiring institution, he could 
do so on his own, but support from the congregation president, even if it came in the 
form of a character endorsement, facilitated the process enormously. 
The tumultuousness of the Chinese past made verification extremely difficult 
in some instances, especially if an applicant’s credentials predated the Chinese 
Republic.  In one case involving the opening of a Cantonese school to teach Chinese 
characters, the French Consul could not locate a school at all until he eventually 
determined that the institution was a missionary school run by Americans.
331  In the 
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instance of Cantonese Ho Sui-Yin, who sought to open a private school in Cholon, 
neither the current nor former provincial records yielded any results.  It was eventually 
determined that the degree from his institution, the Teaching School of Canton, had 
been awarded in the 32
nd year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu, during the Qing 
dynasty.
332 
In 1928, three Cantonese men, Tchang Tse-Tsen, Liao Si-Tsien, and Ly Tho-
Sum, sought to open a Chinese private school, in their city of residency, Huế.
333  
When the French Consul in Canton attempted to verify their credentials, he found that 
only one of them, Ly Tho-Sum, had a verifiable course of study. For Liao Si-Tsien, no 
documentary evidence could be found, but Guangdong’s Office of Instruction, when 
presented with a copy of his diploma and his photograph, was able to confirm that he 
had received a degree from the defunct school of the former provincial government.  
As for Tchang Tse-Tsen, no records of instruction were found for him at all.
334  
Whether Tchang was trying to deceive the French by allying himself with other men 
of letters, or whether he was the unfortunate victim of political dislocation, we will 
never know, but this anecdote does serve to reinforce the notion that unrest in China 
could have a dramatic impact in the lives of men trying to make their fortunes abroad.  
Who were these people who wanted to teach?  While it is possible that a 
female instructor slipped through the cracks, the records indicate that all of them were 
men.  They came from many different provinces and sought to teach a wide array of 
subjects.  Cantonese applicants predominated, although many Fujianese and 
Hainanese sought to open schools or to teach as well.  Hainanese applications were 
also verified through the French Consul in Canton.  Trieu Chau communities also 
sought new schools and teachers but unless Hakka teachers worked at pan-Chinese 
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schools in the provinces, there are no records of specifically Hakka schools outside of 
major cities.  Some men had been academically successfully; others had barely passed 
their final exams.  Most had finished secondary school but a few had only attended 
primary schools.  These latter were mainly enlisted as teachers of Chinese characters.  
All but two or three applicants had in common the nearly universal absence of college 
degree, although several had gone to Normal schools or other teaching institutions.  
Many applicants sought only to teach Chinese characters, although some applicants 
were able to teach any primary subject assigned to them.  Also, the majority of them 
had attended school in Canton, although Amoy and Fuzhou were also fairly common.  
Outside of those cities, applicants had studied at schools or universities in Beijing, 
Yunnan, Hainan Island, or, occasionally, Indochina itself. 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the data concerning these schools deals 
with the numbers and locations of them across Indochina.  Schools either already 
existed or were being established in more than 25 cities and towns across Indochina, 
and many of the places were quite small and rural.  The city of Faifo
335 alone had two 
requests involving Hainanese education, one each from the Cantonese and Trieu Chau 
communities there, and one request of indeterminate origin.  Of course there were 
requests involving schools in Hanoi, Haiphong, Cholon, and Nam Đinh, but there 
were also requests from Thu Xa, Tuy Hoa, Vinh, and Phanri.  This implies quite a 
depth of penetration, extending well out from major urban centers into smaller towns 
in all three regions of present-day Vietnam, a fact that seems, especially in the case of 
Annam, to fly in the face of basic demographic assumptions with regard to the demand 
for Chinese education: first, that access to Chinese schools would largely have been 
limited to Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Tonkin as a result of the large Chinese 
populations living there, and second, that smaller towns and villages would not have 
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the Chinese population required to support their own particularistic Chinese 
schools.
336 
The Ecole Pavie and the Lycée Franco-Chinois 
The previous section of this chapter has discussed overseas Chinese education 
in some detail, but French authorities also tried their hand at establishing schools in 
Indochina for Chinese students.  The Ecole Pavie, located in Hanoi, was the first 
school created in Indochina for the Chinese in general, and for the sons of mandarins 
in particular. Mandarins from the Chinese provinces bordering Tonkin, primarily 
Yunnan and Guangxi, sent their sons to Hanoi to study at this school.  In Hong Kong, 
the British were concurrently in the process of establishing an Anglo-Chinese 
Universities.  The French took quite badly their inability to compete with the English 
in attracting young sons of Chinese notables to their schools.  The Ecole Pavie, 
founded in 1904, was one of the first French efforts to rectify that perceived 
imbalance, and it was at once a great success and a terrible failure.  This is its story. 
In June 1904, Li Tsao-tien, the Taotai and Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
Yunnan, sent a letter to the Governor General inquiring about French options for 
educating his two sons, who were 22 and 16 years of age.  In particular, he wanted to 
know if there was a school for French students that his sons could attend, in order to 
learn French and to become more acquainted with Yunnan’s neighboring 
colonialists.
337  No such school existed, but after the Governor General’s inquiry, 
Tonkin’s Resident Superior suggested opening a boarding school for sons of Chinese 
notables, where, for example, Yunnan’s Taotai’s sons could mingle with the sons of 
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Longtcheou’s Taotai, who were already based in Hanoi.
338  Plans were immediately 
underway to establish the school.   
On September 17, 1904, the Governor General told his Chief of Cabinet that he 
was “of the opinion that the school for the sons of the Chinese mandarins should be 
formed at once.” Also in this response, he approved the school’s rather steep annual 
fee of 1200 francs per student and said that he would inform the French Consul at 
Yunnan of the plans to create the school.
339  In just a few weeks, the response of 
Yunnan’s minister arrived.   
I would suggest sending, every year, to Hanoi, a certain number of 
pupils, some of whom would go on, after [finishing in Hanoi], to 
complete their studies in France.  Given the movement that exists in all 
the parts of the Empire to entrust the care of educating young Chinese 
men to the Japanese, there would perhaps be enough interest to create a 
university in Hanoi where one could fight against this anti-foreign 
influence.
340 
After receiving such a positive response from China, matters unfolded with surprising 
speed.  By December, 22 Chinese students from Yunnan, 10 of whom had already 
been admitted to the new school by examination, departed for Hanoi, escorted by 
Léang Siang, a Provincial mandarin.
341  The French were pleased with the initial 
enrollment of 10 students, but realistic about the importance of it.  “[The Chinese] 
wanted to try an experiment, and, to prove it, sent forty students to Japan and ten to 
Tonkin. If they are satisfied, next year the proportion can be reversed.”
342   
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As the end of the first year approached, prospects for the young school looked 
bright; the students had progressed nicely, no issues of discipline had arisen, and both 
the Chinese and the French seemed optimistic.
343  Even the Minister of Asian Affairs 
in Paris applauded the colonial efforts, encouraging them to increase enrollment at the 
school and to look into founding an Indochinese university, all for purposes of 
garnering international political equity and increasing the spread of French influence.  
For the minister, the use of French as the educational medium in Hanoi’s schools for 
young Chinese was of paramount political importance.  “The increasing importance 
for us of counterbalancing Japanese influence in China will seem to you, certainly, to 
justify all of the measures intended to propagate the use of our language.”
344 
In 1906, the timbre of the school began to change when several students 
submitted a petition requesting permission to be allowed to practice military tactics for 
half a day every day.
345  At first, the request was denied.  The Governor General had 
consulted with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Yunnan, who had demurred, 
commenting, “These young people are destined for civil service careers.”
346 Despite 
this official reluctance, the request was granted a short time later, and the Ecole’s 
students began to study the art of war under French soldiers in Hanoi.
347   
The first indication that the French might regret that decision came quickly 
when an excerpt from a letter sent by an Ecole Pavie student appeared in the Chinese 
press: 
Yunnannese students in Hanoi sent a letter to Peking addressed to the 
Ministry in charge of the reorganization of the armies saying that 
during their holidays, they traveled along the border of Indochina and 
Yunnan. They noticed that the French had established many fortresses 
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and that in the territory of Yunnan, all are along the railroad line…The 
province of Yunnan is therefore endangered because everyone knows 
the ambitions of the French. It is necessary to organize a very strong 
army for the defense of the border.
348 
The French investigated the incident, spoke to the students en masse, and, while 
unable to identify the offending party, did manage to determine that the students had 
received the information second-hand from reading Chinese publications.  The 
Director of the Ecole Pavie attempted to convince the students that France represented 
no danger to Yunnan, but to no avail: “Chinese, with the mentality that is theirs, will 
never believe that a Frenchman can, on this point, tell them the truth.”
349 
Political activism among students at the school did not stop there.  A 16-page 
pamphlet called Yunnan Warning (Yunnan Jinggao) circulated through the province in 
1906, and French sources were able to trace the anti-French tract back to Ecole Pavie 
students.  The document spoke of the danger posed by the French to Yunnan’s 
sovereignty, comparing the French in China to the Russians in Manchuria and citing 
the French in Algeria as proof of French duplicity and savagery.
350  Another bulletin, 
entitled “Advice for Yunnan’s Population,” condemned the way the French grew 
wealthy as the people of Annam starved.  “Annam's realm has been conquered for 20 
years. A part of the population has disappeared. At the beginning of the French 
occupation, the population was not too miserable because the country was not 
dominated. France was afraid of an uprising and it was important to achieve 
pacification: peace was advised. Later the population returned to misfortune. Now, all 
of the dangerous rebels are dead.”
351  The authors of this piece of propaganda claimed 
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to be students in Hanoi; once more, the Ecole Pavie was implicated in anti-French 
agitation. 
The French government quickly realized that the difficulties that they were 
having with Ecole Pavie students paled in comparison to the problems facing 
Yunnanese authorities.  In 1908, with no explanation, Yunnanese officials informed 
the Governor General that it would no longer be possible to send a new class from the 
province to the Ecole Pavie.  After a bit of confusion, the French Vice-Consul in 
Yunnan met privately with the Provincial Treasurer
352 who explained why Si-Léang, 
Yunnan’s Provincial Governor, had ordered that no more students be sent to the 
school.   
These pupils, after ending their studies at the Ecole Pavie, were, upon 
their return, the cause of real difficulties for the authorities in the 
schools that they entered or the places in which they live.  They have 
not stopped provoking unfortunate unrest, either by means of public or 
private speeches, or by wanting to get involved in local affairs and in 
international issues by [writing and distributing] pamphlets or by 
making charges [against those] high authorities. This revolutionary 
spirit, said the Treasurer, is not any less dangerous because it hampers 
local administrations and it risks compromising international 
relations.
353 
At first, the sudden decision of the Yunnan government to stop patronizing the 
school seemed to have taken the French Government aback; however, it is also clear 
that the French were aware of the many problems being caused in China by Ecole 
Pavie students.  As previously discussed, at least three different sets of lengthy and 
detailed pamphlets full of anti-French propaganda and written by Ecole Pavie students 
circulated throughout Yunnan in late 1905 and early 1906 alone.  Additionally, the 
Head of Indochina’s Political Bureau was personally aware of the involvement of 
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Ecole Pavie students in revolutionary activities propagated by one of the most 
dangerous opponents of the Qing dynasty.  “Antidynastic and revolutionary sentiments 
professed by these students are not in doubt; during the Nam-Quan fort escapade, 
three of them were convinced to travel to Lang Son, at least, with Sun Yat Sen and his 
companions.”
354  When Ecole Pavie graduates became implicated in revolutionary 
forays involving the future father of the Chinese Republic, the threat they posed to 
Yunnan’s provincial mandarins could not be ignored.  In the end, the scandal over 
political unrest fomented by former students signaled the death knell for the unique, if 
short-lived, school. 
The Ecole Pavie was officially disbanded by an order of the Governor General 
dated 11 July 1908.
355  The reasons behind the institute’s abrupt closure are complex, 
but fundamentally, even though the French had previously bandied around the idea of 
closing the school, the ultimate decision came from China, and its meaning was 
unmistakable.  Yunnan authorities would no longer send students from their province 
to the Ecole Pavie.  Only two solutions remained: send all of the students back to 
Yunnan immediately, or let them enroll in a Normal School in Hanoi that accepted 
foreign Asiatics for the rest of the school year.
356  The Viceroy of Yunnan agreed to let 
the students return immediately on two conditions.  First, that the fall tuition already 
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paid to the French be returned to Yunnan’s government, and second, that if the 
students could not afford the return fare of 50 taels per person, that the Government 
General of Indochina advance them the money, which would later be reimbursed to 
it.
357  Thus, with a brief bureaucratic squabble over finances, the school was closed. 
In a confidential letter sent to the Governor General, the Head of Indochina’s 
Political Bureau condemned the entire Ecole Pavie venture as a disastrous failure. 
As a matter of fact, the Ecole Pavie did not produce any of the hoped-
for results:  intended especially to develop French influence in Yunnan, 
most of the pupils that it educated gave evidence, afterwards, of their 
hostility towards France; intended to contribute to the development of 
friendly relations between France and China, it threatens to become, on 
the contrary, a source of difficulties because of the revolutionary spirit 
that moves the students.
358 
Despite the early success of the Ecole Pavie in attracting the attention of southern 
China’s ranking mandarins, in another major respect, the school was a failure.  It never 
managed, despite several attempts, to recruit students successfully from wealthy 
Chinese merchant families with ties to Indochina.  Had it shifted gears to allow 
admittance to those types of students, it might possible have managed to maintain a 
less politically charged environment. With a dramatically larger pool of prospective 
students, it also would have had less trouble attracting a complete enrollment from 
year to year.   
In spite of these failings, though, efforts to educate Chinese in French style 
schools continued unabated.  In fact, I would like to suggest that the failure of the 
Ecole Pavie, combined with the support and cooperation of Cochinchina’s Chinese 
notables, eventually allowed for the emergence of a school that did not fail, but 
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stalwartly endured right up until the collapse of the French regime in 1954.  This 
school was known as the Lycée Franco-Chinois.  Colonial attention turned to the 
fledgling Lycée Franco-chinois as the bearer of French hopes for shifting the minds of 
young Chinese students towards the French and away from both the English and the 
Japanese, who were so much better positioned geographically for accessing the 
Chinese educational market. This idea gains further credence when one considers that 
the school’s native-place ties with Fujian were quite strong and that the school’s Board 
of Directors, along with the general government, recruited quite heavily from places 
like Amoy and Fuzhou – a region where English influence was less evident than in 
Canton, and hopes for French success could be higher.   
While the Indochinese University did not come to be, the English plan to open 
their own universities in China gradually morphed into a plan to open the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. French Colonial authorities were already distressed by the 
fact that wealthy Chinese in Cochinchina educated their sons in English secondary 
schools and they tried to figure out a way to consolidate French influence in Asia, 
particularly in Indochina and among the merchant Chinese.  This was the primary 
colonial justification for establishing the Franco-Chinese Secondary School in Cholon, 
or the Lycée Franco-Chinois; however, the Lycée Franco-Chinois is significant within 
the Chinese community as well.  For Cholon’s Chinese, and arguably for the Chinese 
throughout Cochinchina, the Lycée Franco-Chinois was one of the crown jewels, not 
only of Sino-French cooperation, but of inter-congregational cooperation as well.   
In 1907, Charles Hardouin, the Chief of the Governor-General’s Cabinet, had 
undertaken a mission to China in which he publicized the French intention to create a 
secondary school for Chinese pupils in Cholon.  Plans for the Franco-Chinese 
Secondary School accelerated quite rapidly in the months following Hardouin’s 
exploratory trip.  That the French were integrally involved in the planning and  
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implementation of the Franco-Chinese Secondary School cannot be denied; however, 
the early efforts for the establishment of a modern, Western school for Chinese 
students came from other sources in addition to the French.  In fact, as early as 
December of 1907, a group of Chinese merchants living in Cholon established an 
association whose sole purpose was to create a school that would “give the Chinese 
children a modern education.”
359  These same Chinese merchants even commissioned 
a French notary, Mr. Gigon-Papin, to investigate the feasibility of such an 
institution.
360  With such proactive support from the Chinese community in Cholon, 
the colonial government quickly agreed to facilitate the creation of the Franco-Chinese 
Secondary School.   
The desire for a French school expressed by Cholon’s notable Chinese proved 
to be a much-desired lifeline for the colonial administration. On January 27, 1908, 
colonial authorities met in a general assembly at which they appointed a Board of 
Directors for the as-yet-unformed school.  Six members of this Board, including the 
first President of the Board, Mr. Schneegans, were European; the other twelve 
members, including the first vice-president of the Board, Mr. Ta-Mah-Yan, were 
notable Chinese businessmen and heads of the four major Chinese congregations 
(bang).
361 On February 10, 1908, about two weeks after the creation of the school’s 
Board of Directors, the new company received its official seal of approval when the 
Lieutenant Governor of Cochinchina, Mr. Bonhoure, endorsed the establishment of 
both the Association and the school it sought to create.
362  Three years later, the joint 
committee of Chinese and Frenchmen got their project underway.   
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When petitioning the French government for a subsidy to meet the school’s 
budget shortfall, the President of the committee commented on the early days of the 
Association, writing that its purpose  
was to create, in the most important Chinese center of the Colony, an 
establishment similar to those which had already existed for several 
years in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore, where well-to-do 
Chinese based in Indochina had not hesitated, despite the relatively 
high expense, to send their children. These [children], their studies 
completed, returned to us educated like the English and speaking 
English exclusively. It seemed that it would be possible to keep [those 
students] in Indochina by offering the same education, but in French.
363 
By highlighting the ever-present competition with Great Britain, the Association of the 
Franco-Chinese Secondary School managed to maintain the interest and support of the 
colonial administration throughout the early years of its existence, not a mean feat 
considering that the school ran with a perpetual budget shortfall and required 
significant yearly subsidies in order to continue its operations. 
When considering the local value of an institution like the Lycée Franco-
Chinois, it is important to remember the depth of penetration of congregational 
schools into rural areas.  All regions of Indochina maintained Chinese-run, 
congregationally-supported elementary schools for local Chinese children.  The flight 
to foreign schools and universities only affected the best and the brightest of Chinese 
pupils, those destined for higher education.  By establishing a Chinese secondary 
school in Cholon, the French, with the help and cooperation of the Chinese 
congregations, had gone a long way towards obviating the need for travel to Hong 
Kong or Canton for further education.
364 
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Despite their stalwart support of the endeavor, it would be incorrect to assume 
that the Colonial government bore the primary pecuniary responsibility for building 
and operating the school. After Lieutenant-Governor Bonhoure approved the 
establishment of the Association of the Franco-Chinese Secondary School,
365 the 
association called upon the European and Chinese communities in Saigon and Cholon 
to pledge financial support to the school.  The resulting signatures promised a sum of 
$159,160 piastres, only $15,160 piastres of which were paid by European donors.  The 
remaining $144,000 piastres of the initial sum collected came directly from members 
of Cholon’s Chinese community.  Prompted by the generosity of the network of 
Chinese businessmen based in Cholon and no doubt relieved that wealthy Chinese 
youth would no longer be required to seek education from the English, the French 
General Government added its own donation of $20,000 piastres to the amount 
collected by the Board of Directors.
366  
Although technically in the town of Cholon, the proposed site for the school 
actually sat on the border between Cholon and Saigon, offering easy access to Chinese 
pupils from both cities. The Colonial Government, led by Governor General Beau, 
donated a substantial tract of land to the Association for the construction of the 
school’s facilities, and the Governor General himself placed the first stone of the new 
school on February 26, 1908. At the ceremony marking the commencement of 
construction, five of the Chinese founders of the secondary school were awarded the 
distinguished Decoration of State Education
367 for their efforts on behalf of the new 
institution of learning.
368 During the period of construction, the Board of Directors 
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desired that the school commence operations despite the lack of suitable facilities. To 
that end, the Board sought temporary space in which to house and teach the students 
and their professors. Once again, the Chinese community came up with a solution to 
the dilemma of space when the Fujian Congregation volunteered the use of their 
pagoda in Cholon to the students and faculty of the school until the school’s actual 
building was completed. The association quickly accepted this generous offer and the 
Franco-Chinese Secondary School sprang to life.
369 
On April 7, 1909, Governor General Klobukowski addressed the assembled 
students and an audience of French and Chinese dignitaries during an ornate ceremony 
at the Phuoc Kien pagoda, the temporary site for the newly inaugurated school.  In his 
speech, he spoke little of education and his hopes for the school’s success; rather, he 
delivered a stern address with heavy political overtones.  Discussing the long 
relationship between China and Indochina, Klobukowski warned the Chinese to 
remain obedient to local laws, saying,  
Indochina has always welcomed [the Chinese] warmly and has given 
them the greatest opportunities to work. [Here] they are entitled to 
appeal either to indigenous statutes or to French law. Therefore, the 
Colonial Government counts it as absolutely required that [the Chinese] 
always remain respectful of the regulations and of the laws which 
ensure a privileged position for them in Indochina. That is why their 
absolute and complete loyalty can be claimed.
370 
In his speech, Klobukowski goes on to acknowledge the fundamental condition of the 
Chinese community in Indochina.  They consistently participate in the commerce, 
labor, and communities of Saigon and Cholon, but the French doubt their loyalty and 
commitment to the governing bodies of Vietnam, fearing instead that the numerous 
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Chinese citizens in Indochina remain loyal only to China, and to their political and 
economic interests there.  The political climate in Indochina at the time goes a long 
towards contextualizing this speech.  The Vietnamese peasant uprising of 1908, the 
closing of the University of Hanoi, and a number of similar incidents had served to 
darken considerably the colonial mood, a mistrust clearly conveyed in the severe and 
stern nature of Klobukowski’s address. 
Despite his 1909 seriousness, Klobukowski himself generally supported 
Chinese organizations in Indochina
371 and the Franco-Chinese Secondary School 
proved to be no exception to this unwritten policy, but he expected something more 
than good stewardship in return for the financial support of the colonial authority, as 
the above passage from his speech indicates.  In fact, what was perceived as his 
permissive attitude towards the Chinese population of Indochina led to quite a bit of 
friction within the administration, and on occasion, scathing letters of protest were 
sent to the Minister of Colonies in Paris, who then required explanations of and even 
defenses for Klobukowski’s decisions. The subsidy granted to the Franco-Chinese 
Secondary School by Klobukowski’s administration was just one of a number of 
issues for which the Minister of Colonies demanded justification.
372  The financial 
pressure that the administration faced from Paris also shines through in the speech 
Klobukowski gave at the opening of the school, in which he urged the school’s Board 
of directors to adhere to the “the strictest economy in the construction of this 
establishment. Needless use of luxury is not preferable to reserving the collected 
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capital sums necessary for the normal functioning of [the school] for one or two 
years.”
373 
The school’s builders paid heed to Klobukowski’s plea for economy.   
Construction of the school building only cost $109,800 piastres, considerably short of 
the $179,160 piastres that had been raised by the Board in its initial collection; 
however, the remaining funds quickly dwindled with the purchasing of furniture, 
educational supplies and books that had to be ordered from France, equipment for the 
dining halls, and so on. The financial shortfall was exacerbated by the rather 
inefficient fact that the pupils cost more money to keep, feed, and educate than they 
brought to the school in the form of tuition and board.  By 1912, when the Board of 
Directors decided to install electricity in the new building (at the cost of $10,000 
piastres for the entire project) the school’s financial struggles had become abundantly 
clear.
374   
In fact, the most serious issue challenging the success of the school concerned 
its irregular funding, a problem so severe that it once actually halted the operation of 
the institution for several months in 1917. Financial woes beset the school as early as 
1911, when, before the institution was even operational, $10,000 pledged to support 
its operation were lost due to the unexpected bankruptcy of one of the Chinese 
businesses that had pledged to support it.  The surplus money from the founding of the 
school had been exhausted by 1914.  The closure of 1917 represented a real low point 
for the institution, but in 1918, the French stepped in to subsidize the running of the 
place.  These subsidies took many varied forms, including large donations of funds 
levied by the congregations from the Chinese community
375 and various supplements 
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donated by the Government of Cochinchina.
376  In fact, the most consistent source of 
funding enjoyed by the school in the 1920’s was money funneled to the school out of 
the amounts paid to France by the Chinese government as part of the reparations 
remaining from the Boxer Rebellion.
377 
These funding problems were not alleviated until the President of Cholon’s 
Municipal Council had the inspired idea to add 5 cents to the taxes paid by each of 
Cholon’s Chinese merchants and businessmen, money that was to go directly into the 
Lycée’s budget.  Cholon’s Chinese Chamber of Commerce welcomed a solution that 
was at once simple and effective, but not too onerous for smaller businessmen to bear.
 
378  In fact, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the leaders of Cholon’s 
congregations felt that an increased tax would present fewer problems for them than 
had the old method of laboriously collecting pledges from the entire Chinese 
community.
379  The only major complaint was that Cholon merchants bore the brunt of 
a tax that was used to support a school that was attended by Chinese from all across 
Cochinchina and Cambodia.  Even more off-putting to Cholon’s Chinese, Saigon’s 
Chinese community members were also not initially subject to taxation.
380  After a 
complaint by the President of Cholon’s Municipal Council, the government 
reexamined the taxation notion.  With the endorsement of the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and of the Chinese congregations of Saigon and Cholon, the 
Cochinchinese government extended the tax to include all Chinese residents of 
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Cochinchina.
381 With the combined money from taxes and the Boxer Reparations, the 
school could finally keep its financial head above the water. 
This solution offers insight into one of the most fundamental realities of the 
congregation system.  In Indochina’s hierarchy of Chinese congregations, the 
congregations in Cholon sat unchallenged at the top; Saigon’s congregations were just 
a small step below. Thus, when the Chinese community in Cholon felt that something 
was unfair, the French government, as in this case, paid attention.  This is not meant to 
imply, by any means, that the French always capitulated to Cholon’s Chinese; rather, a 
strong opinion voiced by that Chinese community guaranteed at least a hearing from 
the French.  The second point worthy of note is that when the united congregations of 
Cholon and Saigon agreed to measures such as a Cochinchina-wide tax increase to 
support the Lycée Franco-chinois, the opinions of smaller congregations outside of the 
city were irrelevant.  In this case, the congregations’ decision was certainly not 
capricious.  The institution of the new tax guaranteed the school a source of funding 
that would remain as long as Chinese remained in Indochina to attend the institution. 
The connections between the Lycée Franco-Chinois and the Chinese 
congregations also warrant closer attention.  Statutes published in 1908 by the Lycée 
Franco-Chinois are essentially a list of all of the very prominent Chinese businessmen.  
Phong Nhut, Cantonese congregation president and future president of Cholon’s 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, appears on the list, as does another familiar name:  
Ly Dang.  In fact, Ly Dang’s appearance here suggests an answer to a bit of a Lycée 
mystery.  Ly Dang’s name appears as a founding member of the institution on the 
published statutes from 1908.
382  By 1914, he is no longer listed as a member of the 
school’s council,
383 because his bankruptcy had already led to his return to China.  The 
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fact that a prominent businessman went bankrupt and cost the school $10,000 piastres 
in pledges sometime after 1911, and the fact that Ly Dang was a prominent 
businessman and council member who went bankrupt after 1911 but before 1914, 
although circumstantial, seems to indicate that he was the bankrupt businessman in 
question. 
For the French, the high degree of Chinese involvement in the affairs of the 
Lycée spoke favorably about the institution.  From one perspective, the Lycée largely 
avoided the anti-French sentiments and revolutionary inclinations that had doomed the 
Ecole Pavie.  By enrolling students who were personally invested in Indochina by 
virtue of family ties, the risk of radical reformism and generally xenophobia was 
greatly reduced.  As the head of the school’s council wrote, 
You will doubtless consider with us that the question of the education 
to be given to the Chinese upper class is not only educational, but 
above all, political. Our neighbors in Hong-Kong have consented to 
large sacrifices to drain the intellectual Chinese elite, and it would be 
certainly annoying if the Chinese businessmen of the Colony were 
forced to send their children to British territory to receive an education 
for which no need was foreseen in Indochina, except for our 
establishment.
384 
From the Chinese perspective, this school also seems to have been a success.  Books 
and pamphlets commemorating various classes and reunions at the school were still 
being published well into the 1950’s, a clear indication of the institution’s longevity. 
Conclusion 
By the mid-1920’s, Frequent French refusal to allow political activism in the 
form of commemorations and demonstrations led to open Chinese resistance to 
colonial prohibitions.  During annual commemorations of the Marco Polo Bridge 
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incident, local French authorities refused to give congregations permission to hang 
national flags to commemorate the day, but they could not prevent individual Chinese 
from closing their shops, wearing crepe armbands, and distributing flyers on a massive 
scale.
385  In Saigon and Cholon, in addition to business closings, as many as 10,000 
Chinese from all of the congregations paraded through the Chinese Consulate in 
Saigon from 7 o’clock in the morning to 5 o’clock in the afternoon, paying their 
respects to a hanging portrait of Sun Yat Sen.
386   
While politicized cultural activities occasioned friction, French and Chinese 
leaders found common ground over the issue of education.  French officials were 
concerned about the flight of Indochina’s best and brightest overseas Chinese pupils to 
foreign schools and universities.  By establishing a Chinese secondary school in 
Cholon, the French, with the help and cooperation of the Chinese congregations, went 
a long way towards obviating the need for Chinese students to travel to Hong Kong or 
Canton for further education.  Education in Indochina benefited both the French and 
the Chinese by creating a class of overseas Chinese pupil that was fluent in French, 
presumably friendly to French interests, and able to interact successfully with colonial 
authorities; however, when confronted with funding, colonial imperatives once again 
carried the day.  Despite their stalwart support of the endeavor, the overseas Chinese 
community itself still bore the primary pecuniary responsibility for building and 
operating the school.  
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CHAPTER 7:  FINDING THE MIDDLE GROUND: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND 
MEDIATION IN THE CONGREGATIONS 
As the only officially recognized representatives of Indochina’s Chinese 
communities, congregations assumed a prominent role as mediators for their members.  
This mediation took multiple forms; congregations interceded on behalf of their 
members with French authorities, local indigenous administrators, or even other 
congregations.  This intercession might occur in a Vietnamese village, in the capital of 
the Chinese province from which the supplicant hailed, or even in the halls of Paris’s 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but wherever arbitration occurred, it was likely to 
concern one of two matters:  immigration or commerce.   
The following chapter of this dissertation addresses issues of immigration, 
crime, and expulsion; it will focus largely upon mediation as it involved financial or 
commercial issues.  To that end, our discussion shall center upon two types of 
mediation:  domestic mediation, between Chinese and indigenous communities or 
simply between two or more conflicting Chinese communities; and international 
mediation. This last might include Chinese mediation with the French Government 
General, Chinese mediation with French government in Paris, or even Chinese 
mediation with Chinese high officials or French consuls in Chinese native places, most 
frequently Amoy or Canton. 
Domestic Political Mediation 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Chinese mercantile success in Indochina made Chinese 
businesses easy targets for indigenous agitation, especially in rural areas of the colony.  
In the early 1920s, a spate of anti-Chinese activities in Vinh Long province led the 
Chinese congregations to appeal to the French for protection and defense.  On 
November 25, 1922, two local Annamite students went to the “Kouang An” shop,  
188 
owned by local Chinese merchant Luong Hưu,
387 to inquire into the purchase of a 
padlock.  One student bought a padlock for 40 cents and was given the key; the other 
allegedly stole a padlock and then returned to the store later in the day to demand the 
key.  The Chinese store employee told the student he could have the key if he paid his 
40 cents.  The student, infuriated, hurled insults at the man and threatened to return 
with his classmates to take his revenge upon the store.  Shortly thereafter, a small mob 
of indigenous students returned to harass the salesman and to throw rocks at the store, 
threatening the salesman and the merchandise.  Only after the arrival of the police did 
the students stop their assault on the store.
388 
Unfortunately, the confrontation did not end there. Four days later, on 
November 29, the students returned en masse, this time led by an indigenous professor 
from their school.  This second attack, committed by around 50 students,
389 occurred 
in the early morning, around 7 am, and left the shop windows shattered and much 
merchandise destroyed.  Particularly shocked by the involvement of the professor in 
this affair, the Chinese wrote, “The Annamite professor, scornful of the most basic 
laws, personally went to assist the actions of his students, provoking the disturbance at 
the shop in Vinh Long.”
390  While the exact cause of the disgruntlement of the 
Vietnamese students in this case cannot be determined, the early 1920’s in 
Cochinchina were characterized by the frequent exhortations made by prominent 
Vietnamese working in the French administration to boycott Chinese goods and 
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services.  These anti-Chinese boycotts were supported by a number of prominent 
groups, including Bui Quang Trieu and his Vietnamese Constitutionalists. 
These were not the first incidents that had occurred in Vinh Long.  Previously, 
in 1919, the store of Hainanese merchant Ouei Nam Hing had been attacked.  In 1920, 
shopkeeper Du Thang of the Trieu Chau congregation fell victim to a similar scheme.  
For local merchants, the uproar at the Kuoang An shop was the last straw; thus, in 
December of 1922, the leaders of all five of Vinh Long’s Chinese congregations sent a 
formal letter of complaint to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Cholon, asking for 
them to intercede with the French government on their behalf.
391  The Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce immediately forwarded the petition of Vinh Long’s 
congregation presidents to the Governor of Cochinchina,
392 who, as chance would 
have it, had already received a report from Vinh Long’s administrator, warning him 
that he was likely to hear of the incident because Vinh Long’s Chinese merchants had 
reached the end of their patience.  “The pupils took advantage of [this incident] to vent 
feelings of hostility which exist here against the Chinese, feelings that have shown 
themselves repeatedly and in similar ways these past years.”
393   
The repeat attack came as no surprise to the local police, who had stationed an 
officer near the shop after the original November 25 incident to prevent just such local 
retaliation; however, when the students returned in such large numbers, the policeman 
was frightened by them and did nothing to intervene.  The policeman, apparently an 
habitual opium smoker with a record of past failings, was dismissed by the provincial 
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administrator.  In the end, the Administrator ordered the Director of the Vinh Long 
School to open an inquiry into the attacks and to publicize any punishments that 
resulted from the investigation.  Also, as a means of placating the frustrated local 
Chinese businessmen, the town of Long Châu paid an indemnity to the beleaguered 
Luong Hưu that was intended to recompense him for his troubles.
394   
In addition to dealing with indigenous conflicts, congregations could appeal to 
the French on matters concerning intra-congregational conflicts as well.  Inevitably, 
congrégations were not above internal rivalries and petty acts of vengeance for real 
and imagined social or business slights.  In these situations, Chinese congrégation 
leaders could use their subordinate positions relative to the French administration to 
get rid of hated competitors and enemies. The mere suspicion of malfeasance, if 
whispered into the appropriate colonial ear, could result in a man’s expulsion from the 
colony and the ensuing loss of most, if not all, of his property and interests there; 
however, small congrégations away from the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan center 
could themselves be embarrassed if a big urban congrégation chose to dispute the 
regional congrégation’s claims. One such incident involved the fate of Tran Phut, a 
Cantonese man from Soc Trang. 
On July 21, 1887, the leader of Soc Trang’s Cantonese congregation sent a 
letter to Mr. Masse, the French administrator of Soc Trang, requesting the expulsion 
from the Colony of one Tran Phut, whose crimes, among other things, included 
general allegations of rabble-rousing and unsavoriness of character.  In the letter, the 
congrégation’s president himself confessed to being unable to remember many of the 
details surrounding Tran Phut’s misdeeds, but he, on behalf of the Cantonese leaders 
and shopkeepers of Soc Trang, still insisted that the man be expelled from Soc Trang 
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“in order to set a good example for [the region’s] Chinese inhabitants.”
395  U p on  
hearing reports of a near-vagabond fomenting unrest in his district, Masse made a 
hasty investigation of Tran and sent a letter off to Saigon, imploring the Director of 
the Interior to expel him from the Colony unless, of course, he felt inclined to intern 
him at Poulo Condore.
396 
Somehow, whether through French or Chinese contacts is unknown, the 
Cantonese congregations of Saigon and Cholon discovered Tran’s plight and quickly 
rushed to his aid, writing a letter detailing his years in the region and his immense 
respectability.  No less than 18 major businessmen and congregation leaders from 
Saigon and Cholon signed this letter defending the character of the hapless prisoner.
397  
Cochinchina’s Cantonese establishments had known Tran Phut for many years.  In the 
1860’s, he had lived in Cambodia where he operated a successful business in Phnom 
Penh. Unfortunately, his business eventually faltered and he was forced to close shop. 
Moving away from Phnom Penh, Tran eventually settled in the village of Bai Xau in 
Soc Trang province where he opened an opium shop and married an Annamite woman 
with whom he had at least two children.
398  The urban congregations trusted Tran 
completely and had over the years extended him a nearly limitless line of credit for his 
business ventures, trust that, according to the congrégations, was never betrayed.  In 
fact, the urban Congrégations blamed the whole expulsion affair on the jealousy and 
hatred of some Soc Trang Chinese who bore false witness against Tran and had him 
arrested out of spite.  They implored the French administration to consider the plight 
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of Tran’s family, to consider the source of the alleged accusations, and to consider the 
honorability of those vouching for his character.
399  
Not surprisingly, the French chose to question Tran firsthand to determine the 
truth. Under interrogation at Saigon’s Central Prison, Tran explained that the leader of 
the Soc Trang congregation was very angry with him, because in 1886, Tran had 
vouched for several Chinese imprisoned for being members of a secret society.  The 
Administrator eventually released the men and the Soc Trang president had not 
forgiven Tran for his interference.
400  After questioning Tran, Tourillon, Saigon’s 
police superintendent, recommended that Tran be allowed to stay in the Colony, 
although he suggested that the man be required to move from Soc Trang to avoid 
future troubles.  Justifying his recommendation, Tourillon cited the respectability of 
Tran’s character witnesses, adding that a more severe punishment could be dispensed 
later “should this Chinese prove himself unworthy of the administration’s leniency.”
401  
As no order of expulsion is included in Tran’s dossier, it is probably safe to assume 
that the superintendent’s recommendation was accepted and Tran was allowed to 
remain in Cochinchina. 
This incident is illuminating in two respects.  First, it stands as a shining 
example of the way congrégations could use French decrees to eliminate rivals in the 
region.  In fact, the imposition of an entire code of laws upon the Chinese community 
by an outside authority arguably empowered local Chinese leaders by providing them 
with the powerful weapon of expulsion to be wielded as necessary to purge 
undesirable members.  The act of appealing directly to the French nicely bypassed any 
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internal mediation within the Chinese community, thus ensuring that formal 
negotiations with an assigned Chinese arbiter would not interfere with the elimination 
of an enemy.  In the case of Tran Phut, this plan failed because of the willingness of 
the Cholon and Saigon congrégations to intervene on his behalf; however, one can 
safely assume that few Chinese based in rural regions boasted the loyal friends and 
powerful connections necessary to salvage their Indochinese interests when 
condemned by local French authorities.  In fact, if one looks closely at Tran’s story, it 
seems possible that the president of the Soc Trang congregation had resorted to false 
accusations in the past to rid himself of enemies or competitors.  Certainly Tran Phut 
seemed to imply that this was the case when he explained the reasons underlying the 
animosity between him and the congrégational authorities.
402 
Second, this incident serves to highlight an unwritten rule of Indochina’s 
congregations. Congrégational authority adhered to a strict pecking order, with rural 
congrégations subordinate to urban ones and the congrégations of Saigon and Cholon 
dominant over all. This dominance is less clear in the case of Tonkin, where distance 
inevitably decreased the effective reach of the great Chinese centers to the south, but 
for Cochinchina and Cambodia, word from Cholon, and to a slightly lesser degree, 
Saigon, was law. French edicts did not explicitly enforce this hierarchy, but the 
tendency to apply justice along terms of mutual responsibility, as seen previously with 
the example of the Trieu Chau congrégation’s involvement in the secret society 
uprisings of 1882, implicitly reinforced the authority of Cholon and Saigon by making 
rural activities directly relevant to urban financial interests.  Additionally, as the final 
verdict indicates, the French authorities in Saigon completely disregarded the 
accusations of the Cantonese president in Soc Trang, instead using the information 
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provided by the wealthy and extremely powerful Cantonese congrégations of Cholon 
and Saigon to determine the truth. 
Commerce and Trade 
Issues of commerce and trade were certain to pique the interest of overseas 
Chinese communities and equally sure to elicit a quick Chinese response if they 
impacted the normal operational patterns of Chinese businesses in Indochina.   
Examples of this sort of dispute abound, and congregational intervention on behalf of 
their members occurred quite frequently.  In 1911, for example, the presidents of the 
Hainam, Trieu Chau, and Phuoc Kien congregations in Cholon all forwarded letters of 
complaint to Cochinchina’s Lieutenant Governor, protesting the fact that they were 
held responsible for the taxes from boats that might only pass through their cities once 
in a month and whose captains certainly felt little need to pay the requisite duties.
403  
As the following photo indicates, these boats were often small, with shallow drafts and 
minimal crews who often did not feel the need to follow official French rules when it 
came to paying taxes and duties on cargo. 
 
Figure 14 Chinese Junk
404 
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The congregations faced an extremely serious problem when it came to these 
boats.  Boat captains could easily hide out in the endless maze of canals, tributaries, 
and tiny waterways that crisscrossed the region and customs officials were extremely 
unlikely to be able to monitor them successfully, especially if they did not want to be 
found.  If congregation officers never saw these boat captains, they certainly could not 
collect taxes due from them, but despite this reality, congregations were still 
responsible for making up the unpaid money.  French administrators admitted that the 
Chinese situation was dire, but they could not agree on a solution to the problem.  
Correspondence flew furiously back and forth between the Chinese and the various 
administrators in the Cochinchinese government until a solution was finally reached.  
Chinese congregations would remain responsible for the unpaid taxes of Chinese 
boats, but the registry system of boats would be completely revamped in order to 
allow the customs agencies to keep better track of the comings and goings of these 
vessels.  Additionally, proof of tax payment would be required for any number of 
business transactions in the colony, a measure intended to encourage captains to pay 
up in order to avoid penalties and bureaucratic difficulties later.
405  In this way, the 
Chinese and French reached an accord that, while perhaps not everything the Chinese 
might have hoped for, still showed a good faith effort to alleviate the burden placed 
upon the congregations by delinquent boat captains.  As the following picture 
suggests, the diversity of cargo carried on a typical Chinese ship offered great 
potential for profit.  Many boat captains preferred to pay their taxes and preserve their 
legitimacy and recourse to colonial protection rather than frittering those safeguards 
away by becoming delinquent in tax and duty payments. 
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Figure 15 Chinese Junks in Cholon
406 
Other financial adjustments made by the French drew severe criticism from 
Indochina’s overseas Chinese.  In 1921, for example, the dramatic increase in the 
business tax, as much as 250% for some merchants, outraged the Chinese community 
so much that the French offered to review each complaint on a case by case basis to 
make sure the increases did not overwhelm small and mid-sized businesses.
407  
However, of all of the commercial actions taken by the French, there was one in 
particular that created an overwhelming backlash in Indochina’s overseas Chinese 
community. This was the move by the French government to require that all 
accounting and bookkeeping be done in French rather than in Chinese. 
Indochina’s Chinese, most of whom could not speak French with any level of 
proficiency, much less read or write it, were completely appalled by this decision 
which, for most of them, meant that they would have to hire separate translators to 
manage the conversions of their books into French.  The French rationale for this 
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decision was essentially suspicion; by having all accounting done in French, it would 
be easier for colonial administrators to inspect Chinese accounting and ferret out any 
attempts to defraud the colonial government.  Unlike many of the acts that preceded it, 
this new French language requirement earned the ire of the Chinese in all five regions 
of Indochina, who quickly met to discuss the matter and appealed to their various 
French administrators to defer implementation of this new regulation pending 
negotiations between the Governor General and Cholon’s Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce. 
The Governor General formally supported this regulation for the first time in 
1926, and although the Chinese complained that they were not competent in French, 
the actual requirement demanded accounting in an indigenous language or a language 
using the Latin alphabet.  The Governor General made it clear that this measure was 
intended primarily to reduce Chinese corruption.  “The measure is a general order; 
however, it will only effect the numerous Chinese businessmen in Indochina because 
the Japanese, the Siamese, and the Indians … are generally familiar with the English 
language – when they do not know ours – and will easily be able to do their 
accounting in a language using Latin characters.”
408  In fact, the Governor general was 
well aware of the hardship this new regulation would impose upon Chinese 
businesses.  He suggested a gradual implementation of this plan, starting with the 
largest companies first, because they could afford to hire accountants, to avoid 
overstressing small companies that would not be able to afford the extra staffing 
requirements.
409 
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Despite the Governor general’s careful planning, and despite the many 
examples he gave of similar colonial situations,
410 this proposal went all the way to 
President of France for approval.
411  Within a few weeks, the French President ratified 
the measure, and all colonial accounting had to be recorded using the Latin 
alphabet.
412  Eventually, a sort of workable compromise was reached in terms of the 
on the ground application of the statute.  A commission established by the Lieutenant 
Governor in Cochinchina proffered the suggestion that chartered accountants be used 
to oversee the conversion and translation of accounts from Chinese to French.  These 
accountants, vetted by local authorities and completely trustworthy, were responsible 
for all translations and queries related to the Chinese accounts.
413  Additionally, the 
translations were limited to the names of the account holders only, although in the case 
of Chinese companies, company signboards were not sufficient; the French required 
the actual names of the businessmen underwriting the company.
414 
In actuality, it is quite likely that language was not the main stumbling block 
when it came to Chinese accounting practices.  According to historian Robert 
Gardella, traditional Chinese accounting practices during the Qing dynasty bore little 
resemblance to the “double entry” methods so valued by Western accountants.   
Gardella describes a system of multiple ledgers, where, in larger businesses, a certain 
numerical creativity allowed successful managers to be rewarded more than less 
successful ones, and where the entire system, cloaked in secrecy, forced a competition 
between employees and branches that contributed to the owners’ overall control.
415  In 
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one respect, Gardella justifies colonial suspicions by describing a flexible, clandestine, 
and often complicated ledger system that often treated business deals as family 
arrangements and whose “jungle-like undergrowth unnecessarily complicat[ed] 
ordinary business operations.”
416  But despite its complicated nature, Gardella asserts 
that native Chinese and accounting practices during the late Ming and Qing dynasties 
– and, one presumes, into the Republican period – were more than sufficient to meet 
the needs of any Chinese business, large or small, were it to be applied rigorously. 
The conflict over the language of accounting took nearly 10 years to resolve.  
The French administration first began to consider the idea after the Americans 
promulgated a similar law in 1921 in the Philippines.  In 1930, Chinese were still 
protesting the hardship incurred by the statute.  In these letters, the frustration of the 
overseas Chinese shines through quite clearly.  With China wracked by civil war, the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry was either unwilling or unable to intercede on behalf of her 
citizens overseas.
417  This left Indochina’s Chinese truly on their own…and 
conducting their accounts in French. 
International Political Mediation 
While the French might have struggled with issues of Chinese immigration in 
Tonkin, in Cochinchina, the Chinese came to their own defense over the question of 
congregational responsibility for expelled Chinese.  As early as 1889, the combined 
presidents of the congregations of Saigon and Cholon protested the French 
requirement that they pay the head tax due on Chinese expelled from the Colony.  The 
presidents argued that they themselves had already footed the bill for supporting and 
feeding the mendicant Chinese prior to their expulsion and the congregations had also 
paid for the passage of these undesirables back to China.  The fact that they then owed 
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basic taxes to the French administration on behalf of these expelled individuals 
weighed heavily upon them.  “The state of our congregations’ capital is not as 
prosperous because our business has been hard hit these last days.”
418  This incident 
shows the willingness of overseas Chinese to approach the Governor General directly 
and with solidarity when they desired a change in colonial laws applicable to their 
community.  
 
Figure 16 Chinese Merchants
419 
Not all complaints sent by overseas Chinese to the Governor General were so 
simple.  In 1903, all of the notable Chinese in Cholon and Saigon sent an eleven-point 
petition to the Governor General protesting the reception Chinese emigrating into the 
colony received at the hands of the French.  The complaining Chinese quite likely bore 
some resemblance to those seen in the picture above, financially comfortable, well 
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groomed, and serious.  Their complaints were many and covered all aspects of the 
process of arrival into the colony.  Concerned first with their own congregational 
coffers, the Chinese protested the continued payment of a revolving tax intended to 
recompense the French for the construction of the Xom-Chiêu depot along the Saigon 
River, intended to protect new arrivals from the elements, long after the cost of 
construction had been recovered.   
Points two and three concerned the debarkation of passengers and recovery of 
their luggage, a period of time during which Vietnamese coolies swarmed new 
arrivals, jostling for portage rights and creating a scene of chaos, confusion, and 
frustration.  To combat this disorder, the Chinese suggested point number four:  the 
creation of what would essentially be an immigration revenue farm.  The Chinese 
congregations would select among their members one entrepreneur who would take 
responsibility for the debarkation, registration, and cataloguing of immigrants, 
ensuring a smoother process and relieving the congregations of the burden of the 
meticulous accounting required at the point of disembarkation. 
The next two points concerned the human dignity of the arriving Chinese.   
When immigrants arrived in the colony, they were transshipped to the Xom-Chiêu 
depot, during which process they were rarely treated with kindness and often received 
insults and abuse at the hands of custom’s officials.  More disturbing for the arriving 
Chinese was the process of registration, especially as it pertained to Chinese women 
and children. 
The undersigned ask you, Mr. Governor General, to give orders for the 
immigrants to be treated people and not as dogs or pigs by the 
Immigration Head and Agents, and also that immigrant women and 
children are not subjected to the formality of measurement.
420 [We] 
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don’t know how to avoid that which is damaging to the chastity of the 
women and the girls, for various parts of their bodies to be felt by 
multiple people under the guise of looking for marks or signs suitable 
for establishing their identity.
421 
The thought of this practice, viewed a gross violation of female Chinese immigrants, 
excited the congregations to action to protect the dignity of their fellow countrymen 
far more even than the insults and disparagement to which they were subjected upon 
their arrival in the colony.  The remaining points all concerned business or taxes in 
some way.  Point eight also dealt with treating Chinese humanely.  The congregations 
asked that very elderly or disabled Chinese who had spent many years in the colony 
but were too aged or infirm to support themselves be exempt from their taxes, thus 
helping them to avoid deportation from the colony.   
Point seven requested that established colonial merchants with valid colonially 
issued passports in hand be excused from the melee of the immigration queue.  They 
argued that there was no benefit to paying taxes and receiving such a mandatory 
passport if they had to wait in the same line as the newly arrived, unregistered 
immigrants.  The final points, nine through eleven, dealt with assorted issues of 
taxation, from the reestablishment of an old tourism tax to the reduction – and 
elimination for women and children – of the price of colonial passports.  They also 
requested enhanced authority to expel members for the congregations, and for the 
establishment of a different system for collecting Chinese taxes that would be more 
convenient for congregation members.
422 
The point by point rebuttal issued by the Immigration service denied many of 
the Chinese allegations, even going so far as to accuse the petitioners of deliberate 
untruth on several of the issues.  The rebuttal went on to clam that the Immigration 
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service itself had fallen victim to a concentrated attack by Cochinchina’s Chinese 
community, and that as a fundamentally fiscally-based service, Immigration would 
inevitably draw the enmity of the people from whom it sought to collect;
423 however, 
the significance of all of these issues brought before the Governor general by the 
Chinese is less the success or failure of their petition than it is their willingness and 
ability to approach the French government with an organized, multidimensional plan 
intended to better meet the needs of the overseas Chinese community.  The solidarity 
exhibited by the Chinese community during this episode of 1903 is also a harbinger 
for things to come, an indication of the great potential for community action possessed 
by the overseas Chinese community if they felt it in their own best interests to 
mobilize. 
As a point of clarification, it would be incorrect to imply that the only time 
Chinese imperial authorities approached the French about matters concerning the 
overseas Chinese was when they desired the extradition or suppression of criminals or 
revolutionaries.  Imperial authorities also interceded on behalf of overseas Chinese, 
expending their political equity at the highest levels of French government to attempt 
to gain concessions for their citizens overseas.  In 1905, China’s Ambassador to Paris 
approached the French foreign ministry in Paris, asking for a reprieve from the head 
tax and relief, in the regions of Annam, Cambodia, and Laos, from the permits 
required for travel within those territories.  The Chinese Ambassador had demanded a 
response from the French foreign ministry on at least three different occasions over a 
period of three years, and only in 1905 did he receive a complete response. The 
foreign ministry refused the ambassador’s appeal on several fronts.   
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First, with regard to the right of circulation, the Ministry pointed out that 
Chinese in Cambodia and Cochinchina, territories which had long been pacified by the 
French,  were allowed to wander freely without special passes.  According to the 
French, the necessity for circulation permits in Laos, Tonkin, and Annam was 
regrettable but unavoidable as the French extended their control in the region.  As for 
the head tax, the foreign ministry pointed out that the levy was essential for the 
security of the Chinese empire.   
The Imperial Government cannot refuse to recognize that in a country 
like Indochina, bordering Chinese provinces disturbed by secret 
societies, it is indispensable that local authorities strictly watch 
immigrants, verify their identities in a permanent way, and follow their 
movements exactly. Without such precautions, the French possessions 
would serve as a place of asylum to vagrants… these dangerous 
refugees could even create, shielded from our defense, centers of 
conspiracy about which your Government would not fail to 
complain.
424   
He also called attention to the fact that the Chinese enjoyed all of the benefits of the 
infrastructure provided to the colony by the French and therefore should be 
responsible for funding a portion of those improvements.  Finally, he criticized the 
Chinese for complaining about the tax when the Indians in British colonies paid a 
similar levy but had never protested it.  Although imperial intercession turned out to 
be a wasted endeavor, this anecdote, and others like it, still show that the Chinese 
Empire was willing to intercede with European governments on European soil to 
better the lives of her citizens overseas.  It also shows the willingness of Indochina’s 
overseas Chinese community to seek redress in the highest corridors of colonial 
power, rather than just striving for satisfaction with the local administrator or the 
French Consul in the Chinese native place. 
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If they had little luck with personal negotiations, overseas Chinese were not 
above taking their troubles to the press.  In 1925, an article appeared in the Peking 
Daily News protesting the levy of the head tax upon overseas Chinese resident in 
Indochina and requesting that the tax be lifted by the French government and that the 
Chinese government and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs do all in their power 
to help.  This article claimed as its authors two representatives of Haiphong’s Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, Tch’en Yeou K’in and Siu Che Fa.
425  While any such request 
by China’s government was doomed to failure, the publication of this article in the 
Chinese press, where Indochina’s administration was sure to hear of it, shows the 
audacity of Haiphong’s Chamber of Commerce, which, without fear of retribution, 
took its grievance and aired it on an international stage. 
Conclusion 
Financial and commercial disputes provide an excellent lens through which to 
view details of the interactions between the overseas Chinese, indigenous, and French 
administrative communities.  From these anecdotes, it becomes apparent that the 
overseas Chinese were willing to seek redress at all levels of government, whether 
dealing with the local administrator in their provinces of residence or with the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris.  Conflicts like those involving the Co Quang 
villagers show that indigenous communities took the same liberties when dealing with 
the Chinese.  While the congregations usually initiated such pleas on behalf of their 
country men, the story of Ha-A-Tho indicates that Chinese also took it upon 
themselves to achieve satisfaction, and that the corridors of colonial power led to 
positive results, as well as negative ones, for those who dared to seek satisfaction. 
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CHAPTER 8:  CONTROL AND CONTESTATION: CRIME, POLICING, AND 
IMMIGRATION IN THE CONGREGATIONS 
For colonial authorities, the Chinese residing in Indochina in general, and in 
Cochinchina in particular, represented a significant proportion of the total population.  
In many respects, this situation empowered Cochinchina’s Chinese by requiring the 
French to consider carefully any drastic changes in immigration or police policy in 
order to avoid serious economic and political repercussions, both in the colonies and 
internationally.  Policing the enormous Chinese community in Indochina, not just for 
overt criminal activities but for immigration violations as well, proved to be the most 
difficult task undertaken by the French with regard to the Chinese.  This enormous 
problem was mitigated to some degree by the congregation system, which placed final 
responsibility for unlawful Chinese activities in the hands of the Chinese themselves.  
Not only did this ensure some small degree of self-policing within the Chinese 
community, but it guaranteed that the French would be able to recoup any costs related 
to suppression of crimes committed by Chinese or deportation of illegal immigrants 
from the colony.  In return, the colonial administration granted each congregation the 
right to refuse membership to any immigrant, or to repudiate current members at any 
time based on their unwillingness to vouch for the moral character of said members.  
This chapter addresses the issues of crime, immigration, surveillance, and 
congregational responsibility in Indochina as whole, but also focuses special attention 
on two unique problems: the fate of women and children in the colonies, and the 
issues confronting immigration control on the Tonkin, and to a lesser degree, Laotian 
borders. 
Criminals, Revolutionaries, and Congregational Responsibility 
The French were aware of the problems of policing the diverse populations of 
the Saigon-Cholon area from their earliest activities in the region.  On January 30,  
207 
1876, the newly fledged Police Commissioner submitted a report to his superiors in 
which he outlined the number, types, and distribution of forces required to police the 
area effectively.  For the suburbs, he placed Chinese translators first on his list of 
necessities.  Surveillance of Chinese maritime activities also held pride of place for 
policing the main waterways from the cities to the sea, as well as from the cities to the 
interior of Cochinchina.  This surveillance included tiny sampans and small junks, and 
was required to enforce customs duties and immigration regulations, as well as general 
legal issues.  Finally, the report requested 10 Chinese agents
426 to be appointed by the 
administration, who, while not themselves secret, would assist the secret agents in 
their work.
427 
In the commissioner’s narrative report, the Chinese come before Annamite 
agents in all of these categories, giving the clear impression that the Chinese 
community was a more significant concern for the colonial administration than the 
indigenous community was.  Whether this was the case because of their economic 
importance to the colony, or whether the French merely believed that the Chinese 
were more prone to lawbreaking is unclear.  Nevertheless, the significance placed 
upon surveillance and law enforcement specifically directed towards the Chinese 
speaks powerfully of their influence in the new colony. 
In the effort to assist surveillance of Indochina’s Chinese, all Chinese travelers 
within the territory, even if they were permanent residents on Indochina, were required 
to display their residency cards at various travel points, such as train stations, and by 
demand of colonial authorities.  In Hanoi, the president and vice president of the 
Cantonese congregation there viewed this as both an inconvenience and an affront to 
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upstanding Chinese citizens who merely wanted to travel inside of Tonkin.
428  Hanoi’s 
police commissioner was less than sympathetic to this request.  Not only did he 
comment that European nationals traveling within China were subject to the same 
regulations, but he questioned the character of the Cantonese vice-president in a way 
that revealed the true reasons underlying the practice of requiring identity cards at all 
times.  
I must tell you that the second-in-command of the Congregation of 
Canton is back from a journey to China, and appears to me to have 
returned full of new aspirations, imprinted by a liberalism that would 
be a complete negation of any measure of public security.  I learn, on 
the other hand, that secret meetings are held by certain notable Chinese, 
while the others among their countrymen would think of reviving the 
reformist question.
429 
French concern over reformist and revolutionary influences was not limited to 
the Chinese.  The Vietnamese caused them far more anxiety as the 20
th century 
progressed; however, unlike Vietnamese anti-colonialists, Chinese activists and rebels 
possessed a unique capacity to strain severely France’s economic and political 
relationships with China.  As the political situation in China became increasingly 
unstable, those who committed revolutionary acts, including assassinations, frequently 
fled across the border into China to escape Qing justice.  In 1907, Phong Sing, a 
subprefect of Canton, was murdered by a group of Chinese revolutionaries.  In August 
1907, these revolutionaries seized the town of Fang Tcheng and, according to reports 
of the incident, assassinated Phong Sing for reasons “exclusively political,” after 
which, they allegedly sought refuge in Tonkin.
430   
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These six men, Kong Man Phu, Chun A Man, Ung Phoc, Vong Nhan, Thu 
Moui Shie, and Lo Quang Som, had actually been arrested by coincidence, for being 
in Tonkin illegally; however, their incarceration had come to the attention of the 
Viceroy of Canton who asked that they be detained on suspicion of murder.
431  By the 
time the Viceroy’s request reached Tonkin, the six suspects had already been released 
to Hanoi’s Cantonese congregation who had added them to their rolls.  Although the 
French had demanded that the Cantonese president take responsibility for these men 
and present his plans to prevent their abrupt flight from justice, they were essentially 
free to pursue any diversions allowed to them by the congregation.
432   
The French postponed the extradition of these wanted men pending an official 
request from the Cantonese government, a request that had to be accompanied by hard 
evidence supporting their allegations against the incriminated individuals;
433 however, 
the French seemed to have little doubt that the men they had detained were guilty of 
the assassination.
434  This anecdote is instructive on several levels.  Not only does it 
illuminate the relative ambivalence of the French government when confronting a 
problem that really did not affect them at all – in this case, the murder of a Chinese 
official for political reasons – but also, it reveals the great trust placed in the leaders of 
major Chinese congregations, and the relative surety of the colonial authorities that the 
congregation leaders would remain faithful to their obligations under colonial law. 
This anecdote was hardly unique during the twilight of the Qing dynasty.  In 
May 1908, China’s Foreign minister complained to the French Ambassador to China 
that rebel forces affiliated with the prominent anti-Manchu revolutionary Sung-Tsen 
were using Tonkin as their place of escape, in which to regroup from attacks such as 
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the raid on HoKéou, which had already occurred, and to plan for new attacks on 
Manchu interests across the border.  Accordingly, the Foreign Minister requested that 
France step up its surveillance in the border regions in the hopes of capturing these 
wanted criminals and extraditing them back to China.  The French acceded to the 
Chinese request.  As the Head of the Cabinet recommended to the Governor General, 
“It is important to avoid any border incident and especially, to prove to China that, in 
spite of inaccurate intelligence from the authorities in the Southern provinces, we have 
no intention of helping, or even of encouraging the rebels.”
435 
This decision had immediate ramifications for some of Hanoi’s long-
established Chinese businessmen.  As a result of Chinese pressure on the French to 
avoid any semblance of anti-dynastic prejudice, within ten days, the Resident Superior 
had identified several merchants of Tonkin who were affiliated with reformist parties 
or activities in China and had requested that they leave the colony.  The four men, A-
Veng, A-Pik, Long-Sang, and Wong-Cheng, despite having led exemplary colonial 
lives and having been long and profitably established in Hanoi, were not expelled; 
however, they, and a presumably long list of soon-to-be expelled Chinese who had not 
yet been formally identified by the French, were prohibited from reentering Tonkin at 
any time, under penalty of permanent expulsion, barring some change in the French 
relationship with Imperial China.  The men were personally escorted to a ship 
departing to Hong Kong, and colonial authorities were ordered to watch the ship sail 
away to ensure that no one tried secretly to violate the “invitation” to leave.  The 
Resident Superior did not attempt to hide the fact that these acts were all a result of 
political pressure from his northern neighbor.  “They have been invited to leave 
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Tonkin,” he wrote, “because of the political situation on the frontier and the necessity 
for the Administration to observe the strictest neutrality.”
436 
Businessmen were not the only ones to suffer from the new, unwritten rules of 
1908.
437  In August, Yuong Sao Panh, the Vice President of Hanoi’s Cantonese 
congregation was expelled from the colony because he regularly received packets 
containing 50 issues of the anarchist journal from Paris, “La Vovaj Tempoj.”
438  
According to Tonkin’s police, this journal only addressed “civil war, mass murder, the 
overturning of all established institutions,” including “an abominable paean to Leon 
Czolgosz, U. S. President William McKinley’s assassin.”
439  The receipt of this 
journal, along with Yuong Sao Panh’s willingness to discuss the things he read, 
resulted in his demotion as Vice President of the Cantonese congregation and his 
immediate expulsion from the colony, an expulsion that was made official on 
September 1, 1908.
440   
Yuong Sao Panh hardly seemed like a dangerous man.  According to 
intelligence reports following his arrest and expulsion, he was 51 years old, had been 
married for 40 years, and had six children.  He came from Huong San village in 
Guangdong Province and he had lived in Tonkin for 19 years.  When given the choice 
between exile to Hong Kong or exile to Singapore, Yuong chose Singapore, a 
circumstance that can either be seen to indicate his fear of Manchu reprisal as a result 
of entanglement with revolutionary affairs, or that he had spent so much of his life 
working in a colonial environment that was not yet ready to return home.
441  In either 
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case, his biography hardly reads like that of man who needs to be escorted to the 
nearest ship, and whom the ship’s captain is prohibited from allowing to debark at any 
but the final destination.
442  Shortly after his expulsion, Yuong spoke on his own 
behalf, begging the Resident Superior for permission to return to Hanoi temporarily, in 
order to rescue his wife and family who had languished there in his absence, and also 
to settle the affairs of the business he had operated in Hanoi for more than 19 years.
443  
When this request was forwarded to the Resident Superior, the reply, handwritten on 
the first page by the Resident Superior himself, leaves us wondering about Yuong’s 
fate; the Resident Superior essentially says he will have to think about it.
444  
The Resident Superior seemed to believe that the problem of Chinese 
reformists in mountainous north Tonkin was gradually improving with time;
445 
however, his apparent optimism was not shared throughout the administration.  In a 
letter to the Resident Superior, the Governor General voiced a concern for a rising 
trend among French bureaucrats, the truth of which is immediately obvious, nearly 
100 years later, upon reviewing the records of the time.  “It would be advisable to urge 
the agents of your administration not to apply the terms ‘reformist’ or ‘revolutionary’ 
to all Chinese criminals of common law who cross the border and cause disorder in 
Tonkin.”
446 
As the Governor appropriately pointed out, not all accused Chinese broke the 
law for political reasons.  In many cases, profit motivated overseas Chinese to break 
the law.  In 1896, a Chinese worker named Lao Liet was the chief employee of the Ha 
Tân company.  Four months prior to Lao Liet’s downfall, the owner of the business 
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had announced that he needed to travel to Haiphong on business, a trip that turned out 
to be the pretext for him abandoning the colony to return to China without making 
good on any of his debts.  Rather than disclose the abrupt departure of the owner, Lao 
Liet decided to continue selling goods under the Ha Tân name, keeping the profits and 
putting off his suppliers when they demanded payment for their goods.  This charade 
only continued for a month until the suppliers became too menacing.  Then, 
beleaguered by all concerned parties, Lao Liet refused to pay any supplier or creditor 
any recompense in money or goods.   
Two suppliers filed formal complaints against Lao Liet with the French 
government.  The first, the Vietnamese owner and proprietress of the property being 
used by Lao Liet, took Lao Liet in front of the local magistrate to reclaim the money 
owed her.  On the same day as that hearing, the French Resident in Thai Nguyen was 
informed of the second complaint, made by a European supplier named Wurkling, and 
was directed to preserve whatever he could of the European’s equity.
447  In the ensuing 
investigation, Lao Liet’s scheme came to light, and eventually, despite his lengthy 
protestations of innocence, he was expelled from Indochina.
448  The passage of time 
renders us unable to determine whether or not Lao Liet’s deception was intentional, or 
if he felt that he had an opportunity – previously unimaginable – to make a go of it in 
Indochina.  His own letter of protest indicates that he was the victim, abused by 
French authorities and wrongly implicated as a deliberate swindler.
449  Whether or not 
he intended to defraud people, he was undeniably less than honest, and in the end, he 
paid dearly for his ill-considered financial maneuvering.  
Arrest as a criminal did not automatically guarantee expulsion for a Chinese 
resident of Indochina.  In 1903, when local authorities in Nam Đinh arrested a 30 year 
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old Phuoc Kien man named A Thieu, he was at first labeled a vagabond with no 
employment or other means of subsistence.  When police asked the Phuoc Kien 
congregation president if he would take responsibility for A Thieu, the answer was no, 
based on the man’s limited mental faculties; however, authorities also discovered that 
A Thieu was related to a Hanoi businessman, A Thuan.  The two were brothers-in-law.  
Rather than expulsion, Nam Đinh’s Resident suggested handing A Thieu over to the 
care of his family and making them responsible for his conduct.
450  Unfortunately, 
protracted efforts to contact A Thuan seem to have yielded no result.  In the end, a 
handwritten note scrawled by the Governor General seems to reveal A Thieu’s fate.  
“He should have been expelled a long time ago if no one is responding about him.”
451  
Even if A Thieu met with expulsion in the end, it seems clear that French authorities 
did not rely upon expulsion as a one-size-fits-all penalty for law breaking.  The fact 
that they attempted to locate Tonkin-based family willing to take charge of the 
mentally handicapped man before removing him from the colony shows an instance of 
true compassion, how ever rare, in the colonial milieu. 
Likewise, the penalty of expulsion was not necessarily irrevocable exile from 
Indochina. A-Hyan, a former president of Hanoi’s Cantonese congregation, had been 
expelled from Tonkin in 1886 after submitting requests to the Resident Superior 
demanding that the head tax be abolished for Chinese residents in Annam and Tonkin.  
Claiming ignorance of French law as his excuse, A-Hyan begged permission to return 
to Tonkin and resume his business, emphasizing, how ever sincerely, his devotion to 
French law, as evidenced by his unwillingness to reenter Tonkin without the 
permission of the Governor General.
452  The following year, largely as a result of the 
support he received from Hanoi’s Chinese notables, A-Hyan received permission to 
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return to Tonkin and continue his business there.
453  These documents represent a 
flexibility in colonial law as it was applied by the French that, while not necessarily 
typical, is still worthy of note. 
Inevitably, the severity of the crime of which Chinese had been convicted 
directly impacted the clemency, or lack thereof, exhibited by the French.  In 1896, 32 
Tonkin-based Chinese were arrested, convicted of piracy, and sentenced to as many as 
ten years of incarceration at Poulo Condore, the length of the sentence determined by 
the nature of each man’s crime, to be followed by immediate expulsion from the 
colony.  According to the original order of condemnation, these men stood convicted, 
not of being brigands themselves, but of providing material aid, intelligence, and 
supplies to the actual criminals who roamed across northern Tonkin, thus hampering 
French attempts to pacify the region.
454   
Seven months after the arrest of these 32 individuals, congregation leaders 
from Hanoi and Haiphong, along with significant Chinese businessmen from both 
cities, came together to submit a petition to the Governor General begging him to 
grant clemency to the incarcerated individuals.  This petition played upon the most 
basic fundamentals of French nationalism. Submitted on July 13, the day before 
Bastille Day, the Chinese wrote, “On the occasion of the celebration of Noble France, 
which every Frenchman and their friends will soon celebrate, they come with 
confidence to beg you, Sir Governor General, to forgive the remainder of the 
punishment left to their unfortunate fellow countrymen.”  To assure the Governor 
General that he would not come to regret any clemency he offered, they added that 
“they [would] take necessary measures to ensure that they will never again step foot 
on Indochina’s soil.”
455 
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Tonkin’s Secretary General found the proposed release of the condemned men 
not only unjust, but also a danger to public welfare. 
Today, as on the day that I signed the order, I reckon that these motives 
for general and public interest exist still and that they have to forbid us 
any premature forgiveness, any indulgence which, in the eyes of the 
Asiatics, would be seen as weakness. 
Never losing sight that the work of pacification in these parts of the 
country cost a lot of blood and silver and that it is not yet finished, I 
think that it would be very dangerous to set at liberty individuals whose 
complicity allowed, for such a long time, the pirates of Yen-The and 
Cai-Kinh to be informed about our planned troop movements and of 
our supply caches in food, in weapons, in ammunitions, in the 
mountains where they had found refuge.
456 
The risk of undermining the French Administration’s control over the region caused 
the Secretary the most concern, and he expressed deep concern over any action on the 
part of the government that might cause the Chinese to lose their fear of possible 
French reprisals.   
French Influence and Protection of Overseas Chinese 
Though the anecdotes related so far have dealt with Chinese perpetrators of 
crime or disorder, the Chinese also found themselves to be victims of crime and 
required French intervention to protect their lives and property.  When this happened 
in Indochina, it most often took the form of negotiation, with local or regional 
authorities mediating between offended parties to reach an amicable solution 
acceptable to all parties; however, when the crimes befalling Chinese residents of 
Indochina were taking place back in China, matters became more complex.  In 1902, 
in one of many examples of such phenomena, ten prominent Chinese merchants from 
Fujian province personally requested the assistance of the French Consul in Fuzhou in 
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protecting their families and property in Fujian province from the frequent violence 
and disorder that afflicted Fujian at the time.
457   
This situation was complex on a number of levels.  In the first place, it gives us 
a clear indication of the fact that, in the twilight of the Chinese empire, overseas 
Chinese businessmen felt that Chinese authorities could offer them no protection 
against the degrading security situation in their native places.  For them, despite 
subethnic connections, the best bet for material and physical security remained 
colonial intervention.  In the second place, this situation put the French in an 
uncomfortable position.  The French were not responsible for securing Chinese 
territory, and technically, although there might have been a few exceptions, the 
overseas Chinese businessmen so vital to Indochina’s commerce and prosperity were 
not French citizens.  Therefore, intervention for these merchants basically meant a 
foreign government intervening with China on behalf of Chinese citizens. 
The French were reluctant to get involved politically in the fates of overseas 
Chinese businessmen, more out of an unwillingness to be drawn into internecine 
Chinese conflicts than for any other reason, but they also recognized that the English 
and the Japanese felt no such compunctions when it came to interceding on behalf of 
Straits or Formosan Chinese, respectively.
458  Accordingly, they devised a plan 
intended to limit French involvement in internal Chinese matters while still offering 
protection to the prominent merchants most in need.  By this system, the French 
Consul in Amoy would have a list of the names of all prominent Indochinese-based 
Chinese businessmen with interests in the area and would intercede personally with 
local Chinese administrators when one of the listed individuals required assistance.  “It 
would be an unofficial patronage, a personal and discreet action of our representative 
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with local authorities to draw their attention to all the cases where the families would 
be victims, either of acts of violence and robbery, or of the slowness, failings, and 
quirks of the Chinese administration, in brief and only in the cases involving law and 
order.”
459 
Despite the benevolence exhibited by the French in this case, the plea of 
Cantonese businessman Sam Cang shows that French protection did not extend to all 
supplicants.  When roving brigands and an unstable political situation in Guangzhou 
threatened his life and property, Sam Cang appealed to the French protection, but was 
rebuffed by the French Consul in Canton.  The Consul argued that Sam Cang had 
exaggerated the danger to his interests in Canton and also emphasized the danger of 
extending protection to one Chinese citizen when they had refused protection in other 
similar cases.
460  Distraught, Sam Cang appealed to the Governor General in Hanoi, 
writing, “The long stay in Cochinchina by my relatives made me hope that I could 
count on protection if necessary. Today I am in an uncertain situation as regards the 
safety of myself and of my family. I appealed to your representative in China for the 
high protection of France; this protection was refused to me for the only motive that I 
am not a French subject.”
461  In fact, Sam Cang his father Sam Lanh before him had 
spent nearly 50 years in Cochinchina, occupying positions of great respect in the 
community and operating important businesses there without irregularity or 
complaint.
462  Despite a solid reputation and a long history in French territory, the 
documents imply that Sam Cang was refused the protection he so desperately sought. 
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Immigration 
Some of the biggest issues confronting the Chinese and the Chinese 
congregations in Indochina were the immigration and head taxes.  As in other 
countries in Southeast Asia, Chinese usually opposed tax increases that applied to 
them, but despite the images of massive strikes and boycotts that caused urban centers 
to grind to a halt, most of these protests were far more genteel.  In Indochina, the 
Chinese congregations usually stood at the vanguard of attempts to defend the 
interests of their communities, and the carefully worded petitions they periodically 
forwarded to the Cochinchinese administration revealed not only a true concern for the 
welfare of their less powerful constituents, but also an awareness of international 
politics and a desire to find middle ground for both sides of an argument.   
A proposed increase in the head tax to be levied upon Chinese residents of 
Saigon and Cholon in 1918 drew a quick but measured response from the presidents of 
the congregations, who expressed regret over the difficulties imposed upon all of 
Indochina’s residents during World War I. 
Regrettably the consequences of the war were felt in your colony and 
you know about the economic crisis the colony is going through at 
present: Chinese businesses in Cochinchina have suffered from it and 
will continue to suffer from it for perhaps a long time; exports have, so 
to speak, stopped and the import business is considerably reduced 
because of the transport crisis; so that existence in Cochinchina became 
particularly difficult for small storekeepers and the Chinese workers 
who constitute the bulk of the Chinese immigrant population in your 
colony. To demand the tax from them which has been suggested at 
present, is, in our opinion, if we may respectfully suggest, to stop the 
importation of manual laborers into this country, the necessity for 
which is one of the essential problems for the desired development of 
the Colony; It is also to run a serious risk to see soon that your High  
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Administration has the obligation to expel, en masse, Chinese coolies 
who will not have been able to comply with the tax.
463 
One issue that severely challenged French control over Indochina’s overseas 
Chinese community concerned the use of Chinese names.  As discussed in the 
introduction to this dissertation, all Chinese names also had corresponding Vietnamese 
pronunciations, and by the 20
th century, a fair proportion of overseas Chinese went by 
the  quốc ngữ (or Vietnamese) pronunciations of their names while they were in 
Indochina.  For French colonial authorities, the problem was that one Vietnamese 
transliteration of a specific Chinese character might actually be a homonym for 
dozens, or even scores, of other Chinese characters. 
In 1912, the French Vice-Consul in Amoy sent an irritated letter to Governor 
General Sarraut complaining of this very problem.  The Governor General had 
forwarded four legal writs to Amoy, requesting that the Vice Consul ensure their 
delivery to the interested parties.  The names of the three involved Chinese parties, as 
well as the name of the village from which they came, were all presented to the Vice 
Consul in quốc ngữ.  Not only was the Vice Consul unable to locate the individuals, 
he could not even identify the village from which they were supposed to have hailed.  
Emphasizing the hopelessness of his task, he complained to the Governor General, 
writing: 
This is not the first time that I have found myself in the presence of this 
difficulty. Also, allow me to wish that the Chinese established in Indo-
Chine are known to the administration or to French justice only by 
names which, in their country, are absolutely unknown and 
consequently make it impossible to research or immediately identify 
them if they have business in their country of origin. Besides that, 
generally speaking, their name is transcribed in Indochina with 
Annamite pronunciation. They are very often known only by their first 
name, according to the customs of the Cantonese and Fujianese… And 
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so, an individual whose name is Hong-Teng in dialect of Amoy 
becomes, in legal documents, Ah-trinh. But even if one used the 
Chinese pronunciation, identification, while being greatly facilitated, 
would still not be certain, given the quirks of transcriptions.
464 
To combat this problem, the Vice Consul urged that Chinese characters become a 
standard part of all French legal documents pertaining to Chinese with interests in 
Indochina.  
While this solution might have ameliorated the problem faced by the colonial 
administration, it did not solve the basic dilemma faced by researchers of the Chinese 
overseas.  While the French possessed extensive immigration records using pictures 
and Chinese characters to match Chinese residents of Indochina to the Vietnamese 
pronunciation of their names, many of these Chinese still signed official documents 
using quốc ngữ rather than characters.  Additionally, internal French documents, while 
occasionally using the personal immigration numbers assigned to Chinese upon their 
arrival in French territory, almost always refer to Chinese by the quốc ngữ 
transliteration of their names.  The result of this problem, compounded by the 
difficulties posed by the varied dialects spoken by the overseas Chinese in Indochina, 
is that it is often extremely difficult, even using Chinese sources such as temple stele 
or institutional records, to match with any certainty names written in Chinese 
characters and names appearing in quốc ngữ in colonial sources.   
Women and Children 
The realities of community demographics require any study of the overseas 
Chinese in Indochina in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries focuses upon the lives 
and endeavors of men, almost completely ignoring women and children in the process.  
This omission is essentially unavoidable.  Women and children comprised a very tiny 
percentage of Indochina’s Chinese population and rarely appear in any archival 
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documents except perhaps for colonial pictures, where they are recorded faithfully 
along with all of the other ethnicities and indigenous curiosities that captured the 
attention of colonial visitors or scholars.  The one documentary exception to this rule 
concerns immigration, when the legal status of wives or families became an issue for 
government officials, but they only rarely surfaced in immigration-related documents 
as well, leaving us to wonder what, exactly, the lives of Chinese wives must have been 
like in Indochina.   
The first and most critical point to remember when dealing with the wives of 
Indochina’s overseas Chinese is that those wives were not always themselves Chinese.  
Although I am not aware of any data detailing exact statistics on the topic, overseas 
Chinese did marry Vietnamese women.  Paradoxically, the French were quite 
protective of indigenous women when it came to relationships with Chinese men.  
They are often preoccupied by the notion that these women are being shipped to China 
against their will, kidnapped by cunning Chinese who will not attend to their welfare.  
Apparently, these suspicions were not without foundation.  In his work on human 
trafficking, Eric Tagliacozzo comments on the rising concern of Straits Settlement 
officials that Singapore-based Chinese were using Annam as a source for women to 
fuel the regional sex industry.
465  The veracity of this tidbit of information is bolstered 
by the fact that, ostensibly to protect Vietnamese women from immorality, 
abandonment, or other evils, the French strictly regulated the departures of 
Vietnamese women from the colonies into China, or accompanied by Chinese. 
This reluctance extended even into apparent family units, as the case of one 
particular Sino-Vietnamese family in Baria indicated.  This family, consisting of the 
Chinese man, his Cochinchinese wife, and their two children, desired permission to 
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return together to China with the man, who was leaving the colony.  The couple had 
lived together in Baria for more than ten years but because no documentary evidence 
existed to support their claims of permanence, French law technically prohibited the 
woman and children from following the man.  To get around these restrictions, if 
Cochinchina’s Lieutenant Governor personally approved of the arrangement, the 
couple would be required to obtain sworn affidavits from village officials, attesting 
both to their lengthy cohabitation and to the births of their children.  Baria’s 
Administrator felt that if the couple provided all of the required documentation, the 
woman should be allowed to leave, “especially since she has no other family in 
Cochinchina.”
466  When the couple sought the Lieutenant Governor’s approval, the 
Lieutenant Governor informed them that a sworn affidavit of paternity would suffice 
to take the children back to China; however, he said nothing about what would be 
required to allow the woman to leave for China with her family.  This omission forced 
Baria’s Administrator to contact the Lieutenant Governor again, requesting 
clarification about what to tell this woman who so clearly desired to leave 
Cochinchina with her family.
467  The final disposition of this case is unknown, but it 
does give an indication of the difficulties and suspicion encountered by mixed race 
families simply trying to live their lives in the ways most convenient for themselves. 
Even métis women could not escape the strict control of the French.  In 1899, a 
23-year-old Cantonese man named Tche Tong headed back to China from Nam Đinh 
with Nguyen A-Kan, a métis woman whom he claimed to have married seven months 
before in Nam Đinh.  The two youths were apprehended by maritime Customs 
officials in Pakhoi;
468 at the time of their arrests, they had no papers other than a 
temporary permit issued to Tche Tong for entry into Tonkin.  The couple had boarded 
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the ship “Hating” in Pakhoi under unspecified “fraudulent” circumstances, a trespass 
that resulted in Tche Tong’s detention by Pakhoi’s local Chinese authorities, and the 
remand of Nguyen A-Kan to the French.  Eventually, Tche Tong was turned over to 
the French as well for deportation to Hong Kong.
469   
The French Vice Consul assigned to Pakhoi and Tung-Hing
470 considered the 
couple deeply suspicious.  “It is inexplicable, in any case, that these two individuals, 
instead of taking the boat that goes directly to Hong-Kong in Haiphong, preferred to 
go first to Moncay by rowboat, then by junk from Tung Hing to Pakhoi, where they do 
not know anybody.”
471  He was neither convinced by nor interested in Tche Tong’s 
assertions that he had married the young woman in Nam Đinh, and that the young 
couple was heading back to Tche Tong’s parents’ house in Hong Kong, where they 
intended to stay for a while.
472  Frankly, the French suspicion seems unfounded.  With 
the exception of sneaking aboard the Pakhoi boat under dubious circumstances, the 
couple seems to have exhibited no criminal or suspicious behavior, and if they had 
exhibited such behavior, the French would certainly have made note of it in their 
records.  In fact, the only thing they seem to have been guilty of doing was taking the 
slow boat to China, so to speak.  If Tche Tong’s story is taken at face value – a newly 
married couple returning to the husband’s family to visit for a time – then the story fits 
the circumstance.  After all, what was the hurry?
473
 
While conflicts over the status of Vietnamese women typically revolved 
around whether they should be allowed to leave the country, disputes involving 
Chinese women most often centered around whether they should be allowed to stay.  
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Incidents of Chinese women fleeing abusive or unhappy relationships by crossing into 
Tonkin pepper colonial documents; some of these cases are straightforward, but others 
reveal the complicated cultural milieu of the Sino-Vietnamese border region at the 
turn of the 19
th century.  One such case concerned the Cantonese man Vong Sen-San 
and his erstwhile wife, Ly Si.  According to Ly-Si, in 1900, her husband, a gambling 
addict, reached his gaming nadir, losing everything to the game.  In response to this 
collapse, he sold their two children into servitude and sent his wife away, wanting 
nothing more to do with her.  Living off the charity and generosity of strangers, Ly Si 
made her way Tonkin and then to Nam Đinh, where she finally settled.  The trek to 
Tonkin was no wild flight of fancy for her; the family had been based in Tong-Hing, 
the town adjacent to Moncay on the Tonkin border.  The following year, she met and 
married Hang Hưu, the pilot of the Chinese longboat “Phuc Sinh.”   
Unfortunately, after a year of marriage, Vong Sen-San returned for Ly Si, 
demanding that she return with him to Canton to resume their lives.  Vong Sen-San 
repeatedly journeyed to Nam Đinh to demand his wife’s return but she adamantly 
refused to depart with him, fleeing whenever he appeared to demand her return.  By 
early 1903, both parties were nearing their wits’ end.  In Tonkin, Ly Si requested that 
French authorities intervene on her behalf and protect her from Vong Sen-San, whom 
she claimed had threatened her repeatedly.  For his part, Vong Sen-San had sought 
assistance from a higher power.  He enlisted the aid of Father Grandpierre, a Catholic 
missionary from Lo-Fao in Guangdong.  Father Grandpierre intervened with the 
French Commander in Moncay, contact that eventually led to the involvement of Nam 
Đinh’s French Resident, and even the Resident Superior, with the case.  One might 
justifiably wonder at the involvement of a catholic priest in this cross-border marriage 
dispute.  After all, at the time of Ly Si’s abandonment, both parties were Buddhist; 
however, while Ly Si remained Buddhist, at some point during the two years  
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following his tacit dissolution of their marriage, Vong Sen-San had converted to 
Catholicism, suddenly finding himself unable to remarry ever again without violating 
a sacred writ of his new religion. 
In his letter to the Resident Superior, Nam Đinh’s Resident, without ever 
overtly challenging the involvement of the church in the incident, expresses thinly 
veiled skepticism at the priest’s story.  He denies that Ly Si avoided all meetings with 
her husband, averring instead that she fled to Hanoi after a meeting between the two 
was convened on neutral French territory in the Residency itself.  He goes on to 
question implicitly the validity of Vong Sen-San’s conversion in the first place, 
writing “Vong Sen-San has been Catholic for only two years, from the date of the 
intervention of Father Grandpierre.”
474  In response to the priest’s assertion that 
colonial law required the return of wife to husband, he points out that the purpose of 
this law was to protect Vietnamese women kidnapped by pirates and sold as slaves in 
China, not to force the return of a woman who fled her husband of her own free 
will.
475  Thus, in a single dispute between husband and wife, colonial authorities found 
themselves embroiled in a conflict between two individuals that involved gambling, 
bigamy, Chinese law, international borders, marital disharmony, and the Roman 
Catholic Church.  
In the end, the French decision was clear but completely toothless.  If Vong 
Sen-San changed his place of residence to Nam Đinh and thereafter filed formal 
complaints under two articles of the Annamite Code,
476 French police would 
personally escort her back to her husband’s home; however, Vong Sen-San would not 
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be able to imprison his wife in his home without risk of being charged with her illegal 
and arbitrary detention.  Furthermore, if Vong Sen-San remained in China, French 
authorities would only be able to escort her to the border, and would not take 
responsibility for her actions or location after that.
477  This last situation seemed the 
most likely, as the Resident Superior had already implied that the Cantonese 
congregation in Nam Đinh, perhaps in support for Ly Si and her new husband, would 
be less than willing to vouch for Vong Sen-San as a local Chinese resident.
478  In other 
words, Ly Si had to return to her husband and her marital responsibilities, but Vong 
Sen-San could do nothing to keep her there against her will.
479  
While the circumstances of this particular case were certainly unique, the 
general situation vis-à-vis bigamist Chinese women in Tonkin was not.  The French 
clearly struggled with how to dispose of women who, on the one hand, had committed 
neither crime nor irregularity while in the colonies but who, on the other hand, were 
highly sought after by Chinese authorities acting on behalf of abandoned Chinese men.  
Not surprisingly, this problem affected Tonkin more than any of Indochina’s other 
regions and the border region wrestled with this situation most of all.  In 1909, Cao 
Bang’s police commissioner sent a missive to the governor General asking 
clarification about when it would be permissible to expel Guangxi women who had 
established themselves in Tonkin and remarried without attending to their previous 
marital situation back in China.  Based upon the terms of the treaties between China 
and France regarding extradition, French authorities would only remand people to 
imperial officials if they fell into one of three categories:  if they were the object of a 
deportation order signed by the Tonkin’s Resident Superior or by Indochina’s 
Governor General; if their extradition was granted after fulfillment of formalities 
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indicated by Circular 85s of February 10, 1908; or if they crossed the border without 
passport or permit.  In the cases of the Guangxi natives who so troubled the Police 
Commissioner, however, none of these situations applied, meaning that while Chinese 
law might criminalize the irregularity of their marital status, French law did not.  The 
women were not officially vagabonds and, therefore, there were no grounds for 
deportation.  In order to extradite these women, the imperial government was required 
to prove that they had actually formally remarried while in Tonkin, at which point 
Chinese officials could pursue the repatriation of these women.
480 
Tonkin: Immigration and Surveillance on a Porous Frontier 
Tonkin posed a unique problem for the organization, surveillance, and control 
of Chinese immigration, because the immense border with China, characterized 
mainly by thinly inhabited villages and narrow mountain trails, defied attempts to 
monitor it.  Accordingly, the Tonkinese administration only became aware of the 
presence of illegal Chinese sojourners after they found them wandering around 
somewhere in Tonkin.  In 1899, French police officials on Tonkin’s border 
complained about the constant and unstoppable stream Chinese medicine peddlers, 
theater troupes, geomancers, and even necromancers that flooded into French 
territory.
481  In 1901, concern had shifted to the Chinese slipping across the border in 
order to distribute short stories coming out of popular Chinese theater, but that 
contained “biased or alarming” news, predominantly about the events occurring in 
China.
482  As is easily imagined from the following picture, these theater troupes were 
particularly hard to surveil, as they consisted of just a few members who traveled 
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freely and easily throughout the countryside with few belongings and no ties to any 
given congregation or place. 
 
Figure 17 Chinese Theatrical Troupe
483 
By 1905, the banditry and opium smuggling issues along the border had grown 
so severe that Yen Bay’s resident recommended with scathingly anti-Chinese 
commentary that whole sections of the province be closed to the Chinese presence.  
“All the Chinese who live in the China border region are unmistakably bandits, past, 
present, or future.  This assertion results from facts and it is not open to debate.”
484  In 
this instance, the Resident Superior was openly disapproving of the official’s attitude 
and refused his request: “It is impossible to envision a general action against these 
                                                 
483http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://hinhxua.free.fr/autrefois/chinois/Cholon_la_processi
on_du_dragon.jpg&imgrefurl=http://hinhxua.free.fr/autrefois/chinois/photo_chinois_vn.htm&h=457&
w=719&sz=97&tbnid=BguALWOgyy0tqM:&tbnh=88&tbnw=139&hl=en&start=2&p. Feb 12, 2006. 
484 Letter from Yen Bay’s Resident, 26 June 1905, TTLTQG1, RST 4267.  
230 
individuals in the sense proposed by Mr. Damade for no other reason than their 
nationality.”
485 
Chinese caravanners, as the French called them, posed a real problem for the 
colonial administration.  The problem was that not all caravanners were undesirable.  
The French made a distinction between caravanning and peddling, a dubious division 
that used native place as a seemingly random point of dissimilarity; caravanners from 
Yunnan were typically good, while caravanners from the two Guangs or Sichuan were 
utterly undesirable.  In fact, the actual point of distinction seems to have been intent 
rather than native place.  According to the French, Yunnanese peddlers were essential 
to the local economy, especially in the highlands of Tonkin and Laos, because they 
were genuine traveling storekeepers, mostly honest and without ulterior motives.
486  
Guangxi, Guangdong, and Sichuan, however, produced peddlers who crossed the 
border primarily to trade trinkets to the local montagnards in exchange for opium.
 487  
This latter trade the French found unacceptable; the flourishing drug trade in the rural 
mountains gave drug smugglers months during the winter where they could camp or 
perpetuate their trade in opium unmolested by local authorities.
488  The problem was 
differentiating between the two on the frontier. 
To solve this problem, Indochina’s government began negotiations with 
Yunnanese authorities across the border to discuss providing legitimate Yunnanese 
caravanners with some sort of identification to distinguish them from the bandits and 
drug smugglers that roamed the area.  Even the delegate in Yunnan seemed a bit 
skeptical about this plan.  Peddlers rarely departed from large urban centers and if 
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right of passage were granted to anyone saying they were peddling goods in northern 
Indochina, nothing stopped undesirable elements from attaining such a card through 
deceit.
489  In the end, a conflict between the Resident in Laos, who insisted that the 
caravans were indispensable to his region, and the Resident Superior in Tonkin, who 
felt that they should not be allowed to enter his territory unless they submitted to all 
manner of searches and guarantees, resulted in the matter being tabled indefinitely.
490  
With the exception of increased border surveillance for political reasons, the tabling of 
this issue no doubt resulted in a return to the status quo for caravanners and drug 
runners alike. 
Managing the problem of opium smuggling on the Sino-Tonkinese border was 
a task of such magnitude that one cannot help but be sympathetic to the exasperated 
French officials struggling to control the trade.  Writing about drug smuggling in 
maritime Southeast Asia on the Anglo-British frontier, Eric Tagliacozzo comments, 
“The entire length of the Straits of Melaka acted as a shallow sieve, one that leaked 
contraband opium onto the coasts of Sumatra.”
491  Despite the largely overland nature 
of the Sino-Tonkin opium trade,
492 a similar scenario can be imagined for Tonkin and 
Laos as well.  Far north Tonkin and Laos essentially acted as an endless sea of 
mountains, where smugglers could disappear for weeks at a time and where the 
occasional apprehension of drug dealers was more a matter of French good fortune 
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than of the skill of colonial surveillance.  As the following photograph indicates, the 
rural and remote nature of the many passages from Tonkin into China served to further 
complicate an already untenable situation with regard to borders and immigration 
controls. 
 
Figure 18 Road to China
493 
The other major problem facing Tonkin’s authorities concerned the application 
of congregational law to the established Chinese communities in the mountain regions.  
As has been discussed in previous chapters, French law required that congregations 
bear the cost of immigration, expulsion, or taxes due from any Chinese circulating in 
the territory; however, the cost of shipping someone back to Hong Kong through 
Haiphong, especially for inland Chinese, was really quite exorbitant.  Further 
compounding this problem was the severe poverty of the northern highlands, meaning 
that the people expected to bear the cost burden of expulsion were barely managing a 
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hand-to-mouth existence in the first place.  Even the French recognized the 
impossibility of the situation.  In 1902, in his monthly report, the Resident of Bac-Kan 
wrote,  
There is no congregation in Bac-Kan province, except for multiple 
Chinese agglomerations, foreign to the unity of the others and who 
would not hear of uniting for anything. Without gross injustice, and 
without causing an exodus of these people, unfortunate but nevertheless 
useful, we can not force them to pay for foreigners who secretly enter 
into the province, thanks to the ease with which they can cross the 
military territory.
494 
Wandering Chinese did not constitute the only immigration issue on the 
northern border.  In 1909, as the French sought to establish the brand new province of 
Lai Châu, they struggled with how to classify the various Chinese residents of the 
province.  The eventual imposition of the congregation system was a foregone 
conclusion,
495 but the disposition of the local Chinese prior to its application was a 
matter of some debate.  In the end, the French decided to categorize long established 
Chinese in the region as indigenous and non-permanent Chinese as overseas Chinese.  
The primary distinction between these two classifications concerned payment of the 
annual tax.
496  The fascinating thing about this particular situation is the utterly 
arbitrary nature of the French resolution.  After all, Chinese who had lived in Lai Châu 
forever were no less Chinese than Chinese who were just working there for a while.  
This anecdote also speaks to the false sense of absolutism conveyed by the Western 
notion of political borders.  Whether the Chinese families of Lai Châu lived 100 yards 
inside of China or 100 yards inside of Vietnam, they were still the same people living 
the same lives in the same place they had always called home.  
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From the French perspective, economic gain and opportunities for employment 
constituted the most innocent of the motives attributed to Chinese working and living 
in the far north.  The colonial administration concerned itself far more with possible 
intrigues and unrest propagated by Chinese revolutionaries or speculators using the 
flexible mining and engineering conglomerates as a cover for their clandestine 
activities.  Chinese laborers working near Gia-Lâm in Bac-Ninh province found 
themselves subjected to particularly intense scrutiny as a result of their proximity to 
and association with the Yunnan Railroad Company.
497  For Chinese entrepreneurs 
based in Tonkin’s capital, Hanoi, the business and employment opportunities offered 
for a time by the unique juxtaposition of multitudes of Chinese laborers, the intensive 
corporate centralization of the Railroad Company, and the remoteness of Gia-Lâm 
from any other major urban center proved irresistible in terms of doing business.  Gia-
Lâm’s convenient location, just across the river from Hanoi and connected to the city 
by bridge, gave Hanoi merchants a brief but significant increase in the number of 
available consumers.  This type of temporary relocation seriously undermined the 
efficacy of the congregation system with regard to its ability to supervise the resident 
Chinese population, a major source of disquiet for a colonial administration that 
preferred to monitor the resident Chinese population on a microscopic level.   
Bac-Ninh’s monthly report provides a clearer idea of the degree of surveillance 
to which Tonkin’s Chinese residents were subjected.  In this report, Bac-Ninh’s 
administrator writes,  
The Chinese, in the current situation and because of certain scheming, 
must be the objects of a very particular surveillance.  This surveillance 
is quite easy in Bac-Ninh and in Dap-Câu where the majority of the 
provinces’ Chinese are grouped, most of whom have been established 
here for a long time and who almost never circulate in the interior. 
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There is a Chinese in Tu-Son County
498 and two more in Thuân-Thanh 
County who seem peaceful.
499 
In an environment in which Tonkin’s resident Chinese community faced judgment on 
an individual level, the big city businessmen and construction workers who followed 
the path of the railroad could only have aroused the suspicion of colonial officials.   
In principle, a Chinese resident of Hanoi remained under the authority of his 
Hanoi-based congregation at all times.  In practice, however, a congregation could 
exercise little control over a member who spent extended periods of time far from his 
city or town of official residency.  In November 1914, local French authorities in Bac-
Ninh complained bitterly about the lack of supervision over Hanoi-based Chinese 
working in Gia-Lam, claiming that they ghosted around the province, completely 
ignored not only by Bac-Ninh’s existing congregations, but also by the Hanoi 
congregations responsible for their behavior.
500  Disturbed by this report and 
concerned with potential subversion on the part of Gia-Lam’s unsupervised Chinese, 
Tonkin’s Resident Superior ordered Hanoi’s Mayor, Logeret, to look into the matter, 
which the Mayor did by contacting a congregation in Hanoi directly to discuss the 
problem.  Although the documents do not mention a specific congregation by native 
place name, the answer of the congregation concerned was quite explicit.  The 
congregation in Hanoi acknowledged its inability to provide all but the most cursory 
attention to its members working in Gia-Lam, and suggested that the same problem 
would exist were the supervision of Hanoi-based Chinese working in Gia-Lam to be 
transferred to Bac-Ninh’s congregation.
501  Logically, the problems accompanying the 
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transfer of authority over an individual to a place far from the individual’s official 
place of residence seem just as perplexing as the reverse proved to be.   
Finally, the Resident Superior himself offered a tentative solution to the 
dilemma of Chinese surveillance, which involved appointing a special vice-president 
from the Hanoi-based congregation who would himself be based in Gia-Lam. This 
individual would assume responsibility for the entire community of Chinese working 
in Gia-Lam with permanent residency in Hanoi, thus ensuring access to 
congregational authority for the sojourning Chinese, and reestablishing the 
accountability of the Hanoi-based congregation on behalf of Tonkin’s government.
502  
Although the final resolution of this problem is unknown, the whole scenario offers a 
clear idea of the immense complexity of the logistical problem engendered by the 
French desire for total supervision and accountability within Indochina’s Chinese 
communities. 
A few years earlier, a circular issued by the Resident Superior of Tonkin 
sparked a different exchange that reveals the highly mutable situation in the 
mountainous north during the first years of the 20th-century.  In September 1908, J. 
Morel, the Resident Superior of Tonkin, distributed a circular to all of the Inspectors, 
Administrators, and Military Commanders under his jurisdiction, demanding that they 
strictly supervise Tonkin’s congregational elections to ensure that only Chinese 
residents willing to uphold the French regime won the presidential office.  In this 
circular, the Resident Superior also required exhaustive background checks on all 
Chinese residing in or transiting through Tonkinese territory, not only requiring a 
Chinese resident’s domicile and name, but also his history in the colony, his family 
history, and any other facts that might give insight into his character.
503  This vetting 
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was intended to reveal any potential revolutionaries lurking in Tonkin.  If reformists 
were found, the congregational president loyal to the French then assumed the role of 
enforcer. “They must, in effect, work with the Authorities as the police of their 
congregation and exercise an active surveillance over their members by making, if 
necessary, appeals for your [Administrators, Inspectors, and Military Commanders] 
intervention in the interests of public order.”
504   
Not surprisingly, the two extant responses to the Resident Superior’s circular 
reveal significant variations from region to region with regard to the Chinese political 
situation in Tonkin.  The president of Cao-Bang’s largest congregation apparently 
appeased Major LeBlond, the commander in charge of the Second Military Territory, 
by maintaining that he, the president, understood that he endured in his position by 
protecting the interests of “those he represent[ed].”
505  As LeBlond rhapsodized about 
the virtues of the congregation president, one can only wonder if the people whose 
interests were represented by the Chinese president were, in fact, the French; however, 
without clear archival evidence in either direction, we must also consider the 
possibility that the Cao-Bang president skillfully managed to balance the demands 
forced upon him by the local administration and the needs of the overseas Chinese 
community he was elected to represent. 
While Cao-Bang’s regional administration expressed satisfaction at the 
Chinese in their bailiwick, the Administrator in Lang-Sơn told a very different story.  
According to Administrator Du Vaure, Lang-Sơn swarmed with Chinese involved in 
suspicious activities and the French bureaucrat treated the Resident-Superior’s demand 
with great skepticism.  “Your instructions are very difficult to carry out in the high 
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country,” he wrote. “All of the Chinese who live there are, in effect, without 
exception, reformists, and although there are two or three large commercial houses, 
none of them can present any serious guarantee of commercial honorability.  We are 
forced to choose among established shopkeepers, those who seem the most 
transparent.”
506   
In Lang-Sơn, a city and province sharing a long swath of border with China, 
Chinese residents only constituted a part of the Chinese presence in the region.   
Substantive numbers of migratory Chinese merchants, peddlers, and vagabonds 
meandered through the border region year round, in direct violation of established 
French law in Tonkin.
507  For the French, these individuals represented a significant 
threat to colonial control and authority, and very little distinction was made between a 
peddler of traditional medicines and a revolutionary fleeing to Tonkin to avoid the 
wrath of the Qing dynasty.  Not surprisingly, local resident Chinese viewed the 
situation in a different, if not more nuanced, light.  Lang-Sơn’s Administrator 
commented that the shopkeepers chosen to head the congregations were unreliable 
because of their personal acquaintance with reformists lingering in the area.  Instead of 
assisting the French in apprehending these reformists, they helped to hide them. Du 
Vaure wrote, “They openly protect the reformists and try to hide them, even when this 
makes them guilty of crimes against common law.”
508   
The two ends of the spectrum represented by Cao-Bang and Lang-Sơn give a 
general idea of the wide local and regional variations apparent in French attitudes 
towards Tonkin’s resident Chinese, as well as painting a picture of the different 
approaches taken by the Chinese communities themselves in their dealings with local 
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French administration.  Cao-Bang was, and is, the type of place one only visits for a 
reason, a dead end valley high in the mountains populated only by gold mines and the 
miners who work them.  Lang-Sơn, on the other hand, is a high traffic zone, resting 
prominently on a main land route to and from China.  The vast gulf separating these 
two places is representative of another issue as well.  There is a marked tendency 
among scholars of French colonialism in Vietnam to view the Chinese congregations 
as monolithic organizations, perhaps varying in size, but identical in scope and 
structure.  Likewise, it is quite easy to view overseas Chinese residing in French 
colonial territory as merchants, bankers, or business tycoons served by a selection of 
Chinese coolies brought to Tonkin or Cochinchina to do their masters’ bidding. In 
fact, as these examples from Tonkin indicate, both the congregations and the general 
overseas Chinese community were highly adaptable organizations that existed in many 
forms and represented an infinitely variable population. As such, the basic French 
blueprint for congregational law was a wall so fragmented that assorted sections of the 
Chinese community invariably managed to slip through the cracks of institutional 
supervision.   
These details of practice and law may not seem particularly significant at first 
glance, but they do provide insight into the complicated world of Sino-French 
interactions and the diverse nature of the overseas Chinese community in Indochina in 
general.  The mining and engineering conglomerates of the northern mountains and 
the opportunities they offered for profit and anonymity encouraged a very different 
type of Chinese immigration than did the more typical merchant and transportation 
companies of the coastal and inland waterways, not to mention the highly developed 
Chinese networks of the Mekong Delta.  Furthermore, the description of the Pia-Ouac 
miners as a floating population vividly portrays the mobility and the fluidity of 
Chinese coolies in the north, but more importantly of the Sino-Tonkin border region,  
240 
where the labyrinthine natural barrier of the mountains did more to blur political 
borders than to reinforce them. 
Congregational Responsibility:  Vouching for Congregation Members 
In addition to the unique immigration problems posed by the shared border 
with China, Indochina suffered from other issues of immigration and congregational 
responsibility.  As discussed in the leadership section of this dissertation, the president 
of each congregation, as a requirement of his office, guaranteed payment to the French 
of the full head tax amount due from his congregation, even if the shortfall had to be 
made up from his personal fortune.  This generally meant that congregation presidents 
took the responsibility of vouching for new and established congregation members 
quite seriously, a circumstance that applied universally to all regions of Indochina.   
Congregations requested that community members be stricken from their rolls 
for a number of reasons.  In the case of Soc Trang’s Trieu Chau congregation, 
ethnicity also played a factor in the removal of two men from the congregation rolls.  
In the late autumn of 1893, during a hotly contested election, two candidates, Trinh 
Ngủ and Dương Thành Hiệp, placed their names in the running for congregation 
president. Neither man received a single vote because, as the Chinese plaintiffs put it, 
they were “half-bloods and descendants of half-bloods … but we did not vote for them 
because they are not Chinese.”
509  The attempt by these two métis members of Soc 
Trang’s Trieu Chau community to wrest power from “legitimate” full-blood Chinese 
by participating fully in the electoral process within the congregation affronted the 
entire congregation. Disgruntled by their total lack of support within the congregation, 
the two men proceeded to “disturb the tranquility of the Congregation.”
510  T h e  
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response was swift and decisive.  Forty-two members of the congregation wrote to the 
administrator to have the two troublemakers stricken from the congregation’s rolls and 
placed on the register of indigenous residents based on the fact that neither man was 
Chinese.  “As long as they continue to remain in the congregation,” insisted the 
plaintiffs, “they will always give rise to business adverse to public security.”
511   
In 1907, in Annam, the president of Quang Ngai’s Fujian congregation 
repudiated two congregation members, Thai Vat Ky and Thai Luc Ky, both of whom 
resided in Thach Tru Thon village.  According to the president, these men had paid 
neither their personal nor their commercial taxes for a number of years, leaving it up 
to the president to make good on their debts.  Additionally, the Fujian president 
alleged them both to be men of evil reputation; although specific incidents were not 
detailed, they were accused of usury and extortion.  As a result of their unreliable 
natures, the congregation refused to vouch for them any longer, meaning that they 
faced certain expulsion from the colony.
512  Within two weeks, the order of expulsion 
had been pronounced and the two men were to be escorted to a ship and sent to Hong 
Kong at the expense of their congregation.
513   
Thai Luc Ky was banished from the colony, but Thai Vat Ky managed to find 
a loophole and postpone his escape.  Just as he was scheduled for deportation out of 
Tourane
514 to Hong Kong, Thai Vat Ky found another congregation, the Fujian 
congregation of Tourane, to vouch for him.  Though good fortune might have played a 
role in his narrow escape, there can be little doubt that networking was also a central 
factor.  Had Thai Vat Ky not possessed sufficient stature or connections within 
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Indochina’s Fujianese community, he would never have been able to convince them to 
intercede on his behalf – after all, the hapless Thai Luc Ky was not so lucky – but Thai 
Vat Ky’s story did not end with his close call.   
After being rescued by the Tourane congregation, Thai Vat Ky returned to 
Quang Ngai under the pretense of attending to his business affairs; instead, he 
resumed his habits of usury.  After three weeks in Quang Ngai, he returned to Tourane 
where he employed a lawyer to intercede with the local administration on his behalf as 
it concerned the matter of him returning to Quang Ngai for an indefinite length of time 
to tend to his business.  The Resident Superior in Annam, after warning him that no 
further license would be granted him by the French administration, agreed to Thai Vat 
Ky’s request under two conditions: first, his stay in Quang Ngai province could not 
exceed one month; and second, if any complaint reached the ears of the 
administration, he would immediately be expelled from the colony. 
Inevitably, during his month in Quang Ngai, complaints about Thai Vat Ky’s 
behavior reached the ears of the Resident, who, true to his word, promptly ordered the 
man’s expulsion from the colony.
515  The Governor general informed Annam’s 
Resident that the expulsion of Thai Vat Ky would have to wait until after a French 
court found him guilty of the violence and extortion of which he had been accused; 
however, while French authorities waded through the bureaucratic red tape that 
preceded any expulsion, Thai Vat Ky took matters into his own hands and fled the 
province, allegedly to Cochinchina.
516  Thus, Thai Vat Ky illustrates how a single 
individual, repudiated by his congregation and expelled by French authorities, 
managed to escape deportation, first through the legal means of finding another 
                                                 
515 Letter from the Resident Superior in Annam, 1 February 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 20334.   
516 Letter from the Resident Superior in Annam, 21 February 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 20334.    
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congregation willing to vouch for him, and then through the illegal means of fading 
anonymously into the vast colonial jungle, never to be heard from again. 
Conclusion 
In China’s late imperial period, attacks on Manchu interests across the Tonkin 
border in China resulted in the Chinese Foreign Minister requesting that France step 
up its surveillance in the border regions in the hopes of capturing these wanted 
criminals and extraditing them back to China.  This imperial request had the 
immediate result of putting enormous pressure on Indochina’s – specifically Tonkin’s 
– overseas Chinese community.  Previously welcome and respectable overseas 
Chinese found themselves sacrificed to the Imperial government as a result of the 
French desire to seem cooperative to the failing Celestial Empire.  The French Orders 
of Expulsion emanating from this period sound faintly apologetic, as if the French 
recognized the harm that they were doing to individuals for the sake of expediency.  
Nevertheless, the expelled men were forced to seek their fortunes somewhere outside 
of French territory. 
French officials also clashed with congregations over other issues.  Disputes 
over Vietnamese women being allowed to leave Indochina with Chinese men were 
commonplace, as were conflicts over whether or not Chinese women should be 
allowed to stay.  In Tonkin and Laos, in the mountainous north, drug smuggling, 
wandering vagabonds, and control of the highland caravanners proved to be sore 
points with the French administration. In fact, the only real evidence of congregational 
cooperation with the French as it pertained to matters of crime and immigration 
concerned the use of the French as a powerful legal recourse to assist Chinese 
congregations with the expulsion of troublemakers or problem members.  At times, as 
this chapter demonstrates, the Chinese co-opted this authority as well, using French  
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power to rid themselves of miscreants, but to cleanse the congregation of unwanted 
members, particularly members of mixed Sino-Vietnamese descent.  
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CHAPTER 9:  CHINESE CERCLES:  KINSHIP OR CRIME? 
In Indochina during the late 19
th century, colonial authorities often agonized 
over the misdeeds of a type of Chinese organization called a cercle. “Cercle” is a 
French term often translated as “association” which is used in Indochina to represent 
organizations bound together by shared interests or personal characteristics, and not all 
cercles were composed of Chinese members.  For example, in the 1920’s, Saigon-
Cholon welcomed its first Aeronautical Cercle for airplane aficionados.  Likewise, 
some cercles emerged to bring together members who had all graduated from the same 
colonial school, or who participated in the same hobbies.  For cercles composed 
entirely of Chinese members, however, the term is better understood as referring to 
any officially sanctioned group of overseas Chinese who are bound together by 
commonalities other than dialect.
517  In my opinion, these cercles represented the best 
and only chance for overseas Chinese in Indochina to create in their own communities 
the types of segmentations and differentiations that came so naturally to them in their 
native places.  These segmentations were denied them under French congregational 
law, which recognized only dialect as a viable grouping criterion.  It is very easy to 
dismiss cercles as dens of iniquity, which many of them undoubtedly were; however, 
this type of unsophisticated perspective completely overlooks the larger questions:  
how did the Chinese choose to divide themselves within each dialect group, and what 
larger purpose, if any, did each cercle serve for its members? 
                                                 
517 This definition should not be understood to mean that cercle members did not speak the same 
dialect; only that for the most part, the criteria determining membership eligibility did not include 
dialect.  In the very early years of the cercles, there were exceptions to this policy, especially for 
underrepresented dialect groups who were forced to assimilate within the bounds of a congregation 
where the majority did not speak their dialect; however, these early groups quickly gave way to cercles 
based upon shared characteristics such as profession or occupation, rather than language or dialect – 
most likely because for these groups, a shared dialect was a foregone conclusion.  
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As this dissertation has already discussed, in any typical Chinese urban setting, 
whether in Shanghai or Hankow or Singapore, kinship associations existed for the 
purpose of bringing people from a common background together to help them 
materially, socially, and spiritually.  In cities outside of Indochina, these groups often 
segmented themselves in meticulous detail, using such characteristics as native county 
or village, professional occupation, or even combinations of multiple specific factors.  
This meant, for example, that Singapore had a guild exclusively for carpenters from 
Taishan and Hankow had a guild for silk dealers from Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
518  
French legislation impeded Indochina’s Chinese community from developing the same 
kind of highly detailed social structure and hierarchy that existed in other cities.   
Therefore, their preoccupation with opium and gambling notwithstanding, cercles also 
gave these groups the opportunity to establish the social hierarchies and institutions to 
which they were culturally accustomed.  As the following picture suggests, the vast 
majority of Indochina’s overseas Chinese, paralleling the demographics of overseas 
Chinese communities around the world, were male, bound by ties of kinship and even 
friendship made stronger by the isolation of colonial life. 
Historian Madeline Hsu has addresses this very issue of social bonding in her 
article, “Exporting Homosociality: Culture and Community in Chinatown America, 
1882-1943.”  In this article, Hsu suggests that the overwhelmingly male population of 
Chinese in America created, over time, a migrant population that came to value – on a 
personal level – their relationships and bonds with other men as highly as they valued 
their more traditional relationships with distant wives and children.  She proposes that 
the lives of these predominantly male Chinese should not be understood “as a 
perpetual state of unfulfilled longing for wife and children, but as part of a community 
of men that assumed values and rhythms of life that emphasized, not Confucian 
                                                 
518 Rowe, Commerce and Society, 268.  
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responsibilities to family and ancestors, but the friendship, fraternity, and honor of 
bonding with other men.”
519  Careful consideration of the roles of the cercle with 
regard to the social relationships and personal loyalties of Indochina’s overseas 
Chinese adds another significant, if intangible, dimension to our understanding of 
these types of institutions.  It also gives us insight into why overseas Chinese pursued 
the creation of these cercles so indefatigably. 
 
Figure 19 Chinese from Quang-Si
520 
The issue of Chinese clubs and associations in Indochina deserves special 
attention in its own right.  From the perspective of the French administration, Chinese 
Cercles proved quite problematic because they often operated unfettered by the strict 
regulations and established leadership hierarchy that stabilized the other major 
Chinese organization in Indochina, the congrégation.  This chapter will discuss the 
notion commonly put forth by colonial French administrators that Chinese cercles 
were bastions of crime and evil-doing.  In addition to describing the basic nature and 
                                                 
519 Madeline Hsu, “Exporting Homosociality: Culture and Community in Chinatown America, 1882-
1943,” (unpublished), 24. 
520http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://hinhxua.free.fr/autrefois/chinois/Cholon_la_processi
on_du_dragon.jpg&imgrefurl=http://hinhxua.free.fr/autrefois/chinois/photo_chinois_vn.htm&h=457&
w=719&sz=97&tbnid=BguALWOgyy0tqM:&tbnh=88&tbnw=139&hl=en&start=2&p.  Feb 12, 2006.  
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roles of cercles for the larger Chinese community in Indochina, this chapter seeks to 
define the function of the cercles in the overseas Chinese community, discussing the 
manner in which cercles assumed several of the community responsibilities 
traditionally delegated to the huiguan in order to ensure the smooth functioning of 
each specific congrégation without explicitly violating laws put forth by the French 
administration. 
As established earlier in this study, Nguyên law established strict policies for 
the existence and operation of Chinese institutions in Annamite territory long before 
the arrival of the French.  In the early years of their tenure in Indochina, the French 
adopted this system with very few revisions, but by the 1880’s, French-oriented 
organizations known as cercles emerged by the hundreds in major urban centers across 
the region.  What role did these cercles play in Indochina’s overseas Chinese 
communities? How did they appear and why did the overseas Chinese adopt this 
originally French institution so enthusiastically?   
The answer to these questions can be traced back to the urban Chinese 
environments upon which many overseas Chinese institutions were based.  In China, 
social and business groups did not use dialect as their sole differentiating 
characteristic.  Instead, formal and informal groups and associations merged together 
and drifted apart based on native county or town, specific occupation,
521 secret society 
affiliation, or some combination of the three. Chinese cities possessed hundreds, even 
thousands, of these alliances, representing a desire for affiliation clearly impossible 
under the Nguyên-based rules governing the overseas Chinese. The early tenure of the 
French allowed a sudden freedom in Chinese-oriented restrictions.  As French 
institutions took hold in Indochina and more and more colons settled in the territories, 
                                                 
521 By specific occupation, I am referring to a segmentation beyond broader categories like construction 
and into specifics such as bricklayers or cement workers.   
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French cercles began to emerge to meet French interests, interests that were often 
recreational in nature.
522  Apparently seizing the chance to expand their own 
institutional interests, Chinese congregations quickly grabbed the opportunity to 
organize cercles of their own.  For the Chinese, cercles represented the best 
opportunity to recreate the diversity of the mainland Chinese urban environment. 
Although congrégations retained their status as the preeminent Chinese 
institutions of the French colonial period, they were not homogenous institutions 
representing a bland and ubiquitous clientele.  Within the congrégations, members 
separated themselves into a number of divisions and subdivisions based upon such 
shared characteristics as native village or county, occupation, or even home country.
523  
In Indochina, these subdivisions were often referred to as “cercles.”  Inevitably, 
certain Cercles or factions with a specific congrégation participated in leisure activities 
outlawed by the French.  Gambling seems to have been the preferred downfall of these 
organizations which often deteriorated into after-hours, members-only casinos which 
served no other noticeable purpose except to provide a venue for illicit games and a 
social outlet for their members.   
When the French discovered these illicit activities, retribution was swift and 
multi-faceted. First, they arrested all of the individual Chinese men who were known 
to have been involved with the gambling ring. As these arrests usually occurred during 
a nighttime raid on a suspected gambling den, the guilt of those arrested was more or 
                                                 
522 Such as the Cercles Sportif, Airplane cercles, etc. 
523 Indochina hosted several groups and societies intended to represent, for example, Singaporean or 
Malaysian Chinese.  Although these Chinese were based outside of China proper, they were still 
required to affiliate themselves with a congrégation upon their arrival in Indochina.  Thus, a Cantonese 
merchant based in Singapore was required by French law to affiliate himself with a Chinese 
congrégation if he desired to work or live in Indochina.  This requirement existed even if the merchant 
in question had never actually been to his native Cantonese place and had spent his entire life in 
Singapore or Malaysia.  The only exceptions to this rule concerned ethnic Chinese citizens of western 
nations (i.e., a Singaporean Cantonese merchant with British citizenship).  
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less a foregone conclusion.  Implicated individuals faced individual trial on individual 
charges and were most often sentenced to a fine, a prison term of varying lengths, and 
immediate expulsion from the colony upon their release from prison; however, justice 
did not end there. In addition to punishing those directly responsible for the 
wrongdoing, the Cercle whose members were involved was disbanded and the 
congrégation with which the Cercle was affiliated faced fines and repercussions of its 
own.   
Ultimately, a congrégation was unlikely to be disbanded over such an incident.  
Final responsibility for any infractions committed by members of a congrégation 
rested firmly upon the shoulders of the congrégation’s president. As Nguyen Quốc 
Đinh writes in his 1941 examination of the congrégation system and colonial law, “All 
infractions of Indochinese law and of the provisions of the decree of 1935 committed 
by a congrégation are imputed to its president; he is the one who is personally 
incriminated:  he is punished, and this may include depriving him of his liberty.”
524  In 
fact, for the regions of Annam and Tonkin, French law explicitly limited the liability 
of the congrégations from the actions of its members to “acts of rebellion against 
France, serious political troubles, or actions which disturb the general safety, which do 
not fall under ordinary penal laws.”
525 Even in one of three above-mentioned cases, 
the decree limited financial damages to the amount required “to provide the 
Administration with the means of putting down these disorders and insuring that they 
do not recur.”
526  Despite the fact that Cochinchina often served as the proving ground 
for laws concerning the Chinese population and the congrégations, no such law limited 
                                                 
524 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 88. 
525 Article 3 of the decree of October 11, 1905 as quoted in Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese 
Congregations, 171. 
526 Article 3 of the decree of October 11, 1905 as quoted in Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese 
Congregations, 171.  
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punitive damages levied upon or the criminal responsibility of Cochinchinese 
congrégations.  Not until 1935 did legislation emerge that limited the responsibility of 
the congrégation in the event of malfeasance by a congrégation member in 
Cochinchina.
527 
The late 1870’s and early 1880’s were busy years for Chinese cercles in 
Cholon and Saigon.  In the spring of 1878, Cholon’s Phuoc Chau community wrote a 
letter to Cholon’s Administrator for Indigenous Affairs asking that they be allowed to 
open their own cercle.  Prior to 1874, the Phuoc Kien congregation had actually been 
three separate congregations, each with their own leader: the Phuoc Chau, the Toan 
Chau, and the Chuong Chau.  Accordingly, in Cholon, each of these groups had their 
own pagoda. After the merger of these three groups into the Phuoc Kien congregation, 
the Phuoc Chau community found congregation life increasingly onerous, because of 
the significant differences between their dialect and those of the Chuong Chaus and 
Toan Chau’s. To ease those communications difficulties and create an environment 
more conducive to their business and leisure activities, the Phuoc Chau asked 
permission to open their own cercle in Cholon.
528  Their request was endorsed by the 
Administrator and forwarded to the governor later that month.  The following is a 
modern picture of the Phuoc An huiguan in Cholon, providing us with some idea of 
the gathering places frequented by congregation and cercle members alike.  
Requests to establish cercles were not necessarily approved as a matter of 
course.  In July 1878, the Phuoc Kien congregation requested permission to open a 
Phuoc Kien cercle in Saigon “for no other purpose than to provide a meeting place for 
                                                 
527 Article 3 of the decree of October 11, 1905 as quoted in Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese 
Congregations, 172-3. 
528 Letter from the Phuoc Chau businessmen, 17 April 1878, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3).  
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Figure 20 Phuoc An Huiguan, Cholon
529 
the different shopkeepers of the congregation to freely show their faces and to 
entertain one another honestly, or to deal with their business.”
530  The congregation 
cited the existence in Cholon of two Cantonese cercles as a motivating factor behind 
their request.  They also commented that the third cercle, composed of Chinese from 
different congregations, failed to meet the social and business needs of the Phuoc Kien 
community.
531  Allowing for a spirit of inter-congregational competition, this letter 
can be interpreted as follows:  the Cantonese had two cercles and the Fujianese wanted 
a cercle of their own.  Despite the willingness of the Phuoc Kien congregation to meet 
all of the requirements of French law, margin notes scribbled onto the petition indicate 
                                                 
529 Taken by the author, 2002. 
530 Letter from the Phuoc Kien congregation, 20 July 1878, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3). 
531 While Saigon might have only had three Chinese cercles, at the time this petition was written, 
Cholon had at least three, representing the Cantonese, Trieu Chau, and Phuoc Kien communities.  
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that this request to open a cercle was refused by the office of the Governor General for 
reasons unknown.
532 
By 1880, the Phuoc Kien cercle in Cholon had stumbled into difficult times.  
Around 9 pm on August 4, 1880, while strolling down the Rue de Paris in Cholon, 
Cholon’s Chief Constable noticed a large number of Chinese wandering in and out of 
the Phuoc Kien congregation house, even thought the main rooms of the house seemed 
empty.  Suspicious, he came in for a closer look, only to discover that the Chinese 
were entering and leaving through a door concealed by the building’s stairway.  Inside 
the door, he saw around 60 Chinese gathered at a table clearly involved in some sort of 
game of chance.  As he approached the room, a sentry called out the alarm; Chinese 
scattered in all directions and he entered to find it empty of people, property, or goods.  
After that incident, he warned the cercle’s president, Ta Chanh Nguon, that would 
have to submit a report on the incident.
533  French tolerance of Chinese rule-breaking 
was in short supply; on August 16, judgment was officially pronounced.  Cholon’s 
Phuoc Kien cercle was closed and the 1,000 piastre guarantee it had offered as proof 
of its legitimacy was forfeited to the local treasury and to the city of Cholon.
534   
Malfeasance on the part of cercle members was not always required for a 
cercle to be closed.  On November 15, 1879, police rushed to the premises of Cholon’s 
Trieu Chau cercle to break up a large brawl that was underway there.  According to 
police reports, the fracas began when employees of the cercle got into a fight with 
eleven Chinese who were not members of the cercle over the game of chance they 
were playing together.  In the process of intervening, police arrested several of the 
Chinese involved and also confiscated nearly 300 francs in cash that they found at the 
                                                 
532 Letter from the Phuoc Kien congregation, 20 July 1878, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3). 
533 Letter from the Chief Constable, 4 August 1880, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3). 
534 Arrêté from the Director of the Interior, 16 August 1880, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3).  
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scene;
535 however, other than in the initial police report, no mention is made of Trieu 
Chau participants in the melee. The Municipal President commented that “None of the 
cercle members was present; the individuals who were arrested are foreigners, Phuoc 
Kien Chinese and Akas who come to gamble.”
536  The list of those arrested included a 
member of the Hainam congregation whose residence was in France, a member of the 
Phuoc Kien congregation whose name was inscribed illegally on the rolls of the Trieu 
Chau Cercle, and one Chinese with French residency who had no congregational 
affiliation.
537  Despite the conspicuous absence of any bona fide Trieu Chau Cercle 
members on the list of those apprehended, on November 22, 1879, the Cercle was 
closed for its violations, and its 1,000 piastre guarantee was confiscated by the 
treasury as penalty.
538 
Although native place paid a nearly ubiquitous role in determining the 
boundaries along which cercles divided themselves, other more refined characteristics 
also defined the organizations.  In 1884, for example, 12 merchants from Cholon’s 
Hainam congregation sent a petition to the Director of the Interior asking permission 
to establish a “Cercle of Hainam Traders.”
539 In 1886, the Cantonese congregation 
applied for and received permission to open an occupationally based cercle, the 
“Cercle of Suppliers and [Rice] Huskers of the Cantonese Congregation.”
540  Just two 
months later, the same Cantonese congregation of Cholon sought to establish a cercle 
just for the Cantonese rice brokers.  The French were distinctly disapproving of this 
request as they felt the Cantonese were taking advantage of French benevolence by 
seeking to open another cercle and also could not imagine why every aspect of the rice 
                                                 
535 Letter from the Chief Constable, 14 November 1879, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3). 
536 Letter from the Municipal President, 14 November 1879, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3). 
537 Handwritten List of Arrested Chinese, no date, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3). 
538 Governor’s Report, 22 November 1879, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(3). 
539 Petition from Hainam’s Merchants, 30 April 1884, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(4). 
540 Letter from the Mayor of Cholon, 12 March 1886, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(4).  
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trade required its own association.
541  As late as 1908, Cholon possessed a “Cercle for 
Chinese Businessmen and for Trieu Chaus.”
542 
In rural areas far from the comfort of Cholon’s Chinatown, Chinese 
businessmen also sought to open cercles, this time with much broader membership.  
Typical of these cases was the request to open a Chinese cercle in Vinh Long.  The 
Chinese merchants emphasized the importance of the town as a stopover on the route 
from Cholon to Phnom Penh, and together, the Cantonese, Phuoc Kien, and Trieu 
Chau congregations sought permission to open a cercle to support the needs of their 
community and of the important businessmen that stopped in Vinh Long on their way 
from market center to market center.
543  In another instance, Cholon-based Singapore 
Chinese sought to open their own cercle in the city, a request which was granted in 
1878.
544  The formation of this type of organization closely mirrors the establishment 
of guilds and native place associations in China as well.  The farther one got from the 
major urban center, the broader the guild membership criteria became.  In other words, 
native place associations from the province of Guangzhou, if located in the city of 
Canton, would likely be differentiated on a village-by-village level.  If, on the other 
hand, residents of Canton who originally hailed from Shandong formed an association, 
the group quite likely would have been provincially inclusive.  In some cases, natives 
from more than one distant province formed guilds together to deepen their networks 
and systems of support. 
Apart from issues of networking and companionship, Indochina’s Chinese 
cercles were not above using the French to their own advantage in competitions 
                                                 
541 Letter from the Mayor of Cholon, 5 May 1886, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 3/137(27). 
542 Confidential Note from Cholon’s Chief Constable, 16 April 1908, CAOM, INDO GGI 50220. 
543 Request by three Chinese congregations, date unknown (1884), TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IA.6/201(2). 
544 Request by the Singapore Chinese, 14 October 1878, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(5).    
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between cercles, or between congregations.  In 1880, an anonymous complaint 
generated, unsigned, from the “Phuoc Kien businessmen” aimed specifically to 
destroy the Hainanese cercle and to tarnish the reputation of the congregation with 
which it was affiliated. This accusation alleged that gambling dens existed on a certain 
street in Cholon, and gave the address and details of the crimes carried out at that 
secret location.  The anonymous tipsters clearly wanted no stone left unturned.   
We come, as a consequence, to ask you, Mr. Governor, to send a civil 
servant accompanied by annamite agents and by Chinese in order to 
encircle the aforementioned gambling house and, at the same time, 
guard the neighborhoods around the house, to avoid allowing gamblers 
to escape and to dissipate the obstacles that could result (if these 
measures were not taken).
545  
The French, well aware of the recent enmity between the Phuoc Kien and 
Hainam communities, were not bothered by the fact that they were being used to settle 
old scores.  The opportunity to eliminate a large scale gambling ring was too good to 
let pass.  Furthermore, the guilt or innocence of the Hainanese was never at question.  
When the raid occurred, no games were in progress and no gambling paraphernalia 
was found; however, French investigators felt that the floor plan and difficult access to 
various parts of the house were sure signs of guilt.  When questioned, the vice 
president of the congregation did not flatly deny that gambling had occurred in the 
establishment.  Instead, he said that no gambling had occurred since the death of the 
congregation president two days before.  That was enough of a confession for the 
police, and the poor Hainanese cercle was left to suffer the consequences of its 
infraction.
546 
                                                 
545 Anonymous Complaint from Phuoc Kien businessmen, no date (1880), TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IA.6/205(2). 
546 Letter from the Mayor of Cholon, 19 October 1880, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(2).  
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The events detailed by Cholon’s Chief Constable on August 4, 1880 played out 
again and again in the following years when Chinese cercles rose to the public eye.  In 
October of the same year, three more cercles, those belonging to the Cantonese, the 
Hakkas, and the Hainanese, were also closed for gambling infractions.
547  As with the 
cercles that had preceded them, their guarantees were confiscated
548 and the agents 
who discovered the misdeeds were awarded forty piastres as reward for their 
diligence.
549  In fact, the inability or unwillingness to ensure that cercles remained 
law-abiding was one of the motivating factors in their eventual proscription under 
French law.  Already short of patience with these organizations, Cochinchina’s 
Lieutenant Governor responded brusquely to a letter from the Mayor of Cholon that 
suggested that the Chinese community was being unfairly persecuted by the 
government when it came to the cercles.  The Lieutenant Governor cited Article 291 
of the Decree of May 16, 1880, a clause dealing with associations and illicit meetings, 
in his rebuttal: 
It is important to apply this last article strictly and rigorously to 
Chinese cercles. As a consequence, all of them that contain more than 
twenty members should be required to submit their statutes for 
examination by superior authorities and to be authorized by an order of 
Mr. Governor general to operate validly. [If they fail] to submit to these 
legal prescriptions, they should be considered opened illegally and 
consequently closed… 
These are not, it seems, measures intended " to irritate " the Chinese 
population and, in particular, the representatives of the big business, 
towards whom I am quite inclined to show great benevolence, on the 
condition however that they cannot for a single moment think 
themselves above the law… In any case, close surveillance, although 
friendly, should continue to be exercised so as to avoid occurrences like 
those that motivated the closing in 1888 of the cercle of the 
"Cantonese" in which, says the preamble to the order of August 11, 
                                                 
547 Letter to the Mayor of Cholon, 28 October 1880, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(4). 
548 Letter from the Mayor of Cholon, 29 October 1880, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(4). 
549 Arrêté from the Governor of Cochinchina, 25 October 1880, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/205(4).  
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1888, it was established that 278 Chinese were engaged in the game of 
baquan. 
I would, in any case, be surprised that the Chinese meet in these cercles 
for the sole purpose of handling commercial business there.  Parties 
frequently get organized there and, if my information is exact, 
invitations to these entertainments are not subjected to very rigorous 
formalities.  It is this fact in particular which merits your diligent 
attention.
550 
In fact, a small war erupted between, Outrey, the Lieutenant Governor of Cochinchina, 
and Drouhet, the Mayor of Cholon, over the cercle issue.  The Lieutenant Governor, 
along with most of Cochinchina’s constabulary, viewed the Mayor as overly lenient, 
especially with wealthy Chinese merchants and blamed Drouhet personally for much 
of the trouble with Chinese cercles and gambling in Cholon.  Discussing the aftermath 
of the 1888 incident in which nearly 300 Cantonese were arrested in a raid on a single 
game of chance, Outrey comments that in 1893, Governor General de Lanessan 
suppressed all of Cholon’s cercles as a result of their unreliability when it came to 
games of chance.
551  T h e  g oal  of  th i s a c ti on  w a s t o r e s u m e  tol e r an ce  of  Ch i n e s e 
associations in a much more discriminating fashion, thereby eliminating many of the 
public disorders and episodes of law-breaking that seemed to follow in the cercles’ 
wakes.  Outrey implies that Drouhet is largely to blame for the failure of this plan, 
writing, “Since this time, without any new authorization, these establishments have 
opened again under the pretext of facilitating commercial transactions. The creators of 
these cercles in effect content themselves with presenting a request to obtain the 
approval of Cholon's municipality, which always grants it without worrying about 
current views on the question
552.”  The mayor, for his part, insulted the skill and the 
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wits of the Lieutenant Governor and his local police, saying, “My simplistic spirit 
refuses to understand why it would be a mistake to tolerate rich Chinese business 
owners in Cholon meeting in establishments where it is not established that one plays, 
while gambling spreads openly in the heart of Saigon, in the presence of the most 
eminent members of the judicial service, and in a cercle where entry is certainly less 
difficult than in Cholon's Chinese cercles.”
553 
The entrepreneurial spirit of some of Indochina’s overseas Chinese 
occasionally shined through the interactions between the Chinese and French.  In one 
particularly noteworthy incident, two Hanoi based Chinese, Lao Tzong Sanh
554 and 
Nam San, actually sent, unbidden, competing bids for the rights to manage Chinese 
cercles in Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Đinh.  The only catch for the French was that all 
forms of gambling, save for two deemed particularly dangerous, would be allowed.
555  
Essentially, these men lobbied for a Chinese controlled revenue farm for Chinese 
gambling, a move seen as undesirable, audacious, and slightly bemusing by the 
French, who immediately refused.
556 
Tonkin was also not immune to the problems posed by Chinese cercles in 
Indochina.  At least one Chinese cercle already existed in Hanoi, inaugurated jointly 
by Hanoi’s Cantonese and Phuoc Kien congregations, and functional since 1886.
557  
By 1889, a multitude of requests to open cercles in Haiphong had descended upon the 
Residency.  The Cantonese request came in January,
558 and in April, the “Cercle de 
Commerçants” added their request as well, reminding the administration that such 
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associations were freely available to Europeans in the colony and even to the Chinese 
in Saigon and Cholon.
559  In July, 16 Chinese, most of whom fell into the bottom two 
categories of the personal tax, asked permission to open a “Chinese Cercle,” for use by 
“prominent businessmen” in the city.
560  Cholon’s mayor preferred the idea of a 
Chinese cercle because, endorsed by the local Chinese congregation, the single pan-
Chinese cercle seemed the easiest way to control the rampant problems of illegal 
gambling in the city.
561   
By the end of the century, the tide still had not shifted, and cercles opened and 
were closed, stuck in a bewildering and endless cycle of requests, approvals or 
refusals, criminal inquests, brawls, gambling rings, and excuses. The cercle fever even 
spread to the borderlands, when the president of the Chinese congregation in Ky-Lua 
village in Lang-sơn asked permission to open a cercle in his town.  A military territory 
at the time of the request, Lang-sơn proved to be too much of a stretch for Tonkin’s 
administration, who refused permission with very little debate.
562 
One of the most difficult issues to grapple with when pursuing an examination 
of Chinese Cercles in Indochina is the apparent inconsistency of the colonial 
administration when it came to allowing their existence or prohibiting it.  From 1878, 
Chinese cercles had operated in French territory under the condition that they provide 
a 1000 piastre bond, intended to guarantee their compliance with French law.
563  On 
June 19, 1886, all Chinese cercles in Cochinchina were closed for business.  Cercles 
were given three days to cease operations, but their guarantees were to be returned to 
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them.
564  The government had grown weary of the many infractions of local law, 
nearly all of which involved some form of gambling; however, after more than two 
years of constant pressure to allow the establishment of Chinese cercles to resume, the 
Lieutenant Governor capitulated.  On June 27, 1888, the right to establish cercles 
resumed, albeit with very strict regulations.
565  Five years later, a period of time during 
which one Cantonese Cercle was closed for holding a gambling event that resulted in 
the arrests of nearly 300 people, Indochina’s Governor General once again shut down 
all of the Chinese cercles. This time, they had three days to cease their operations but 
the treasury confiscated their guarantees.
566 
Gambling 
In 1895, local police came upon a large group of Chinese who were gambling 
at the entrance to Đong Khé village in Haiphong province.  Included in the group, 
among other professions, were three coolies, two merchants, a sailor, a carpenter, and 
an entrepreneur, and they ranged in age from 21 to 46.  Eleven individuals were 
arrested, all of whom claimed to be employed by houses in or around Haiphong, but 
Haiphong’s Chief of Police suspected that several of them were actually professional 
gamblers, because they were arrested with a significant quantity of gambling 
paraphernalia in their possession.
567  This type of subterfuge was not uncommon in 
Indochina.  It was particularly a problem in the large mining compounds in the 
northern mountains, where men dressed as coolies actually did no work, but lived off 
the proceeds of gambling, or were supported by local secret societies.
568   
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Haiphong was, at the time, plagued by illegal gambling rings that targeted 
local markets.  This fact, combined with the general belief in the unsavory nature of 
gambling Chinese, resulted in a more radical reaction from the police who, fully 
supported by Haiphong’s Resident, pushed for very stiff penalties for the lawbreakers.  
Eleven of the gamblers were arrested and expelled from the colony.  Of the expelled 
men, 10 of them hailed from Canton, and the 11
th man was from Hong Kong.
569  Not 
surprisingly, in the transcripts of their interrogations, none of the eleven admitted to 
gambling.  The excuses they offered were varied, including coming to Dong Khé to 
worship at the pagoda, to look for work in the town, or to meet up with local friends; 
however, their protestations of innocence did them no good, and they were expelled.
570 
 
Figure 21 Haiphong, Rue Chinoise
571 
The preceding photograph of Haiphong’s Chinatown in the early 20
th century gives us 
some idea of the size and significance of the overseas Chinese community in that 
northern port city. 
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While French anti-gambling paranoia was not always wrong, neither was it 
always right, and the Tonkinese authorities occasionally showed little interest in 
justice.  Such was the case with the Ly Siou Meng affair.  Ly Siou Meng appeared 
before a tribunal to face charges stemming from his arrest in a police sting for 
operating a gambling house in Hanoi on October 8, 1909.  In spite of Ly Siou Meng’s 
acquittal, Hanoi’s police chief remained convinced of his guilt and determined to 
punish him, regardless of the decisions of the French court.  “I am going to propose at 
once to the Mayor the expulsion of the Chinese, Ly Siou Meng, whose guilt, despite 
the acquittal that intervened in his favor, is not in any doubt.”
572 
Apparently, the Resident Superior viewed the police chief’s request with favor, 
because the matter quickly escalated once the proposed expulsion became known.  Ly 
Siou Meng managed, by means unknown, to enlist the aid of a well-known French 
lawyer in Hanoi to oppose the expulsion on his behalf.  Hanoi’s police chief insisted 
that the hiring of the lawyer was solid proof of the complicity of Hanoi’s 
congregations in the gambling ring.  He argued compellingly that a Chinese worker 
with no apparent means of support could never have afforded such an attorney on his 
own, which to him, “appears to prove that it hit close to home for the big financiers of 
gambling in Hanoi.”
573   
The truth of this matter will never be known, and neither will the results of Ly 
Siou Meng’s attempted expulsion; however, this case brings a number of interesting 
issues to light.  First, Hanoi’s police superintendent seems to have been so invested in 
the outcome of this particular case that the truth took a backseat to punishment, 
whether the accused party was guilty or not.  This speaks powerfully to French 
stereotypes about Chinese in Indochina: their simultaneously indolent and financially 
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cunning natures, and their propensity towards gambling and crime.  Secondly, it shows 
the power of a congregation to intervene at any level of justice to pursue a fair, or 
perhaps merely desired, outcome for one of its members.  Whether or not Ly Siou 
Meng was guilty of the crimes pinned to him, his case shows the willingness of the 
congregation to take on French authorities on French terms and on a battleground of 
French choosing.  It also indicates that, for the Chinese community, not all such 
confrontations were doomed to failure. 
The notion that all overseas Chinese whiled away their time at gambling tables 
does a gross injustice to the upstanding merchants who experienced firsthand the 
tragedies induced by the pastime.  In 1887, the Haiphong-based merchant Tchang Sam 
wrote a heart-wrenching letter to Tonkin’s Resident, begging that gambling be 
abolished in the area. 
I have the honor to notify your Excellence of a regrettable act which 
has just taken place in my family and which would militate once again 
in favor of the abolition of gambling houses. 
Here are the facts: For about ten months, two children were entrusted to 
me to introduce them to the municipality. Their conduct was perfect 
during all this time and I did nothing but praise them to their father who 
had entrusted them to me. 
Recently, [I had] business in Haïdzuong. I had to send my two youths 
to this city with eleven hundred piastres worth of goods with which 
they immediately made a profit of five hundred piastres, making a total 
of seventeen hundred piastres. Haïdzuong regrettably possesses one 
gaming house. My two employees went there and lost this sum in one 
night. The next day, one of them poisoned himself with some opium 
and the other one drowned himself. I leave it to you to judge the pain 
felt by me and by their father at this dreadful piece of news. 
I inform you of this event, Sir Minister, but there are a thousand others 
who each carry the despair and the ruin of our families, and who 
demonstrate the deep immorality of the freedom to open gambling 
houses.  
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I leave for your consideration, Sir Minister, the care of judging the 
disastrous consequences of a similar freedom and the catastrophes that 
it can cause for our families.
574 
“A thousand others” is undoubtedly a great understatement. 
In Indochina, all games of chance were strictly regulated, even simple carnival 
games such as those seen at fairs and festivals.  One such activity that was endemic in 
the region, the jeu de massacre, or massacre game, involved throwing darts or balls 
and small doll-like figures.  If successful, the thrower won things like tobacco, soap, 
cookies, sugar, or matches.  Records from 1907 show the popularity of the traveling 
game as a means of existence, but more importantly, they give insight into the life 
patterns of Chinese choosing this game for a living.  As a point of reference, the 
gamesmen discussed in the following pages were all members of Chinese 
congregations in Cholon.  Despite the fact that they typically slipped between the 
cracks of colonial surveillance, they remained officially inscribed on congregational 
rolls. 
The 51 year old Cantonese man, Hua Tuoc, turned to the game after years of 
personal financial disasters.  Hua Tuoc had lived in Indochina for twenty years, the 
first ten of which he spent in Cholon operating a smithy.  A poor businessman, he was 
forced to close his forge and turn to the salt industry, but he left the salt business after 
6 years to move to Ha Tien and open his own public transportation service.   
Unfortunately, an epizootic struck the region and nearly all of his horses perished.  
After that disastrous twist of fate, Hua Tuoc decided to abandon Indochina and return 
to his native place; however, in early 1906, he returned to Indochina – this time to 
Kampot – to try his hand at business once more.  Once again, his business acumen 
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failed him; in an apparent last resort, Hua Tuoc arrived in Cholon to acquire 
permission to run carnival games for a living.
575 
Not all gamesmen had such a poor track record.  In July of the same year, the 
30 year old Cantonese Dương Dương sought a license of his own to run the massacre 
game in Cochinchina.  Arriving in Indochina in 1898, he worked for four years as a 
cook for various Chinese businesses. After awhile, he became friends with another 
Cantonese man named Phung Mao, who was a fairground gamester.  The two men 
traveled the breadth of Cochinchina repeatedly during their association, but in June of 
1907, Phung Mao returned to China, taking the license to practice games of chance 
with him.  Accordingly, Dương Dương returned to the city to get a license of his own 
and continue the life that seems to have suited him so well.
576 
The final example, that of the Cantonese Cao Dương, is different from either 
of the first two.  Born in 1874 in the village of Phuong Yu in Guangdong, Cao Dương 
traveled to Indochina at the age of twenty, where he found employment piloting the 
rowboats owned by various Chinese businesses in Phnom Penh.  In 1905, Cao Dương 
returned to Canton, but by1907, he was back in Saigon, this time seeking a career as a 
traveling gamesman.
577   
Some men received their licenses and some did not, but two aspects of these 
stories deserve our attention.  First, the French intolerance of gambling and the 
regulations that controlled it extended down significantly farther than repression of 
illegal gambling rings in rural villages or congregation houses.  Even the right to 
gamble matches at a fair was tightly controlled and there was no guarantee that an 
individual, even one with a clean criminal record, would be allowed to pursue such a 
                                                 
575 Letter from the Central Police Commissioner, 14 June 1907, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/211. 
576 Letter from the Central Police Commissioner, 17 August 1907, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH IA.6/211. 
577 Letter from the Central Police Commissioner, 12 September 1907, TTLTQG2, GOUCOCH 
IA.6/211.  
267 
career.  Secondly, the portraits painted of these men are instructive in their detail.  
They reveal a highly mobile society, where residence could shift from place to place 
within Cochinchina, or even from Cochinchina to Cambodia and back again, without 
causing a ripple of notice.  The same porousness seems to have applied to the Chinese 
border, as two of the three men discussed above returned to their native places at will, 
Hua Tuoc because difficult times befell him, and Cao Dương for reasons unknown.  
Nevertheless, the fact that Chinese who clearly did not fit the mold of wealthy 
Congregationalists, but were nevertheless members in good standing of Indochinese 
Chinese congregations, could venture between Indochina and China is worthy of 
remark.  
Conclusion 
Yen Ching-hwang attributes the Chinese gambling problem in Singapore and 
Malaya to simple addiction, the lack of strict social pressure or “adult” supervision to 
curb the wilder instincts of young Chinese men, and the promise of a quick return in 
the face of the grinding poverty of daily life.
578  All of these are interesting and 
insightful sociological theories, but they fail to adequately explain a phenomenon 
prevalent in the Sûreté records from Indochina.  In the raids on illegal gambling 
establishments in Cochinchina, all of those arrested were men, nearly all of those 
arrested were in their twenties or early thirties, and the vast majority hailed from a 
specific sub-ethnic region.  In fact, one could even go so far as to say that nearly all of 
them belonged to the same clan or kinship organization, as the raids usually occurred 
on congregation property and the congregation leaders, who inevitably claimed no 
knowledge of the clandestine crime ring flourishing under their noses, were held 
responsible for the activity by the French authorities.   
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I would like to put forth a different explanation than the one proffered by Yen 
Ching-hwang.  I believe that these Maisons des Jeux, like the cercles from which they 
so often degenerated, served as de facto social clubs for men, especially young men, of 
the Gong class, who by virtue of their lowly status had severely restricted access to the 
less deleterious clubs and pastimes frequented by their more well-to-do “kin.”  In this 
sense, from an institutional perspective, illegal gambling rings are an extension of the 
kinship-based clubs and societies.  The illegality of their activities vis-à-vis the 
colonial administration makes them clandestine and the social class of the Chinese 
participants makes them more or less anathema to “respectable” members of the 
overseas Chinese community.  Additionally, if wealthy Chinese wanted to gamble, 
they had access to the horse races or other gentlemen’s games that were more 
acceptable to the French and therefore not considered criminal. 
Referring to his field work in the early 1960’s, anthropologist and Cambodia 
scholar William Willmott makes the point that “ the crucial factor in inhibiting the 
elaboration of an associational structure for the [Chinese] community in Phnom-Penh 
was the presence of a system of indirect rule that was more or less unique to French 
Indochina…The removal of that system allowed an associational structure to develop 
that is consistent with that of overseas Chinese communities elsewhere.”
579  If one 
applies this particular observation to the historical situation of Indochina’s overseas 
Chinese in general, it lends further credence to the notion that cercles, in the earlier 
years of French colonial rule, represented a legitimate attempt, how ever unsuccessful, 
to replicate more natural segmentations within urban Chinese communities.  In that 
context, the very existence of these organizations suggests active, if clandestine, 
resistance to French authority and law. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Indochina, the overseas Chinese narrative is a story of ascendancy set upon 
a backdrop of decline.  In the twilight of empire, while China herself descended into 
chaos and disorder, overseas Chinese consolidated their economic and political power 
on the periphery, offering succor during disaster to their brothers in need and 
involving themselves, for the very first time, in national Chinese politics by 
contributing their material and moral support to efforts to rejuvenate the country by 
ending the Qing hegemony.  Later, as Republican China rose from the ashes of empire 
only to be broken yet again by foreign invasion and civil war, overseas Chinese 
suppressed the competition that had characterized their intercommunity relationships 
for scores of years in order to support a cause that threatened them all, the territorial 
integrity and sovereign rights of the Chinese nation.  In this way, when China herself 
had been brought to her knees, Chinese overseas not only became the vanguard of an 
international effort to mobilize for the defense and relief of her citizens, but they also 
became her public spokespeople, agitating and propagandizing for her support on an 
international stage.  Because of this, it can be argued that while the power and 
splendor of China declined, the overseas Chinese in Indochina and elsewhere 
ascended, in economic power, in political influence, and in cultural significance. 
In the “Introduction” to their study of local Chinese elites, Joseph Esherick and 
Mary Rankin comment that they include merchants among the local elites discussed in 
their book “because of their wealth, often buttressed by resources commonly 
associated with the gentry, such as degrees (purchased or regular), landholding, 
cultural symbols, and community involvements” and because they “relied on some 
resources and strategies akin to those of the late imperial gentry.”
580  In fact, the notion 
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of merchants as elite nicely parallels the realities of Indochina’s congregations.  In 
other words, it suggests that Indochina’s overseas Chinese reverted from the China-
based segmented community of elites first suggested by Keith Schoppa and assumed a 
pattern of dominance within local Chinese communities that was reminiscent more of 
China’s distant past, the mythology of which implied entrenched official hegemony. 
As the local Chinese gentry of the Nanyang, wealthy merchants received 
traditional perquisites of exalted status, but also found themselves saddled by 
traditionally elite obligations, including mutual aid, community education, and defense 
against the hegemonic colonial bureaucracy.  This situation put Chinese elite in 
Indochina in an ironic and conflicting position.  On the one hand, the dominant French 
colonial state reinforced the supremacy of the Chinese merchant class, in much the 
same ways as China’s imperial state had reinforced the power of local non-mercantile 
elites in China.  This reinforcement achieved its most concrete form in the office of 
congregation president; however, even this physical manifestation of state authority 
seems to have been undermined by local overseas Chinese, who often picked as their 
presidents puppet-leaders, rich enough to satisfy colonial demands but not really 
occupying the top rung of the congregational hierarchy. 
Additionally, this idea of colonial reinforcement is in no way intended to imply 
the absence of competition.  Wealthy Chinese merchants and the French colonial state 
found themselves engaged in a brutal competition for dominance over Indochina’s 
Chinese.  Local authorities – in this case, the overseas Chinese – often challenged state 
hegemony and control to further their pursuit not only of profit, but also of community 
autonomy.  This constant challenge forced the state to defend itself, especially in times 
of political unrest or financial strain, from the attempts made by overseas Chinese 
leaders to increase their own strength, and that of their community, at the expense of 
state power and control.  
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In the case of Southeast Asia’s overseas Chinese and their institutional 
autonomy, their greatest vulnerability can be found in the question of whether or not 
this openly migratory and sojourning community could reasonably constitute an urban 
community.  Indochina’s overseas Chinese considered themselves to be Chinese in 
relation to the indigenous and colonial denizens surrounding them, but they also 
embraced Indochinese identities – as Tonkinese, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, or 
Laotian – when dealing with other Chinese, even of the same native place, dwelling 
elsewhere in Asia.  In Indochina, this locational identity is best evidenced in the 
concrete hierarchy distinguishing congregations, even of the same native place, from 
one another.  The strata of power implicit in the greater authority wielded by a 
congregation in Cholon vis-à-vis its counterpart in the rural hinterland, or even in a 
larger urban center such as Phnom Penh, suggest that locational identity and 
particularistic identity were separate and powerful forces in the lives of Indochina’s 
overseas Chinese.  
Additionally, the economic realities of overseas Chinese life ensured that a 
large percentage of Chinese migrants were destined for permanent residency in 
Indochina.  Poverty, disease, and sheer bad fortune fated most overseas Chinese for a 
lifetime in Indochina, ensuring the continued existence in the colonies of Chinese with 
a vested interest in the quality of their South Seas life.  The diversity of the apparati of 
congregational mutual aid further underscores the awareness that a large percentage of 
Indochina’s overseas Chinese would remain permanently in the colony.  From 
hospitals to systems designed to insure the repatriation of earthly remains, 
congregations increased the scope and number of the services they provided to 
resident Chinese, indicating the certainty that Indochina’s overseas Chinese 
community was a permanent fixture of the colonial landscape.  
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The idea that the frequent, and frequently violent, confrontations and feuds 
between various factions of the overseas Chinese community, most notably between 
sub-ethnic place organizations, contraindicated any type of intercommunity unity or 
identity also deserves closer investigation.  This assertion might bear some merit in the 
late 19
th century, but by the Republican period, the political situation of the overseas 
Chinese had changed.  During the years of China’s national humiliations, such 
intercommunity rivalries seem largely to have been placed on the back burner.  In 
other words, when issues of critical national importance took the stage, the ongoing 
family squabbles of Indochina’s overseas Chinese faded into insignificance against the 
backdrop of national solidarity and support exhibited by the overseas Chinese at large.  
In fact, a number of intercommunity organizations in Cholon provided evidence of this 
Chinese unity.  While Indochina hosted the requisite Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
it had pan-Chinese schools, mutual aid associations, and political organizations as 
well.  
Confoundingly, according to Habermas’s model, a citizen gains access to the 
public sphere only after his stature as a “private” citizen negates his need for 
association with the “public” state.  If association with state authorities negates one’s 
“private-ness,” then, by definition, a majority of prominent overseas Chinese were 
members of the “public.”  This is, in fact, one of the main points of disagreement 
expressed by Frederic Wakeman when addressing Rowe’s works on Hankou.
581  But I 
believe that a more accurate point of distinction is available to us, even within 
Habermas’s own writings, that is, the idea of the liberal public sphere.  In the liberal 
model of the public sphere described by Habermas, public power and private 
autonomy stand as competing social bulwarks, but “between the two spheres, as it 
were, stands the domain of private persons who have come together to form a public 
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and who, as citizens of the state, mediate the state with the needs of bourgeois society, 
in order, as the idea goes, to thus convert political authority to ‘rational’ authority in 
the medium of this public sphere.”
582  Could overseas Chinese in Indochina have 
occupied this role as mediators between public and private, even if they were only 
secondarily “citizens of the state”? 
Definitive answers cannot be stated on the basis of findings in this dissertation, 
but tentative answers can be given.  The recurring issue seems to concern the degree 
of co-optation of Indochina’s overseas Chinese communities by different groups and 
in different ways.  The Chinese of Indochina were particularly susceptible to co-
optation, beginning with the French colonial state whose regulations governed their 
lives and institutions, but more significantly, Indochina’s overseas Chinese were co-
opted repeatedly throughout the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries by the Imperial and 
Republican Chinese states.  This co-optation took many forms, including commissions 
in the Imperial bureaucracy, roles as mediators between China’s reformists and 
revolutionaries and the financial wherewithal of the larger overseas Chinese 
community, and as political propagandists, agitating for change and reform in their 
native nation, irrespective of their places of residence. 
Philanthropy provides another window into the mediating role played by 
overseas Chinese in Indochina, but this issue is not without controversy as well.   
Philanthropic activities stood as a cornerstone of Chinese elite responsibility and had, 
seemingly, since time immemorial.  This precedent of service to kith and kin, and 
support of the downtrodden, was so deeply ingrained in the Confucian ethic that it 
poses a significant problem for historians hoping to use philanthropy as a measure of 
shared urban community or, especially, of modernity.  However, even though 
philanthropic pursuits were part and parcel of local elite responsibility in Ming and 
                                                 
582 Habermas, “The Public Sphere,” 401-2.  
274 
early Qing period China, changing social values could easily have affected the reasons 
for pursuing such activities without changing the activities themselves.  In other 
words, self/private interest and public/state interest absolutely can coincide without 
real contradiction.  For example, all overseas Chinese, irrespective of congregational 
affiliation, stood to gain by having well-trained and responsive firefighting units, 
decent and responsible schools, access to skilled doctors in community hospitals, or 
even through required participation in public works, such as construction, canal 
maintenance, or road improvements.  Likewise, mandatory financial contributions to 
local defense and public safety also benefited both the state and the private spheres. 
As for the co-optation of local Chinese by French, in other words, “state,” 
officials, commission into a colonial position provided a corresponding increase in the 
authority and influence available to a specific Chinese community.  Essentially, it 
strengthened private autonomy by allowing it access to the public sphere.  Why?   
Because, generally speaking, among overseas Chinese, money and prominence were 
the measure of the game, the marker of the success of both the individual and the 
community.  Access even to a few of the rights and privileges bestowed by the 
colonial government translated into a very real benefit to the power and influence of 
private autonomy, as it was represented by the overseas Chinese.  The lives of some of 
the Chinese elite discussed in this dissertation provide ample support of this fact.   
Among many examples of this phenomenon, Ly Dang’s involvement in Cholon’s 
municipal affairs provided him with a political safety that he exploited for personal 
economic gain, but for the benefit of Chinese in Indochina and Imperial and 
Republican China as well.  Likewise, Ignace Bou’s ability to use his status as 
congregation president to manipulate the French colonial system to the advantage of 
his congregation shows the benefits of collusion with the French.  
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Another issue that threatens the applicability of Habermas’s model to the 
Indochinese case concerns the notion of media as the marker of public sphere:  If, as 
Habermas asserts, “newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are the media of 
the public sphere,”
583 then what does that mean for the overseas Chinese, whose every 
written exchange was monitored by French authorities and whose publications existed 
under the dark and unforgiving cloud of French censorship?  In response to this idea, I 
would like to contrast the realities of mass organization among Cochinchina’s Chinese 
in particular.  In the face of overt French discouragement, Cholon’s Chinese still 
managed to achieve widespread participation in boycotts of Japanese and American 
products, in public protests of Japan’s violations of China’s sovereignty, and in 
commemoration of Chinese milestones, such as the death of Sun Yat-sen.  The degree 
of participation in these events suggests that Cochinchina’s Chinese were able to attain 
some degree of community solidarity and organization, and were also able to transmit 
their intentions throughout the community, without full recourse to the free mass 
media that Habermas claims is essential to a public sphere.  In this context, with 
intercommunity organization and collective action freely available to the overseas 
Chinese community, we should consider adjusting our definition of mass media to 
include more traditional outlets, such as public theatre, teahouses, pleasure venues, or 
even the physical structure of the huiguan themselves, buildings to which all of 
Indochina’s overseas Chinese were tied by colonial law, but also spaces where the 
most secret and important functions of each native place community found safe haven. 
By concentrating on the points where Chinese, Vietnamese, and French 
interests intersected, I hope to have shown how they each cooperated and came into 
conflict with one another.  Even while the French held official authority in the 
colonies of Indochina, Chinese transnational networks exercised unofficial control 
                                                 
583 Habermas, “The Public Sphere,” 398.  
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over decision-making, not only in commerce but also in the wider arenas of politics, 
law, and society as they pertained to local Chinese communities. Implicit in this 
conclusion is the ability of the overseas Chinese in Indochina to manipulate the French 
system to their own advantage in the colonies.  Likewise, Indochina’s Chinese were 
able to use the French for assistance and protection from problems in China when 
necessary, and to use the government in France to affect matters on the ground in 
Indochina.  All of these factors represent the internationalization of Indochina’s 
Chinese, a phenomenon that allowed the Chinese to be successful in the colonial 
milieu while still maintaining their influence in their native territories. 
 
Figure 22 Chinese Huiguan, Cholon
584 
                                                 
584 Taken by the author, 2002.  
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